New Jersey Institute of Technology

Digital Commons @ NJIT
Dissertations

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

8-31-2020

Crowdsourcing atop blockchains
Yuan Lu
New Jersey Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Lu, Yuan, "Crowdsourcing atop blockchains" (2020). Dissertations. 1482.
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations/1482

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Digital
Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ NJIT. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@njit.edu.

Copyright Warning & Restrictions
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other
reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and
archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other
reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the
photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.”
If a, user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use” that user
may be liable for copyright infringement,
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order
would involve violation of copyright law.
Please Note: The author retains the copyright while the
New Jersey Institute of Technology reserves the right to
distribute this thesis or dissertation
Printing note: If you do not wish to print this page, then select
“Pages from: first page # to: last page #” on the print dialog screen

The Van Houten library has removed some of the
personal information and all signatures from the
approval page and biographical sketches of theses
and dissertations in order to protect the identity of
NJIT graduates and faculty.

ABSTRACT
CROWDSOURCING ATOP BLOCKCHAINS
by
Yuan Lu
Traditional crowdsourcing systems, such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk),
though once acquiring great economic successes, have to fully rely on third-party
platforms to serve between the requesters and the workers for basic utilities. These
third-parties have to be fully trusted to assist payments, resolve disputes, protect
data privacy, manage user authentications, maintain service online, etc. Nevertheless,
tremendous real-world incidents indicate how elusive it is to completely trust these
platforms in reality, and the reduction of such over-reliance becomes desirable.
In contrast to the arguably vulnerable centralized approaches, a public blockchain
is a distributed and transparent global “consensus computer” that is highly robust.
The blockchain is usually managed and replicated by a large-scale peer-to-peer
network collectively, thus being much more robust to be fully trusted for correctness
and availability.

It, therefore, becomes enticing to build novel crowdsourcing

applications atop blockchains to reduce the over-trust on third-party platforms.
However, this new fascinating technology also brings about new challenges,
which were never that severe in the conventional centralized setting. The most serious
issue is that the blockchain is usually maintained in the public Internet environment
with a broader attack surface open to anyone. This not only causes serious privacy
and security issues, but also allows the adversaries to exploit the attack surface to
hamper more basic utilities. Worse still, most existing blockchains support only light
on-chain computations, and the “smart contract” executed atop the decentralized
“consensus computer” must be simple, which incurs serious feasibility problems. In
reality, the privacy/security issue and the feasibility problem even restrain each other
and create serious tensions to hinder the broader adoption of blockchain.

The dissertation goes through the non-trivial challenges to realize secure yet
still practical decentralization (for urgent crowdsourcing use-cases), and lay down the
foundation for this line of research. In sum, it makes the next major contributions.
First, it identifies the needed security requirements in decentralized knowledge
crowdsourcing (e.g., data privacy), and initiates the research of private decentralized
crowdsourcing. In particular, the confidentiality of solicited data is indispensable to
prevent free-riders from “pirating” the others’ submissions, thus ensuring the quality
of solicited knowledge. To this end, a generic private decentralized crowdsourcing
framework is dedicatedly designed, analyzed, and implemented.
Furthermore, this dissertation leverages concretely efficient cryptographic design
to reduce the cost of the above generic framework. It focuses on decentralizing
the special use-case of Amazon MTurk, and conducts multiple specific-purpose
optimizations to remove needless generality to squeeze performance. The implementation atop Ethereum demonstrates a handling cost even lower than MTurk.
In addition, it focuses on decentralized crowdsourcing of computing power for
specific machine learning tasks. It lets a requester to place deposits in the blockchain
to recruit some workers for a designated (randomized) programs. If and only if these
workers contribute their resources to compute correctly, they would earn well-deserved
payments. For these goals, a simple yet still useful incentive mechanism is developed
atop the blockchain to deter rational workers from cheating.
Finally, the research initiates the first systematic study on crowdsourcing
blockchains’ full nodes to assist superlight clients (e.g., mobile phones and IoT
devices) to “read” the blockchain’s records. This dissertation presents a novel generic
solution through the powerful lens of game-theoretic treatments, which solves the
long-standing open problem of designing generic superlight clients for all blockchains.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Traditional Crowdsourcing: Over-Reliance on Platforms

Recently, the paradigm of crowdsourcing empowers open collaboration on problem
solving and truth finding over the Internet. One remarkable example is the solicitation
of annotated data to create machine learning benchmark: the famous ImageNet
challenge [41] was created via Amazon’s crowdsourcing marketplace, Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) [5]. Another notable example is mobile crowdsensing [56] to help
citizens’ daily life: one (called “requester”) can request a group of individuals (called
“workers”) to use mobile devices to gather information fostering data-driven mobile
applications [148, 43]. Recently, the great commercial successes of Uber [145] and
Airbnb [2] also indicate the crowdsourcing of physical resources/services as another
promising aspect.
The most critical challenge of crowdsourcing is to incentivize workers to
contribute knowledge/services on solving the tasks.

For the purpose, various

monetary incentive mechanisms were introduced [151, 159, 160, 154, 120, 133, 75] to
motivate real efforts. To effectively facilitate these mechanisms, the state-of-the-art
solution necessarily requires a trusted third-party (e.g., MTurk, Uber, etc.) to host
the crowdsourcing tasks through their whole life-cycle, such that these platforms can
fulfill the fair exchange between the crowd-shared data/services and the rewards;
otherwise, the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms can be hindered by the so-called
“free-riding” (i.e., dishonest workers reap rewards without making real efforts) and
“false-reporting” (i.e., dishonest requesters try to repudiate the payment).
It is well-known that the reduction of the over-reliance on a trusted third-party
is desirable in practice, and the same goes for the case of crowdsourcing. First,

1

numerous real-world incidents reveal that the party might silently misbehave in-house
for self-interests [112]; or, some of its employees [149] or attackers [78] can compromise
its functionality. Second, the party often fails to resolve disputes. For instance,
requesters have a good chance to collect data without paying at MTurk, because the
platform is biased on requesters over workers [103]. Third, a centralized platform
inevitably inherits all the vulnerabilities of the single point failure. For example,
Waze, a crowdsourcing map app, suffered from 3 unexpected server downs and 11
scheduled service outages during 2010-2013 [148]. Worse still, a central platform
hosting all tasks also increases the worry of massive privacy breach. A most fresh
lesson to us is the tremendous data leakage of Uber [105].
Noticeably, the trivial idea of directly enhancing the robustness/security of
centralized platforms might not work well in practice. One reason is the potential
huge cost of in-house robustness/security upgrade. For example, Alibaba has to
deploy millions of servers to maintain a robust service during the course of its Singles’
Day on-line sale to handle the burst of tremendous transactions; unfortunately, most
of these servers will be idling in the daily operations after the shopping day ends,
causing significant operational overhead in the centralized system [3]. Let alone, it
could be the case that a certain centralized platform would not be trusted due to
non-technical reasons.

1.2

Blockchain: High Robustness from Less Assumptions

In contrast to the arguably vulnerable central platforms, the blockchain, in particular,
the public/open/permissionless blockchain, is a highly distributed, transparent and
immutable global “bulletin board” replicated across the whole Internet as a chain
of blocks.

The chain is usually maintained by a large-scale peer-to-peer (P2P)

network collectively. Each block in the chain will include some messages committed
by network peers, and be validated by the whole P2P network according to a
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pre-defined consensus protocol.

This ensures reliable message deliveries via the

untrusted Internet. More interestingly, the messages contained in each block can
be program code, the execution of which is enforced and verified by all P2P network
peers; hence, a more exotic application called smart contract [138] is enabled on top
of the blockchain. All these benefits are achieved without assuming the existence of
any fully trusted third-party platform, and only require a very lightweight assumption
that a portion of Internet users (e.g., more than half) are honest instead.
Essentially, the smart contract can be abstracted as a decentralized global
“consensus computer” that faithfully handles all computations and message deliveries
related to a specified task (except the adversary can choose the order of messaging).
It becomes enticing to build a decentralized crowdsourcing platform atop it for
higher robustness to reduce the over-reliance on the fragile assumption of the trusted
third-party platform. Such a robust decentralized system might enjoy high availability
and correctness, where the availability means that the crowdsourcing service is always
readily on-line to serve the users and the correctness indicates that the service always
executes correctly for pre-defined functionalities (such as trustfully enforcing the
critical incentive mechanisms to motivate the participation of highly-skilled workers).

1.3

Challenges: Non-Triviality due to Limits of Blockchain

Unfortunately, the new fascinating technology of blockchain also brings about new
challenges, due to its inherent restrictions.
The first inherent limitation of blockchain is the serious privacy challenge
[76, 85, 82], which was never that severe in the centralized setting before, as one
notable feature of the blockchain is its transparency. The whole chain is replicated
by a permissionless network to ensure consistency, thus the data submitted to the
blockchain will be visible to the public, which causes the leakage of authentication
messages and crowdsourced data immediately. While in the centralized setting, users’
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authentication history and the important data are protected by data centers (such as
the breached one of Uber’s).
Another fundamental issue of the blockchain (more particularly, smart contract)
is that the smart contract cannot support complex computations. The reason lies in
the fact that: during the blockchain mining procedure (the new block generation),
when some output of a smart contract is expected to be recorded (that might
also affect the validity of future blocks), honest miners are required to execute the
program in order to validate the correctness of the outcome. If such a program is
computationally intensive, crafty adversarial nodes may simply skip such verification
step (or ignore putting the output at all), and go ahead to propose new blocks.
Doing this gives the adversarial nodes substantial advantage of winning the chance
for proposing new blocks, as honest nodes would not be able to propose any block
until the execution of the smart contract finishes. Such an undesirable feature was
known as verifier’s dilemma [102].
Besides the previous issues, the smart contract can only validate the internal
states of blockchain, but cannot verify the events happening in the “real world”
instead of the “blockchain world” [158]. Such a critical issue can be translated as that
the blockchain is only trusted to faithfully compute, but is not trusted to rule out
fake “real-world” inputs, which unavoidably prevents the applicability of blockchains
in various interesting use-cases. For example, the blockchain cannot know whether a
particular computer is sending a valid message to another user, if the communication
is off the blockchain. That said, the crowdsourcing of physical resources is still nontrivial, even if one has the magic smart contract technology at hand.
After all, one more challenge of implementing decentralized applications is
that mobile devices and browser environments cannot afford the cost of executing
consensus, which makes them have to rely on a blockchain node to relay the
transactions recorded by the blockchain [96, 80]. In many practical use-cases, there
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is no such a trusted relay node, and DApp users have to suffer from the risk of being
cheated by third-party relays.
That said, the decentralized crowdsourcing, though it is highly appealing, still
suffers from the inherent restrictions of blockchain such as privacy leakage, transaction
re-ordering, fake real-world input, etc. As a consequence, meaningful decentralization
of crowdsourcing is highly non-trivial. In particular, prior to this study, most existing
attempts in the sector of decentralized crowdsourcing [21, 139, 92, 111] are arguably
problematic, since they do not incorporate proper designs against the vulnerabilities
of blockchain, thus rendering the failure of basic utilities when these publicly-known
weaknesses are exploited by any malicious nodes from the Internet.

1.4

Main Results and Dissertation Structure

It remains a challenging open problem to attain meaningfully decentralized crowdsourcing systems (which can not only achieve guaranteed utilities but also realize
real-world practicality). This dissertation thoroughly studies how to overcome these
urgent challenges, and finally achieves provably secure yet still highly feasible decentralized systems for crowdsourcing various resources. The remaining of dissertation
is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces relevant preliminaries, including a few standard cryptographic building blocks, such as blockchain’s public ledger model, the definitions of
encryption, digital signature, zero-knowledge proofs, cryptographic commitments. In
addition, it introduces the needed game-theoretic notions that can be used to argue
security in cryptographic protocols among rational participants.
Chapter 3 focuses on the crowdsourcing of human knowledge, where serious
data leakage and identity breach can be caused by the transparency of blockchain.
The basic utilities of the crowdsourcing system for human knowledge will be
further harmed, as these crowdsourcing tasks can be private, valuable, and personal
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information sensitive.

To mitigate this intrinsic issue of blockchain, a private

and anonymous crowdsourcing framework called ZebraLancer is presented [98] for
generic scenarios of soliciting human knowledge. Advanced cryptographic primitives
are employed/invented to resolve data leakage and identity breach problems, more
interestingly, fair exchange and user accountability are not sacrificed.
Chapter 4 presents a follow-up study to improve the arguably cumbersome
ZebraLancer regarding efficiency. In particular, a concretely efficient system called
Dragoon is designed. Dragoon is not only provable secure to protect the privacy of
data that are submitted via the transparent blockchain, but also is highly efficiently,
because various non-trivial efficiency-driven optimizations are performed to remove
the needless generality to squeeze the most performance via concrete implementations.
Chapter 5 discusses the crowdsourcing of computing resources for running
machine learning programs.

Since the “global computer” instantiated by the

blockchain can only support very simple and deterministic computations, and thus
cannot perform complex and randomized computations such as machine learning
analysis. To solve the issue, a novel and simple incentive game is designed to outsource
the computing of machine learning tasks. Through this incentive game, a class of
machine learning tasks can be executed off-chain by a few workers, and the correct
execution results will be reported by the workers to the blockchain for rationality.
Chapter 6 initiates the first systematic study on the long-existing open problem
of generic superlight client of permissionless blockchains. The proposed protocol
allows the light client to recruit some full nodes in the blockchain network, and
instantiates an incentive game between the low-capable client and the blockchains’
full nodes via dedicatedly designed smart contract. The desired Nash equilibrium
of the incentive game would ensure the full nodes to correctly forward blockchain’s
records to the resource-starved end-user.
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Chapter 7 briefly summarizes a few relevant preliminary results that are worth
to be further explored to extend the scope of the thesis.
Finally, in Chapter 8, the dissertation ends up with a few detailed discussions to
summarize the earlier mentioned results, check out the fundamentally methodological
inspirations, and point out a few promising follow-up directions.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES

2.1

Notations and Abbreviations

Here are some notations and abbreviations that we use through the dissertation:
• Negligible function. By negligible function negl(·), it denotes a function (in
some security parameter λ) for any positive polynomial function poly(·), there
1
exists an integer N , such that for all λ > N , |negl(λ)| < poly(λ)
.
• Negligible probability and overwhelming probability. If the probability of an event
is a negligible function (in λ), it is said that the event happens with negligible
probability; If the probability of an event is 1 except with negligible probability,
the event is said with overwhelming probability.
• String concatenation. By x||y it denotes a string concatenating strings x and y.
$

• Uniformly sampling. By x ← {0, 1}λ , it denotes to uniformly sample a string x
from the set of all λ-bit strings.
• Abbreviations. Through the paper, TM means Turing machine, ITM represents
interactive Turing machine, and P.P.T. is short for probabilistic polynomialtime. For rigorous definitions about TM, ITM, P.P.T. TM, and P.P.T. ITM,
see [134] for details.

2.2
2.2.1

Cryptographic Abstraction of Blockchain

Ideal Global Ledger Model

The (permissionless) blockchain instantiates a so-called public ledger or global ledger,
which is essentially an ever-growing linearized transaction log collectively maintained
by a network of untrusted Internet nodes. An honest node in such a network, also
known as an honest full node, keeps a blockchain replica consistent with that of
all other honest ones, through following a set of pre-defined rules called consensus
protocol.
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In general, we can view a blockchain network as an ideal public ledger that
possesses two critical properties: persistence and liveness:
• Persistence can enforce the convergence of the local replicas of all honest nodes,
i.e., if a transaction appears in the local replica of an honest node, it will
eventually be at the same position in the replica of every other honest node,
when the underlying network delay is finite.
• Liveness enables that anyone can announce valid transactions to the blockchain
network. More importantly, one can expect the transactions to be eventually
written into the local replicas of all the honest nodes, if the underlying network
can eventually delivers the transactions.
These two properties ensure that: (i) A full node, who joins and executes the
consensus protocol, can “read” the blockchain ledger from its local replica and also
“write” any valid transaction into the chain by broadcasting. (ii) Any node, who
may not participate in the consensus protocol, is able to “write” valid transactions
into the blockchain. In practice, the writing can be realized by gossiping with some
honest full nodes to “broadcast” the transactions.

2.2.2

Smart Contracts as Ideal Functionalities

Shortly after the emergence of blockchain, it was realized this fantastic technology can
achieve much more beyond a bookkeeping ledger, as the transactions can also contain
versatile program codes (e.g., Turing-complete scripts) in addition to monetary
transfer records. In particular, the blockchain could be treated as a “bulletin board”,
where a piece of script along with all needed inputs can be posted. Furthermore,
when the execution environment of the script is shared across the whole network
through the underlying consensus rules, the same executing results of these codes can
be enforced and verified by the blockchain network collectively. More interestingly,
the piece of code posted on the blockchain (a.k.a., smart contract) can even hold some
deposits (in the form of cryptocurrency) and finally pay out the deposits according
to certain execution results, making self-executing conditional payment possible.
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The blockchain, therefore, instantiates a transparent global “consensus computer”
that can be employed by any node to faithfully handle with conditional money
transfers, Turing-complete computations and message deliveries related to a prespecified task. The only exception is that the blockchain cannot “send” messages
to a node who does not join the consensus, e.g., a lightweight node. More specifically,
the smart contract can be abstracted as an ideal functionality acting with Internet
users to assist the following tasks [85, 82]:
• Global clock. There is an explicit global clock that would proceed in rounds.
The rationale behind the abstraction is that the blockchain’s liveness ensures it
to grow block by block.
• Reliable delivery of messages. All messages sent to smart contract will be
delivered to all parties by the start of next clock. This is because a message sent
to the blockchain is in the form of a validly signed transaction broadcasted to the
whole blockchain network, and then it will be solicited by a block and written
into the blockchain [57] in polynomial time (under synchrony assumption).
• Correct computation. Smart contract can be seen as a state machine driven
by messages sent to it [23]. By the increment of each block, the states of
smart contract are changed according to the messages sent in the past clock
period. The transitions of states (i.e., computations) are always correct, as
being collectively validated by the while blockchain network.
• Transparency. All internal states and message deliveries will be visible to
everyone in the whole blockchain network (intuitively, anyone).
• Pseudonym (blockchain address). By default, the sender of a message in the
blockchain is referred to a pseudonym, a.k.a., blockchain address. In practice,
a blockchain address is usually bounded to the hash of a public key of a digital
signature scheme. Also, any smart contract deployed in the blockchain can
also be referred by a unique address, such that one can call the contract to be
executed, by committing a transaction pointing to this unique address.

2.3
2.3.1

Other Relevant Cryptographic Primitives

Public Key Encryption

A public key encryption scheme has a tuple of three algorithms (PKE.KGen, Enc, Dec).
PKE.KGen(λ) → (sk, pk) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter
10

λ as input and returns a public key pk and a secret key sk as output. Encpk (m) → c
is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a message m and the public key pk as input
and returns a ciphertext c as output. Decsk (c) → m is a deterministic algorithm that
takes the ciphertext c and the secret key sk as input and returns the message m as
output. Through the dissertation, the public key encryption scheme is required to
satisfy the following correctness and security properties:
• Correctness. For any message m, the probability Pr[Encsk (c) ≡ m | (sk, pk) ←
PKE.KGen(λ) ∧ c ← Encpk (m)] = 1, which is taken over the random coins of
all probabilistic algorithms.
• IND-CPA security. The encryption scheme must achieve the security of indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), which is equivalent
to semantic security and essentially captures that only negligible information
about the message can be feasibly extracted from the ciphertext [77].

2.3.2

Cryptographic Hash Function

A cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ is a function from the domain of
arbitrary bit string to the domain of λ-bit strings, where λ is the security parameter.
Usually, for a cryptographic hash function with security parameter λ, any polynomial
time algorithms: (i) cannot find two strings m and m0 (m 6= m0 ) such that H(m) =
H(m0 ) except with negligible probability in λ, which is known as the property of
collision resistance; (ii) given y, cannot find x, such that H(x) = y, with all but
negligible probability in λ, which is known as the property of preimage resistance.
In addition to the preimage resistance and collision resistance, this dissertation
sometimes considers a stronger model of cryptographic hash function, namely, the
random oracle model which is also global and programmable (by the adversary) due
to standard cryptographic practices [25].
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2.3.3

Cryptographic Commitment

The cryptographic notion of a commitment scheme realizes a digital “locked box”, so
the committed content can be hidden, and later be uniquely opened. A commitment
scheme is a tuple of two algorithms, one of which is the commit algorithm and the
other one of which is the open algorithm.
The commit and open algorithms can be denoted by c ← Commit(m, K) and
0/1 ← Open(c, m0 , K), respectively. Note that be K it denotes a blinding key.
The security requirements for the commitment scheme can be defined as:
• Hiding, that means the receiver seeing the commitment c learns nothing about
the committed message m.
• Binding, that means the sender cannot cheat the receiver to accept (i.e., output
1) if revealing m0 different from the previously committed message m.
Both of the above two properties shall hold will all but except negligible probably
(in the security parameter λ). In addition, the commitment notion always satisfies
the basic correctness requirement, which means if the Open algorithm would always
output 1 to accept, if it takes as input the commitment c, and the correct blinding
key K and the correct message m.

2.3.4

Zero-Knowledge Proof

A zero-knowledge proof protocol (zk-proof) is a two-party protocol between a prover
and a verifier. It allows the prover to generate a cryptographic proof convincing
the verifier that the truthness of a certain statement (x, w) ∈ L, where x is some
public input, w is some private input of the prover (i.e., witness), and L is a specific
language. Moreover, the protocol scripts (including the proof) shall not reveal any
information except that the statement is true (i.e., (x, w) ∈ L) to the verifier.
In greater detail, zk-proof shall satisfy the following security guarantees with
an overwhelming probability:
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• Soundness, that no prover can produce a proof to convince a verifier that ∃w s.t.
(x, w) ∈ L, if @w s.t. (x, w) ∈ L; sometimes, we require a stronger soundness
that for any prover, there exists an extractor algorithm which interacts with
the prover and can actually output the witness w (a.k.a., proof-of-knowledge).
• Zero-knowledge, that the proof distribution can be simulated by a P.P.T.
simulator without seeing any secret state, i.e., it leaks only negligible information about the witness w.
The zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (namely,
zk-SNARK) is a generic framework of zk-proof for any NP language L, which further
allows such a proof to be generated non-interactively in common-reference string
model. More importantly, the proof is succinct, i.e., the proof size is independent
on the complexity of the statement to be proved, and is always a small constant.
More precisely, zk-SNARK is a tuple of three algorithms. A setup algorithm can
output the public parameters (i.e., common-reference string) to establish a SNARK
for a NP-complete language L = {x | ∃w, s.t., C(x, w) = 1}, where C(·, ·) = 1 can be
any NP relationship. The Prover algorithm can leverage the established zk-SNARK
to generate a constant-size proof attesting the trueness of a statement x ∈ L with
witness w. The Verifier algorithm can efficiently check the validity of the proof.

2.3.5

Verifiable Decryption

Through the dissertation, it considers a specific verifiable public key encryption
(VPKE) consisting of a tuple of algorithms (KGen, Enc, Dec, Prove, Verify) with
concrete verifiability to allow the decryptor to produce the plaintext along with a
proof attesting the correct decryption [28].
In short, KGen can set up a pair of encryption-decryption algorithms (Ench , Deck ),
where h and k are public and private keys respectively. We let any (Ench , Deck ) ←
KGen(1λ ) to be a public key encryption scheme satisfying semantic security. For
presentation simplicity, we also let (Ench , Deck ) denote the public-secret key pair
(h, k). Moreover, for any (h, k) ← KGen(1λ ), the Provek algorithm explicitly inputs
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the private key k and the ciphertext c, and outputs a message m with a proof π; the
Verifyh algorithm explicitly inputs the public key h and (m, c, π), and outputs 1/0 to
accept/reject the statement that m = Deck (c).
Beside, we let VPKE to satisfy the following extra properties (i.e., a specifically
verifiable decryption):
• Completeness. Pr[Verifyh (m, c, π) = 1 | (m, π) ← Provek (c)] = 1, for ∀ c and
(h, k) ← KGen(1λ );
• Soundness. For any (h, k) ← KGen(1λ ) and c, any P.P.T. A cannot produce π
fooling Verifyh to accept that c is decrypted to m0 if m0 6= Deck (c), with except
negligible probability;
• Zero-knowledge. The proof π can be simulated by a P.P.T. simulator SV P KE , on
input only public knowledge m, h and c that indeed satisfy (m, c, h) ∈ LV P KE :=
{~x := (m, c, h) | m = Deck (c) ∧ (h, k) ← KGen(1λ )}, which ensures the protocol
leaks nothing more than the truthness of the statement m = Deck (c).

2.3.6

Simulation-Based Paradigm

To formalize and prove security, a real world and an ideal world can be defined and
compared: (i) in the real world, there is an actual protocol Π among the parties, some
of which can be corrupted by an adversary A; (ii) in the ideal world, an “imaginary”
trusted ideal functionality F replaces the protocol and interacts with honest parties
and a simulator S. We say that Π securely realizes F , if for ∀ P.P.T. adversary A in
the real-world, ∃ a P.P.T. simulator S in the ideal-world, s.t. the two worlds cannot
be distinguished, which means: no P.P.T. distinguisher D can attain non-negligible
advantage to distinguish “the joint distribution over the outputs of honest parties
and the adversary A in the real world” from “the joint distribution over the outputs
of honest parties and the simulator S in the ideal world”. Intuitively, all admissible
ideal-world simulators cannot break any security guarantees, as the ideal-world is
secure by default; then, the indistinguishability of real-world adversaries and ideal-
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world simulators will immediately imply the computational security of real-world
protocol.
Moreover, we consider the static adversary through the dissertation, which
means the adversary can corrupt some parties only before the protocol starts.
Protocols proven secure in the real/ideal paradigm can be composed sequentially,
due to the transitivity of security reductions [65], which is known as sequential
composition theorem [65, 29]. The advantage of simulation-based paradigm is that all
desired behaviors of the protocol can be precisely described by the ideal functionality.
Remarkably, this approach has been widely adopted to analyze decentralized protocols
[85, 82, 17] to capture the subtle adversary in the blockchain.

2.4

Game-Theoretic Security

The security model in cryptographic settings assume that the participating parties
are either completely honest or arbitrarily malicious. In game-theoretic settings, a
party is neither honest nor malicious, but rational, and thus seeks for its best utility.
In this scenario, the “security” can then be defined as the realization of desired Nash
equilibrium or its refinements.

2.4.1

Security in Normal-Form Game

Particularly, a game Γ joined by n players, if described in normal-form, can consist
of: (i) a set of players denoted by W = {W1 , . . . , Wn }; (ii) a space of players’ pure
strategies, denoted by S = S1 × · · · × Sn , in which Si denotes the pure strategies
of player Wi , while a strategy σi of player Wi is chosen from his strategy space
(possibly by a randomized way), and we call ~σ = {σ1 , . . . , σn } as a joint strategy
of the players; (iii) a utility function that defines the utility of each player under
different joint strategies. 5 A Nash equilibrium is a particular joint strategy where no
player can realize better utility by unilaterally changing his strategy. Standard Nash
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equilibrium assumes each player makes decision independently. More generally, we
may also consider collusion among part of the players. Throughout this dissertation,
a particular refinement of Nash equilibrium that can be determined by iterated
elimination of weakly-dominated strategies will be applied, as one always can expect
a player would not play a strategy, if there is a better alternative for that strategy. In
case there exists such a refined equilibrium ~σ in Γ, we call (Γ, ~σ ) a practical mechanism.

2.4.2

Security in Extensive-Form Game

Here are the deferred formal definitions of the finite incomplete-information extensiveform game and the sequential equilibrium.
Definition 1. Finite incomplete-information extensive-form game Γ is
defined as a tuple of hN, H, P, fc , (ui )i∈N , (Ii )i∈N i [117]:
• N is a finite set representing the players.
• H is a set of sequences satisfying: (i) ∅ ∈ H; (ii) if h = ha1 , . . . , aK i ∈ H, then
any prefix of h belongs to H. Each member of H is a history sequence. The
elements of a history are called actions. A history sequence h = ha1 , . . . , aK i ∈
H is terminal, iff h is not a prefix of any other histories in H. .
• Let Z denote the set of terminal histories. For any non-terminal history h =
ha1 , . . . , aK i ∈ H \ Z, the set of actions available after h can be defined as
A(h) = {a|ha1 , . . . , aK , ai ∈ H}.
• P : H \ Z → N ∪ {chance} is the player function to assign a player (or chance)
to move at a non-terminal history h. Particularly when P (h) = chance, a
special “player” called chance acts at the history h.
• (ui )i∈N : Z → R|N| is the utility function that defines the utility of the players at
each terminal history (e.g., ui (h) specifies the utility of player i at the terminal
history h).
• fc is a function associating each history h ∈ {h|P (h) = chance} with a
probability measure fc (; h) on A(h), i.e., fc (a; h) determines the probability of
the occurrence of a ∈ A(h) after the history h of the player “ chance”.
• (Ii )i∈N is a set of partitions. Each Ii is a partition for the set {h|P (h) = i}, and
called as the information partition of player i; a member Ii,j of the partition Ii
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is a set of histories, and is said to be an information set of player i. We require
A(h) = A(h0 ) if h and h0 are in the same information set, and then denote the
available actions of player i at an information set Ii,j ∈ Ii as A(Ii,j ).
Note in our context, the strategy of a player is to choose a P.P.T. ITM, whose action
is to produce a string and feed the string to the other P.P.T. ITMs (i.e., other players)
in the cryptographic protocol.
Definition 2. A behavioral strategy (or strategy for short) of player i (denoted
by si ) is a collection of independent probability measures denoted by {βi (Ii,j )}Ii,j ∈Ii ,
where βi (Ii,j ) is a probability measure over A(Ii,j ) (i.e., the available actions of player
i at his information set Ii,j ). We say ~s = (s)i∈N is a behavior strategy profile (or
strategy profile for short), if every si ∈ ~s is a behavior strategy of player i. When ~s =
({βi (Ii,j )}Ii,j ∈Ii )i∈N assigns positive probability to every action, it is called completely
mixed.
Definition 3. An assessment σ in an extensive game is a pair (~s, µ), where ~s is a
behavioral strategy profile and µ is a function that assigns to every information set
a probability measure on the set of histories in the information set (i.e., every). We
say the function µ is a belief system.
Definition 4. The expected utility of a player i determined by the assessment σ =
P
P
(~s, µ) conditioned on Ii,j is ūi (~s, µ|Ii,j ) = h∈Ii,j µ(Ii,j )(h) z∈Z ρ(~s|h)(z)ui (z)
where h = ha1 , . . . , aL i ∈ H \ Z, z = ha1 , . . . , aK i ∈ Z, and ρ(~σ |h)(z) denotes the
distribution over terminal histories induced by the strategy profile ~s conditioned on
the history h being reached (for player P (h) to take an action), i.e.,



0, if h is not a prefix of z
ρ(~s|h)(z) =

QK−1

 k=L
βP (a1 ,...,ak ) (a1 , . . . , ak )(ak+1 ), otherwise
Definition 5. We say an assessment σ = (~σ , µ) is a -sequential equilibrium, if it is
-sequentially rational and consistent:
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• (~s, µ) is -sequentially rational if for every play i ∈ N and his every information
set Ii,j ∈ Ii , the strategy si of player i is a best response to the others’ strategies
~s−i given his belief at Ii,j , i.e., ūi (~s, µ|Ii,j ) +  ≥ ūi ((s∗i , ~s−i ), µ|Ii,j ) for every
strategy s∗i of every player i at every information set Ii,j ∈ Ii . Note that ~s−i
denotes the strategy profile ~s with its i-th element removed, and (s∗ , ~s−i ) denotes
~s with its i-th element replaced by s∗ .
• (~s, µ) is consistent, if ∃ a sequence of assessments ((~sk , µk ))∞
k=1 converges to
k
k
k
(~s, µ), where ~s is completely mixed and µ is derived from ~s by Bayes’ rules.
Remark. The above definition of extensive game (along with the relevant sequential
equilibrium notion) provides a standard way to arguing the security of extensive
protocols in the rational model [71, 45, 118]. Generally speaking, the game-theoretic
analysis of an interactive protocol starts by defining an extensive game to model
the strategies (i.e., probabilistic interactive Turing machines) of each party in the
protocol. A utility function would assign every party a certain payoff, for each possible
execution induced by the strategies of all parties. Then the security is argued by the
properties of the extensive game, for example, its sequential equilibrium [69] or some
other refinements of Nash equilibria [70, 71, 45, 118, 84].
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CHAPTER 3
ON GENERIC PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE SOLICITATION

3.1

Background

Crowdsourcing empowers open collaboration over the Internet.

One remarkable

example is the solicitation of human knowledge, e.g., annotated data.

The

benchmark of famous ImageNet challenge [41] was created via Amazon’s crowdsourcing marketplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk) [5].

One most critical issue in

crowdsourcing is that the crowd might lack interests to contribute qualified data.
Therefore, various monetary incentive mechanisms were introduced [151, 159, 160,
154, 120, 133, 75] to motivate workers to make real efforts.
To facilitate these mechanisms, the state-of-the-art solution necessarily requires
a trusted third-party (e.g., the server of MTurk) to host crowdsourcing tasks to fulfill
the fair exchange between the crowd-shared data and the rewards; otherwise, the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms can be hindered by the so-called “free-riding” (i.e.,
dishonest workers reap rewards without making real efforts) and “false-reporting”
(i.e., dishonest requesters try to repudiate the payment).

3.1.1

Motivation

It is well-known that the reduction of the reliance on a trusted third-party is desirable
in practice, and the same goes for the case of crowdsourcing.
It becomes enticing to decentralize crowdsourcing atop blockchain, as it is a
distributed, transparent and immutable public “bulletin board” organized as a chain
of blocks. The blockchain is usually managed and replicated by a peer-to-peer (P2P)
network collectively. Each block will include some messages committed by network
peers, and be validated by the whole network according to a pre-defined consensus
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protocol. This ensures reliable message deliveries via the untrusted Internet. More
interestingly, the messages contained in each block can be program code, the execution
of which is enforced and verified by all P2P network peers; hence, a more exotic
application of smart contract [138] is enabled. Essentially, the smart contract can
be viewed as a “decentralized computer” that faithfully handles all computations
and message deliveries related to a specified task (except the adversary can choose
the order of messaging). It becomes enticing to build a decentralized crowdsourcing
platform atop.

3.1.2

Challenges

The new blockchain technology also brings about new privacy challenges [76], which
were never that severe in the centralized setting before, as one notable feature of the
blockchain is its transparency. The whole chain is replicated to the whole network to
ensure consistency, thus the data submitted to the blockchain will be visible to the
public. This causes an immediate problem violating data privacy, considering that
many of the crowdsourced data maybe sensitive. For example, even in the intuitively
“safe” image annotation tasks, if there are some special ambiguous pictures (e.g.,
Thematic Apperception Test pictures [113]), the answers to them can be used to
infer the personality profiles of workers. Sometimes, the data are simply valuable to
the requester who paid to get them. What is worse, since the block confirmation
(which corresponds to the time when the submitted answers are actually recorded
in a block) normally takes some time after the data is submitted to the network,
a malicious worker can simply copy the data committed by others, and submit the
same data as his own to run the free-riding attack. Without data confidentiality,
the incentive mechanisms could be rendered completely ineffective in decentralized
settings.
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Furthermore, most crowdsourcing systems [5, 148] and incentive mechanisms
[159, 160, 154] implicitly require requesters/workers to authenticate to prevent
misbehaviors caused by (colluded) counterfeited identities [46]. When crowdsourcing
is decentralized, this basic requirement will cause the history of submitting/requesting
to be known by everyone via the blockchain (that was previously “protected” in a
data center such as the breached one of Uber’s). Thus considerable information about
workers/requesters [155] will leak to the public through their participation history,
which seriously impairs their privacy and even demotivates them to join. Notably, if
a user frequently joins traffic monitoring tasks, then anyone can read the blockchain
and figure out his location traces.
To address the above fundamental privacy challenges of decentralizing crowdsourcing, we have to resolve two natural tensions: (i) the tension between the
blockchain transparency and the data confidentiality, and (ii) the tension between
the anonymity and the accountability. Simple solutions utilizing some standard
cryptographic tools (e.g., encryption and/or group signature) to protect the data
confidentiality and the anonymity do not work well:

the encryption of data

immediately prevents smart contracts from enforcing the rewards policy; to allow
fully anonymous participation will give a dishonest worker an opportunity of multiple
submissions in one crowdsourcing task, and thus he may claim more rewards than
what is supposed (similarly for a malicious requester).

3.2

Prior Art

The insufficiencies of the state-of-the-art solutions are thoroughly reviewed.
Centralized crowdsourcing systems.

MTurk [5] is the most commercially

successful crowdsourcing platform. But it has a well-know vulnerability allowing
false-reporters gain short-term advantage [103]. Also, MTurk collects plaintexts of
answers, which causes considerable worry of data leakage. Last, the pseudo IDs in

21

MTurks can be trivially linked by a malicious requester. Dynamo [128] was designed
as a privacy wrapper of MTurk. Its pseudo ID can only be linked by the pseudo ID
issuer, but still it inherited all other weaknesses of MTurk. SPPEAR [64] considered
a couple of privacy issues in data crowdsourcing, and thus introduced a couple more
authorities, each of which handled a different functionality. Distributing one authority
into multiple reduces the excessive trust, but, unfortunately, it is still not clear how
to instantiate all those different authorities in practice.
Decentralized crowdsourcing. We also note there are several attempts [21, 139,
92, 111] using blockchain to decentralize crowdsourcing, but neither of them considers
privacy and anonymity which are arguably fundamental for basic utility: the authors
of [21] built up a crowd-shared service on top of the blockchain, but the system is
not compatible with incentive mechanisms and is not privacy-preserving either; the
authors of [139] leveraged the blockchain as a payment channel in their crowdsourcing
framework, but it is neither secure against malicious workers and dishonest requesters,
nor privacy-preserving; a couple of recent attempts [92, 111] took advantage of the
public blockchain to enforce incentives, but these frameworks are neither private nor
anonymous, i.e., the collected data and the unique identities (such as certificates) will
leak to the whole network of the open blockchain.
Anonymous crowdsourcing. Li and Cao [93] proposed a framework to allow
workers generate their own pseudonyms based on their device IDs. But the protocol
sacrificed the accountability of workers, because workers can forge pseudonyms
without attesting that they are associated to real IDs, which gave a malicious
worker chances to forge fake pseudo IDs and cheat for rewards. Rahaman et al.
[125] proposed an anonymous-yet-accountable protocol for crowdsourcing based on
group signature, and focused on how to revoke the anonymity of misbehaved workers.
Misbehaved workers could be identified and further revoked by the group manager.
The authors in [64] similarly relied on group signature but introduced a couple of
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separate authorities. Our solution can be considered as a proactive version that can
prevent worker misbehavior, and without relying on a group manager.
Accountable anonymous authentication. The pioneering works in anonymous
e-cash [32, 33] firstly proposed the notion of one-time anonymous authentication.
The concept later was studied in the context of one-show anonymous credential [27].
Some works [153, 140] further extended the notion of one-time use to be k-time use,
and therefore enabled a more general accountability for anonymous authentications.
In [26], the authors considered a special flavor of accountability to periodically allow
k-time anonymous authentications. Our new primitive provides a more fine-grained
conditional linkage of anonymous authentications, which is needed for preventing
multi-submission in each crowdsourcing task.
Linkable group/ring signature. Conceptually similar to the linkability appeared
in one-show credential [27], linkable group/ring signatures [115, 95] were proposed to
allow a user to sign messages on behalf of his group unlinkably up to twice.
In the work of Man Ho et al. [8], a more general concept of event-oriented
linkable group signature was formulated to realize more fine-grained trade-off between
accountability and anonymity: a user can sign on behalf of his group unlinkably up
to k times per event, where an event could be a common reference string (e.g.,
the unique address to call a smart contract deployed in the blockchain). But its
main disadvantage is that the group manager can reveal the actual identities of
users. Similar event-oriented linkability was discussed in the context of ring signature
[143] as well. Even though that construction enjoys unbreakable anonymity, its main
drawback becomes the impracticability of “hiding” the real identity behind a large
group (mainly because the verification of signatures might require the public keys of
all group members).
Our new primitive can be considered as a special cryptographic notion to
formalize the subtle balance between event-oriented linkability and irrevocable
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anonymity (within a large and dynamic group). Specifically, our scheme ensures that
no one can link the actual identity to any authenticated message (which is strictly
stronger than [8]), and also it enables a user to “hide” behind a large group of users
(i.e., all users registered at RA, which is impossible in practice via [143]).
Privacy-preserving smart contracts.

Privacy-preserving smart contract is a

recent hot topic in blockchain research.

Most of them are for general purpose

consideration [82, 161], and thus deploy heavy cryptographic tools including general
secure multi-party computation (MPC). Hawk [85] did provide a general framework
for privacy-preserving smart contracts using light zk-SNARK, but mainly for reward
receiver to prove to the contract. Our work can be considered as a very specially
designed MPC protocol, and a lot of dedicated optimizations of zk-SNARK exist
which can directly benefit our protocol.

Last, cryptocurrencies like Zcash [73]

and Ethereum [52] also leverage zk-SNARK to build a public ledger that supports
anonymous transactions.

We note that they consider more basic blockchain

infrastructures, on top of which we may build our application for crowdsourcing.

3.3

Problem Formulation

More precisely, the definitions about the problem and its security requirements will
be given as the following.

3.3.1

Modeling Knowledge Crowdsourcing

As illustrated in Figure 3.1, there are four roles in the model of data crowdsourcing,
i.e., requesters, workers, a platform and a registration authority. A requester, uniquely
identified by R, can post a task to collect a certain amount of answers from the
crowd. When announcing the task, the requester promises a concrete reward policy
to incentivize workers to contribute (see details about the definition of reward policy
below). A worker with a unique ID Wj , submits his answer Aj and expects to receive
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the corresponding reward. The platform, a medium assisting the exchange between
requesters and workers, is either a trusted party or emulated by a network of peers.
The platform considered in this dissertation is jointly maintained by a collection of
network peers, and in particular, we will build it atop a open blockchain network.
The registration authority (RA), can play an important role of verifying and managing
unique identities of workers/requesters, by binding each identity to a unique credential
(e.g., a digital certificate).

Figure 3.1 The “idealized” model of data crowdsourcing.

We remark that the well established identities are necessary demand of realworld crowdsourcing systems, for example MTurk and Waze, to prevent misbehaviors
such as Sybil attack. Moreover, many auction-based incentive mechanisms [160, 154]
are built upon the non-collusive game theory that implicitly requires established
identities to ensure one bid from one unique ID. We employ RA to establish identities.
In practice, a RA can be instantiated by (i) the platform itself, (ii) the certificate
authority who provides authentication service, or (iii) the hardware manufacturer
who makes trusted devices that can faithfully sign messages [129]. Our solution
should be able to inherit these established RAs in the real-world.
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In this dissertation, w.l.o.g., we assume that each unique identity is only allowed
to submit one answer to a task. Also, we consider settings where the value of
crowd-shared answers can be evaluated by a well-defined process such as auctions
and quality-aware rewards, and also the corresponding rewards, c.f. [120, 133, 75]
about quality-aware rewards and [160, 154] about auction-based incentives. These
incentives share the same essence as follows.
Suppose an authenticated requester publishes a task T with a budget τ to
collect n answers from n workers. An authenticated worker interested in it will then
submit his answers. The reward of an answer Aj will follow a well-defined process
determined by some auxiliary variables, i.e., the reward of Aj can be defined as
Rj := R(Aj ; a1 , . . . , am , τ ), where R is a function parameterized by some auxiliary
variables denoted by a1 , . . . , am , τ . Remark that τ is the budget of the requester, and
we will use Rj := R(Aj ; τ ) for short.
Particularly, in some simple tasks (e.g., multiple choice problems), the quality
of an answer can be straightforwardly evaluated by all answers to the same task, i.e.,
Rj = R(Aj ; A1 , . . . , An , τ ), with using majority voting or estimation maximization
iterations [120, 133, 75]. More generally, [9] proposed a universal method to evaluate
quality: (i) some workers are requested to answer a complex task; (ii) other different
workers are then requested to grade each answer collected in the previous stage.
What’s more, our model captures the essence of auction-based incentive mechanism
such as [154, 160], when the parameters a1 , . . . , am represent the bids of workers (and
other necessary auxiliary inputs such as their reputation scores).
Our work considers the general definition above and will be extendable
to the scope of auction-based incentives, even though the protocol design and
implementations in this dissertation mainly focus on how to instantiate quality-aware
incentives. Also note that the flat-rate incentive, that is each submitted answer will
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get a flat-rate payment [5], can be considered as a special case of the above abstraction
as well.

3.3.2

Defining Security Goals

Next, we specify the basic security requirements for our (decentralized) crowdsourcing
system on top of the existing infrastructure of open blockchain.
Data confidentiality. This property requires that the communication transcripts
(including the blocks in the blockchain) do not leak anything to anyone (except the
requester) about the input parameters a1 , . . . , am of the incentive policy R. Because
these parameters might actually be confidential data or sealed bids. We can adapt the
classical semantic security [67] style definition from cryptography for this purpose:
the distribution of the public communication can be simulated with only public
knowledge.
Anonymity. Private information of worker/requester can be explored by linking
tasks they join/publish [155]. Intuitively, we might require two anonymity properties
for workers: (i) unlinkability between a submission and a particular worker and (ii)
unlinkability among all tasks joined by a particular worker. However, (i) indeed can
be implied by (ii), because the break of first one can obviously lead up to the break
of the latter one. Similarly, the anonymity of requester can be understood as the
unlinkability among all tasks published by her. The requirement of worker anonymity
can be formulated via the following game. An adversary A corrupts a requester, the
registration authority (RA), and the platform (e.g., the blockchain); suppose there
are only two honest workers, W0 and W1 . In the beginning, the adversary announces
a number of n tasks. For each task Ti , suppose there are a set of participating workers
WTi . After seeing all the communications, for any Ti 6= Tj , A cannot tell whether
WTi ∩ WTj = ∅ better than guessing. We note that the anonymity should hold
even if all entities, including the requester and the platform (except W0 and W1 ), are
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corrupted. The requester anonymity can be defined via the above game similarly, and
we omit the details.
Security against a malicious requester. A malicious requester may avoid paying
rewards (defined by the policy R), e.g., launches the false-reporting attack. Security in
this case can be formulated via the following security game: an adversary A corrupts
the requester and executes the protocol to publish a task with a promised reward
policy R and a budget τ . Let us define a bad event B1 to be that there exists a worker
Wj , who submits answers Aj and receives a payment smaller than Rj = R(Aj ; τ ).
We require that for every polynomial time adversary A, the probability Pr[B1 ] is
negligibly small.
Security against malicious workers. A dishonest worker may try to harvest more
rewards than what he deserves. Security in this case can be formulated as follows: an
adversary A corrupts one worker,1 and participates in the protocol interacting with a
requester (and the platform). A submits some answers A := {A1 , . . . , An }, n ≥ 1. Let
us define the bad event B2 as that A receives a payment greater than max{Aj ∈A} Rj :=
R(Aj ; τ ) from the requester. We require that for all polynomial time A, Pr[B2 ] is
negligibly small.
We remark that the above securities against a malicious requester and malicious
workers have capture the special fairness of the exchange between crowd-shared data
and rewards.

3.4

Common-Prefix Linkable Anonymous Authentication

Before the formal description of ZebraLancer’s protocol, let us introduce the new
primitive for achieving the anonymous-yet-accountable authentication first. As briefly
shown in Figure 3.2, our new primitive can be built atop any certification procedure,
1

We remark that we focus on resolving the new challenges introduced by blockchain, and put
forth the best possible security, as if there is a fully trusted third-party serving as the crowdsourcing
platform. For example, it is not quite clear how to handle the collusion of many identities, even in
the centralized setting; thus such a problem is out of the scope of this dissertation.
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thus we include a certification generation procedure that can be inherited from any
existing one. Also, we insist on non-interactive authentication, thus all the steps
(including the authentication step) are described as algorithms instead of protocols.
Formally, a common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication scheme is composed
of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1λ ). This algorithm outputs the system’s master public key mpk, and
system’s master secret key msk, where λ is the security parameter.
• CertGen(msk, pk). This algorithm outputs a certificate cert to validate the
public key.
• Auth(m, sk, pk, cert, mpk). This algorithm generates an attestation π on a
message m that: the sender of m indeed owns a secret key corresponding to
a valid certificate.
• Verify(m, mpk, π). This algorithm outputs 0/1 to decide whether the attestation
is valid or not for the attested message, with using system’s master public key.
• Link(mpk, m1 , π1 , m2 , π2 ). This algorithm takes inputs two valid messageattestation pairs. If m1 , m2 have a common-prefix with length λ, and π1 , π2
are generated from a same certificate, it outputs 1; otherwise outputs 0.
We also define the properties for a common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication. Correctness is straightforward that an honestly generated authentication can
be verified. Unforgeability also follows from the standard notion of authentications,
that if one does not own any valid certificate, she cannot authenticate any message.
We mainly focus on the formalizing the security notions of common-prefix-linkability
and anonymity.
The first one characterizes a special accountability requirement in anonymous
authentication. It requires that no efficient adversary can authenticate two messages
with a common-prefix without being linked, if using a same certificate. More generally,
if an attacker corrupts q users, she cannot authenticate q + 1 messages sharing a
common-prefix, without being noticed. Formally, consider the following cryptographic
game between a challenger C and an attacker A:
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Figure 3.2 Subtle linkability of the common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication scheme. All involved algorithms except Setup are shown in bold.
1. Setup. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm and obtains the master keys.
2. CertGen queries. The adversary A submits q public keys with different identities
and obtains q different certificates: cert1 , . . . , certq .
3. Auth. The adversary A chooses q + 1 messages p||m1 , . . . , p||mq+1 sharing
a common-prefix p (with |p| = λ) and authenticates to the challenger C by
generating the corresponding attestations π1 , . . . , πq+1 .
Adversary A wins if all q + 1 authentications pass the verification, and no pair of
those authentications were linked.
Definition 6 (Common-prefix-linkability). For any probabilistic polynomial time
adversary A, Pr[A wins in the above game] is negligible in some security parameter
λ (over all random coins flipped by the challenger).
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Next is the anonymity guarantee in normal cases. We would like to ensure the
anonymity against any party, including the public, the registration authority, and the
verifier who can ask for multiple (and potentially correlated) authentication queries.
Also, our strong anonymity requires that no one can even tell whether a user is
authenticating for different messages, if these messages have different prefixes. The
basic requirement for anonymity is that no one can recognize the real identity from
the authentication transcript. But our unlinkability requirement is strictly stronger,
as if one can recognize identity, obviously, she can link two authentications by firstly
recovering the actual identities.
To capture the unlinkability (among the authentications of different-prefix
messages), we can imagine the most stringent setting, where there are only two
honest users in the system, the adversary still cannot properly link any of them
from a sequence of authentications. Formally, consider the following game between
the challenger C and adversary A.
1. Setup. The adversary A generates the master key pair.
2. CertGen. The adversary A runs the certificate generation procedure as a
registration authority with the challenger. The challenger submits two public
keys pk0 , pk1 and the adversary generates the corresponding certificates for them
cert0 , cert1 . A can always generate certificates for public keys generated by
herself.
3. Auth-queries. The adversary A asks the challenger to serially use (sk0 , pk0 , cert0 )
and (sk1 , pk1 , cert1 ) to do a sequence of authentications on messages chosen by
her. Also, the number q of authentication queries is chosen by A. The adversary
obtains 2q message-attestation pairs.
4. Challenge. The adversary A chooses a new message m∗ which does not have a
common prefix with any of the messages asked in the Auth-queries, and asks
the challenger to do one more authentication. C picks a random bit b and
authenticates on m∗ using skb , pkb , certb . After receiving the attestation πb , A
outputs her guess b0 .
It is said that the adversary wins the above game, if b0 = b.
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Definition 7 (Anonymity). An authentication scheme is unlinkable, if ∀ probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A, | Pr[A wins in the above game] − 12 | is negligible.2
Construction. Now we proceed to construct such a primitive. Same as many
anonymous authentication constructions, we will also use the zero-knowledge proof
technique towards anonymity. In particular, we will leverage zk-SNARK to give an
efficient construction. For the above concept of common-prefix-linkable anonymous
authentication, we need to further support the special accountability requirement.
The idea is as follows, since the condition that “breaks” the linkability is commonprefix, thus the authentication will do a special treatment on the prefix. In particular,
the authentication shows a tag committing to the prefix together with the user’s secret
key, and then presents zero-knowledge proof that such a tag is properly formed, i.e.,
computed by hashing the prefix and a secret key. To ensure other basic security
notions, we will also compute the other tag that commits to the whole message. The
user will further prove in zero-knowledge that the secret key corresponds to a certified
public key.
Note that our main goal is to decentralize crowdsourcing, such a new anonymous
authentication primitive could be further studied systematically in future works.
Concretely, we present the detailed construction as follows:
1. Setup(λ). This algorithm establishes the public parameters P P that will be
needed for the zk-SNARK system. Also, the algorithm generates a key pair
(msk, mpk) which is for a digital signature scheme.3
2. CertGen(msk, pki ): This algorithm runs a signing algorithm on pki ,4 and obtains
a signature σi . It outputs certi := σi .
2

We remark that our definition of anonymity is strictly stronger than that definition of the
event-oriented linkable group signature [8], in which the RA can revoke user anonymity under certain
conditions.
3
To be more precise, the public parameter generation could be from another algorithm. For
simplicity, we put it here. In the security game for anonymity, the adversary only generates
msk, mpk, not the public parameter.
4
We assume an external identification procedure that can check the actual identity bound to
each public key, and the user key pairs are generated using common algorithms, e.g., for a digital
signature. We ignore the details here.
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3. Auth(p||m, ski , pki , certi , P P ): On inputting a message p||m having a prefix p.
The algorithm first computes two tags (or interchangeably called headers later),
t1 = H(p, ski ) and t2 = H(p||m, ski ), where H is a secure hash function.
Then, let w
~ = (ski , pki , certi ) represent the private witness, and ~x = (p||m, mpk)
be all common knowledge, the algorithm runs zk-SNARK proving algorithm
Prover(~x, w,
~ P P ) for the following language LT := {t1 , t2 , ~x = (p||m, mpk) |
∃w
~ = (ski , pki , certi ) s.t. CertVrfy(certi , pki , mpk) = 1 ∧ pair(pki , ski ) = 1 ∧ t1 =
H(p, ski ) ∧ t2 = H(p||m, ski )}, where the CertVrfy algorithm checks the validity
of the certificate using a signature verification, and pair algorithm verifies
whether two keys are a consistent public-secret key pair.
This proving algorithm yields a proof η for the statement ~x ∈ L (also for the
proof-of-knowledge of w).
~ Finally, the algorithm outputs π := (t1 , t2 , η).
4. Verify(p||m, π, mpk, P P ): this algorithm runs the verifying algorithm of zkSNARK Verifier on ~x, π and P P , and outputs the decision bit d ∈ {0, 1}.
5. Link(m1 , π1 , m2 , π2 ): On inputting two attestations π1 := (t11 , t12 , η1 ) and π2 :=
?
(t21 , t22 , η2 ), the algorithm simply checks t11 = t21 . If yes, output 1; otherwise,
output 0. We also use Link(π1 , π2 ) for short.
Security analysis (sketch).
the construction.

Here we briefly sketch the security analysis for

As the scheme is of independent interests, we defer detailed

analyses/reductions to an extended dissertation where the scientific behind will be
formally studied. Regarding correctness, it is trivial, because of the completeness
of underlying SNARK. Regarding unforgeability, we require an uncertified attacker
cannot authenticate. The only transcripts can be seen by the adversary are headers
and the zero-knowledge attestation. Headers include one generated by hashing the
concatenation of p||m, sk. In order to provide a header, the attacker has to know the
corresponding sk, as it can be extracted in the random oracle queries. Thus there
are only two different ways for the attacker: (i) the attacker generates forges the
certificate, which clearly violates the signature security; (ii) the attacker forges the
attestation using an invalid certificate, which clearly violates the proof-of-knowledge
of the zk-SNARK.
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Regarding the common-prefix-linkability, it is also fairly straightforward, as the
final authentication transcript contains a header computed by H(p, sk) which is an
invariable for a common prefix p using the same secret key sk.
Regarding the anonymity/unlinkability, we require that after seeing a bunch of
authentication transcripts from one user, the attacker cannot figure out whether a new
authentication comes from the same user. This holds even if the attacker can be the
registration authority that issues all the certificates. To see this, as the attacker will
not be able to figure the value of the sk from all public value, thus the headers/tags
can be considered as random values. It follows that H(p, sk) and a random value
r cannot be distinguished (similarly for H(p||m, sk)). More importantly, due to the
zero-knowledge property of zk-SNARK, given r, a simulator can simulate a valid
proof η ∗ by controlling the common reference string of the zk-SNARK. That said,
the public transcript t1 , t2 , η can be simulated by r1 , r2 , η ∗ where r1 , r2 are uniform
values, and η ∗ is a simulated proof, all of which has nothing to do with the actual
witness sk.
Summarizing the above intuitive analyses, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Conditioned on that the hash function to be modeled as a random oracle
and the zk-SNARK is zero-knowledge, the construction of the common-prefix-linkable
anonymous authentication satisfies anonymity. Conditioned on the underlying digital
signature scheme used is secure, and the zk-SNARK satisfies proof-of-knowledge,
our construction of the common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication will be
unforgeable. It is also correct and common-prefix linkable.

3.5

ZebraLancer: Private and Anonymous Decentralized Crowdsourcing

In this section, we will construct a private and anonymous protocol to address
the critical challenges of decentralizing crowdsourcing, without sacrificing security
against “free-riders” and “false-reporters”. The procedures of crowdsourcing will be
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decentralized atop an existing network of blockchain. More specifically, we will tackle
the new privacy and anonymity challenges brought by the blockchain.
As we briefly mentioned in previous sections, the system will implicitly has a
separate registration service that validates each participant’s unique identity before
issuing a certificate. Such setup alleviates some basic problems that every worker
is allowed to submit no more than a fixed number k of answers. For simplicity, we
consider here k = 1.

3.5.1

Design Intuition

Our basic strategy is to let the smart contract (which is hosted by the blockchain
network) to enforce the fair exchange between the submitted answers and their
corresponding rewards, but without revealing any data or any identity to the
blockchain. Let us walk through the high level ideas first.
The requester firstly codifies a reward policy parameterized by her budget (i.e.,
R(·; τ )) into a smart contract. She broadcasts a transaction containing the contract
code and the budget. Once the smart contract is included in the blockchain, it can
be referred by a unique blockchain address, and the budget should be deposited to
this address (otherwise, no one would participate). After that, any worker who is
interested in contributing could simply submit his answer to the blockchain, via a
transaction pointing to the contract’s address.
As pointed out before, we have to protect the confidentiality of the answers, in
order to ensure that answers from different workers are independent. The workers
encrypt the answers under the requester’s public key. Now the contract cannot see
the answers so it cannot calculate the corresponding rewards. But the requester
can retrieve all the encrypted answers and decrypt them off-chain, and further learn
the rewards they deserve. It would be necessary that the requester will correctly
instruct the smart contract how to proceed forward. Concretely, we will leverage
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the practical cryptographic tool of zk-SNARK to enforce the requester to prove: she
indeed followed the pre-specified reward policy calculating the rewards. Detailedly, the
requester should prove her instruction for rewarding is computed as follows: (i) obtain
all answers by decrypting all encrypted answers using a secret key corresponding to
the public key contained in the smart contract; (ii) use all those answers and the
announced R(·; τ ) to compute the quality of each answer.
A more challenging issue arises regarding anonymity-yet-accountability. Also
as briefly pointed before, we would like to achieve a balance between anonymity and
accountability. Here we put forth a new cryptographic primitive to resolve the natural
tension. A user can anonymously authenticate on messages (which are composed of
a fixed length prefix and the remaining part). But if the two authenticated messages
share a common prefix, anyone can tell whether they are done by a same user or not.
Moreover, no one can link any two message-authentication pairs, as long as these
messages have different prefixes. Having this new primitive in hand, a simple and
intuitive solution to the anonymous-yet-accountable protocol is to let each worker
anonymously authenticate on a message αC ||Ci , whenever the encrypted answer Ci =
Enc(epk, Ai ) is submitted to a task contract C that can be uniquely addressed by
αC . This implies that all submissions from a same worker to one task can be linked
and then counted, but any two submissions to two different tasks will be provably
unlinkable, even if they are submitted by a same user. Also, the number of maximum
allowed submissions in each task can be easily tuned (by counting linked submissions).
Last, we also need to augment the smart contract by building the general
algorithm of verifying zero-knowledge proofs in it. In particular, when the smart
contract receives an instruction regarding rewards and its proof, the verification
algorithm will be executed. All inputs of the verification algorithm are common
knowledge stored in the open blockchain, e.g., the budget, the encrypted answers and
the public key of encryption. If a dishonest requester reports a false instruction, her
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proof cannot be verified and the contract will simply drop the instruction. What’s
more, if the smart contract does not receive a correct instruction within a time limit,
it can directly disseminate the budget to all workers evenly as punishment (which can
be considered as part of the pre-specified incentive mechanism), since the budget has
been deposited. In this way, the requester cannot gain any benefit by deviating from
the protocol, and she will be self-enforced to respond properly and timely, resulting
in that each worker will receive the expected reward. On the other hand, a dishonest
worker can never claim more rewards than that he is supposed to get, as the reward
is calculated by the requester herself.
Now we are ready to present a general protocol for a class of crowdsourcing tasks
having proper quality-aware incentives mechanisms defined earlier. As zk-SNARK
requires a setup phase, we consider that a setup algorithm generated the public
parameters P P for this purpose, and published it as common knowledge.5 Our
descriptions focuses on the application atop the open blockchain, and therefore omits
details of sending messages through the underlying blockchain infrastructure. For
example, “one uses blockchain address α to send a message m to the blockchain”
will represent that he broadcasts a blockchain transaction containing the message
m, the public key associated to α, and the signature properly generated under the
corresponding secret key.
Remark that here we let each worker/requester to generate a different blockchain
address for each task (i.e., a one-task-only address) as a simple solution to avoid
de-anonymization in the underlying blockchain.6
5

This in practice can be done via a secure multiparty computation protocol [20] to eliminate
potential backdoors.
6
Our anonymous protocol mainly focuses on the application layer such as the crowdsourcing
functionality that is built on top of the blockchain infrastructure. If the underlying blockchain
layer supports anonymous transaction, such as Zcash [73], the worker and the requester can re-use
account addresses. We further remark that the anonymity in network layer are out the scope of this
dissertation, we may deploy our protocol on existing infrastructure such as Tor.
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Figure 3.3 The schematic diagram of the ZebraLancer protocol.

3.5.2

Details of ZebraLancer Protocol

As briefly illustrated in Figure 3.3, the protocol of ZebraLancer proceeds as follows.
Register. Everyone registers at RA to get a certificate bound to his/her unique
ID, which is done off-line only once for per each participant. A requester, having a
unique ID denoted by R, creates a public-secret key pair (pkR , skR ), and registers at
the registration authority (RA) to obtain a certificate certR binding pkR to R. Each
worker, having a unique ID denoted by Wi , also generates his public and secret key
pair (pki , ski ), and registers his public key at RA to obtain a certificate certi binding
pki and Wi .
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TaskPublish.

A requester anonymously authenticates and publishes a task

contract with a promised reward policy. When the requester R has a crowdsourcing
task, she generates a fresh blockchain account address αR , and a key pair (epk, esk)
(which will be used for workers to encrypt submissions) for this task only.

R

then prepares parameters Param, including the encryption key epk, the number
of answers to collect (denoted by n), the deadline, the budget τ , the reward
policy R, SNARK’s public parameters P P , RA’s public key mpk, and also πR =
Auth(αC ||αR , skR , pkR , certR , P P ).7 The requester then codes a smart contract C
that contains all above information for her task.

After compiling C , she puts

C ’s code and a transfer of the budget into a blockchain transaction, and uses the
one-task-only address αR to send the transaction into the blockchain network. When
a block containing C is appended to the blockchain, C gets an immutable blockchain
address αC to hold the budget and interact with anyone.

8

See Algorithm 1 below

for a concrete example of task contract. (The important component of verifying
zk-proofs is done by calling a library libsnark.Verifier integrated into the blockchain
infrastructure, and implementation details will be explained in Section 4.4.5).
AnswerCollection. The contract collects anonymously authenticated encrypted
answers from workers who didn’t submit before.

If a registered worker Wi is

interested in contributing, he first validates the contract content (e.g., checking the
parameters), then generates a one-time blockchain address αi .
7

He encrypts his

We remark that the requester should authenticate on her blockchain address αR along with the
task contract, and workers will join the task only if the task contract is indeed sent from a blockchain
address as same as the authenticated αR . A malicious requester cannot “authenticate” a task by
copying other valid authentications. In addition, each worker has to authenticate on his blockchain
address αi along with his answer submission as well. The task contract will check the submission is
indeed sent from a blockchain address same to the authenticated αi . Otherwise, a malicious worker
can launch free-riding through copying and re-sending authenticated submissions that have been
broadcasted but not yet confirmed by a block.
8
We emphasize that αC will be unique per each contract. In practice, αC can be computed via
H(αR ||counter), where H is a secure hash function, and counter is governed by the blockchain to
be increased by exact one for each contract created by the blockchain address αR . It’s also clear
that the requester R can predicate αC before C is on-chain, such that she can compute πR off-line
and let it be a parameter of contract C .
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answer Ai under the task’s public key epk to obtain ciphertext Ci . He then uses
common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication scheme to generate an attestation
πi = Auth(αC ||αi ||Ci , ski , pki , certi , P P ).7 Then he uses his one-time address αi to
send Ci , πi to the blockchain network (with a pointer to αC , i.e., the unique address
of the contract C ). Then, C runs Verify(αC ||αi ||Ci , πi , mpk, P P ), and also executes
Link(πi , π∗ ) for each valid authentication attestation π∗ that was received before
(including requester’s, namely πR ). Such that, C can ensure Ci is the first submission
of a registered worker. For unauthenticated or double submissions, C simply drops
it.9 The contract C will keep on collecting answers, until it receives n answers or
the deadline (in unit of block) passes. It also records each address αi that sends Ci .
Remark that Link algorithm will be executed O(n2 ) times, but it is a simple equality
check over a pair of hashes, such that the cost of running it for several times will be
nearly nothing in practice.
Reward. The requester computes and prove how to reward properly authenticated
anonymous answers. The requester R keeps listening to the blockchain, and once
C collects n submissions, she retrieves and decrypts all of them to obtain the
corresponding answers A1 , . . . , An (if there are not enough submissions when the
deadline passes, the requester simply sets the remaining answers to be ⊥ which
has been considered by the incentive mechanism R). Next, the requester computes
the reward for each answer Ri = R(Ai ; A1 , . . . , An , τ ) as specified by the policy
codified in C . More importantly, she generates a zero knowledge proof πreward ,
with the secret key esk as witness to attest the validity of the instruction.

In

particular, the proof is for the following NP-language L = {R, P | ∃esk s.t.
∧nj=1 Aj = Dec(esk, Cj ) ∧nj=1 Rj = R(Aj ; A1 , . . . , An , τ ) ∧ pair(esk, epk) = 1}, where
P denotes Param together with ciphertexts C1 , . . . , Cn ; while R := (R1 , . . . , Rn ) is
9

We remark that our protocol can be extended trivially to allow each worker to submit some
k answers in one task by modifying the checking condition programmed in the smart contract of
crowdsourcing task.
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the instruction about how to reward each answer. After computing R and πreward , R
puts them into a blockchain transaction, and still use her one-task-only blockchain
address αR to send the transaction to C (by using a pointer to αC ). This finishes the
outsource-then-prove methodology. Once a newly proposed block contains the reward
instruction R and its attestation πreward , the contract C first checks that they are
indeed sent from αR (by verifying the digital signature of the underlying blockchain
transaction). Then it leverages SNARK’s Verifier algorithm to verify the proof πreward
regarding the correctness of R. If the verification passes, it transfers each amount Ri
to each account αi , and refunds the remaining balance to αR . Otherwise, pause. If
receiving no valid instruction after a predefined time (in unit of block), the contract
simply transfers τ /n to each αi as part of the policy R.

3.5.3

Security Analysis of ZebraLancer Protocol

Correctness and efficiency. It is clear to see that the requester will obtain data
and the workers would receive the right amount of payments. If they all follow
the protocol, under the conditions that (i) the blockchain can be modeled as an
ideal public ledger, (ii) the underlying zk-SNARK is of completeness, (iii) the public
key encryption is correct, and (iv) common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication
satisfies correctness. Regarding efficiency, we note the on-chain computation (and
storage which are two of the major obstacles for applying blockchain in general)
is actually very light, as the contract essentially only carries a verification step.
Thanks to zk-SNARK, the verification can be efficiently executed by checking only a
few pairing equalities; moreover, the special library can be dedicatedly optimized in
various ways [15].
Security analysis (sketch). We briefly discuss security here and defer the details to
an extended version. The underlying primitives, including our common-prefix-linkable
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Algorithm 1: Example using quality-aware incentive

1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30

Require : This contract’s address αC ; requester’s one-time blockchain address αR ;
requester’s authenticating attestation πR ; RA’s public key mpk; budget τ ;
public key epk for encrypting answers; SNARK’s public parameters P P ;
number of requested answers n; deadline of answering in unit of block TA ;
deadline of instructing reward in unit of block TI .
List keeping answers’ ciphertexts, C ← ∅;
Map of anonymous attestations and authenticated one-time blockchain addresses of
workers, W ← ∅;
if getBalance(αC ) < τ ∨ ¬Verify(αC ||αR , πR , mpk, P P ) then
goto 21 ;
. Budget not deposited or requester not identified.
timerA ← a timer expires after TA ;
while ||C|| < n ∧ timerA NOT expired do
if αi sends πi , Ci then
if
¬Link(πi , πR ) ∧ ∀π∗ ∈ W .keys() ¬Link(πi , π∗ ) ∧ Verify(αC ||αi ||Ci , πi , mpk, P P )
then
W .add(πi → αi ); C.add(Ci );
timerI ← a timer expires after TI ;
while timerR NOT expired do
if αR sends R := (R1 , . . . , Rn ) and πreward then
P ← (epk, τ, C1 , . . . , Cn );
if libsnark.Verifier((P , R), πreward , P P ) then
for each (πi → αi ) ∈ W do
transf er(αC , αi , Ri );

. Start to wait instruction

goto 21;
R ← τ /||W ||;
for each (πi → αi ) ∈ W do
transf er(αC , αi , R);

. Reward all if no correct instruction

transf er(αC , αR , getBalance(αC ));
function getBalance(addr)
return the balance of addr in the blockchain ledger;

. Refund the remaining

function transf er(src, dst, value)
if getBalance(src) < value then
return f alse;
the balance of src subtracts value in the blockchain ledger;
the balance of dst adds value in the blockchain ledger; return true;
. The correctness and availability of this task contract is governed by the blockchain
network; the contract is driven by a global “discrete” clock
. libsnark.Verifier is a library embedded in the runtime environment of smart contract
such as EVM
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anonymous authentication scheme, are well abstracted, which enable us to argue
security in a modular way.
Regarding the data confidentiality of answers, all related public transcripts are
simply the ciphertexts C1 , . . . , Cn , and the zk-SNARK proof π. The ciphertexts are
easily simulatable according to the semantic security of the public key encryption,
and the proof π can also be simulated without seeing the secret witness because of
the zero-knowledge property.
Regarding the anonymity, an adversary has two ways to break it: (i) link
a worker/requester through his blockchain addresses; (ii) link answers/tasks of a
worker/requester through his authenticating attestations. The first case is trivial,
simply because every worker/requester will interact with each task by a randomly
generated one-task-only blockchain address (and the corresponding public key).
The second case is more involved, but the anonymity of workers and requesters
can be derived through the anonymity of the common-prefix-linkable anonymous
authentication scheme.
Regarding the security against a malicious requester, a malicious requester has
three chances to gain advantage: (i) deny the policy announced in TaskPublish phase;
(ii) cheat in Reward phase; (iii) submit answers to intentionally downgrade others in
AnswerCollection phase. The first threat is prevented because the smart contract
is public, and the requester cannot deny it once it is posted in the immutable
blockchain. The second threat is prohibited by the soundness of the underlying
zk-SNARK, since any incorrect instruction passing the verification in the smart
contract, directly violates the proof-of-knowledge (i.e., the strong soundness). The
last threat is simply handled the unforgeability and common-prefix-linkability of our
common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication scheme.
Security against malicious workers is straightforward, the only ways that
malicious workers can cheat are as follows: (i) to submit more than one answers
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in AnswerCollection phase; (ii) sending the contract a fake instruction in the name
of requester in Reward phase; (iii) altering the policy specified in the contract. The
first threat is simply handled by the common-prefix-linkability and unforgeability
of common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication. The second threat can be
approached by predicting others’ answers, and it is prevented due to the semantical
security of public key encryption. The third threat is simply handled by the security
of digital signatures. The last issue is trivial, because the blockchain security ensures
the announced policy is immutable.
Theorem 2. The data confidentiality of our protocol holds, if the underlying public
key encryption is semantically secure and the used zk-SNARK is of zero-knowledge.
The anonymity of our protocol for both workers and requesters will be satisfied, if the
underlying common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication satisfies the anonymity
defined in Definition 7, and the zk-SNARK is zero-knowledge. Conditioned on that
the blockchain infrastructure we rely on can be modeled as an ideal public ledger, the
underlying common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentication satisfies the unforgeability and the common-prefix-linkability, the zk-SNARK satisfies proof-of-knowledge
and the digital signature in use is secure, our protocol satisfies: security against a
malicious requester and security against malicious workers.

3.5.4

Implementation of ZebraLancer Protocol

We implement the protocol of ZebraLancer atop Ethereum, and instantiate a series
of typical image annotation tasks [133] with using it. Furthermore, we conduct
experiments of these tasks in an Ethereum test net to evaluate the applicability.
System in a nutshell.

As shown in Figure 3.4, the decentralized application

(DApp) of our system is composed of an on-chain part and an off-chain part. The
on-chain part consists of crowdsourcing task contracts and an interface contract of
the registration authority (RA). The RA’s contract simply posits the system’s master

44

Figure 3.4 The system-level view of ZebraLancer.

public key as a common knowledge stored in the blockchain. The off-chain part
consists of requester clients and worker clients. These clients can be blockchain clients
wrapped with functionalities required by our system. Specifically, a client of requester
should codify a specific task with a given incentive mechanism and announces it as
a smart contract. Note that we, as the designers of the DApp, can provide contract
templates to requesters for easier instantiation of incentive mechanisms, c.f. [55].
The clients further need an integrated zk-SNARK prover to produce the anonymous
authenticating attestations; moreover, a requester client should also leverage SNARK
prover to generate proofs attesting the correct execution of incentive policies.
This dissertation also compares ZebraLancer to existing crowdsourcing systems
in Table 3.1. The security performance of our system overwhelms others, as it
considers the most strict fairness of exchange, user anonymity and data confidentiality,
under that condition of minimum trust.

For example, our design realizes the

fair exchange without leaking data to a third-party information arbiter.

And

ZebraLancer also guarantees the strongest user anonymity that cannot be broken
by any third-party (even the registration authority), while the anonymity of other
systems can be broken by a third-party authority (or few colluded third-parties).
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Remark that the identities established via a registration service are required by all
systems in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Comparison between our ZebraLancer and Existing Platforms
Ours
Prevention of false-reporting
Prevention of free-riding
Data confidentiality
User anonymity

√
√

MTurk
[5]
×

Dynamo
[128]
×

SPPEAR
[64]

×

×

×

√
√

×

CrowdBC
[92]
√
√
×
×

√
Note:
denotes a realized functionality without using any central trust except the established
identities;
denotes a (partially) realized function by relying on a central trust (other than the
registration authority); × denotes an unrealized feature. Note that the data confidentiality is
marked as ×, if any third-party other than the requesters can access the submitted data.

Implementation challenges. The main challenge of deploying smart contracts
in general is that they can only support very light on-chain operations for both
computing and storing.10 Our protocol actually has taken this into consideration.
In particular, our on-chain computation only consists SNARK verifications, while
the heavy computation of SNARK proofs are all done off the blockchain. Even still,
building an efficient privacy-preserving DApp compatible with existing blockchain
platform such as Ethereum is not straightforward. For instance, in order to allow
smart contracts to call a zk-SNARK verification library, a contract of this library
should be thrown into a block, but this library is a general purpose tool that can be too
complex to be executed in the smart contract runtime environment, e.g., Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM). Alternatively, we modify the the runtime environment of
smart contracts, so that an optimized zk-SNARK verification library [15] is embedded
10

We remark the communication overhead is not a serious worry, because: (i) a blockchain network
such as Ethereum does not require fully meshed connections, i.e., requesters and workers can only
connect a constant number of Ethereum peers; (ii) if necessary, requesters and workers can even
run on top of so-called light-weight nodes, which eventually allows them receive and send messages
only related to crowdsourcing tasks; (iii) even if there is a trusted arbiter facilitating incentive
mechanisms, the only saving in communication is just an instruction about how to reward answers
(and its attestation).
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in it as a primitive operation. Our modified Ethereum client is written in Java 1.8
with Spring framework, and is available at github.com/maxilbert/ethereumj.
We remark that Ethereum project recently integrated some new cryptographic
primitives into EVM to enable SNARK verification as well [52], which ensures
our DApp can essentially inherit all Ethereum users to maintain the blockchain
infrastructure to govern the faithful execution of the smart contracts in our DApp.
Establishments of zk-SNARKs (off-line). As the feasibility of ZebraLancer
highly depends on the tininess of SNARK proofs and the efficiency of SNARK verifications, it becomes critical to establish necessary zk-SNARKs off-line. As formally
discussed before, the authentication scheme and nearly all incentive mechanisms
can be stated as some well-defined deterministic constraint relationships. We first
translate these mathematical statements into their corresponding boolean circuit
satisfiability representations. Furthermore, we establish zk-SNARK for each boolean
circuit, such that all required public parameters are generated. All the above steps
are done off-line, as they are executed for only once when the system is launched.
Note that the potential backdoors in these zk-SNARK public parameters could be
further eliminated via an off-line protocol based on secure multi-party computation
[20]. However, such an off-line setup is beyond the scope of showing our system
feasibility.
An image annotation crowdsourcing task. To showcase the usability of our
system, we implement a concrete crowdsourcing task of image annotation [133]. The
task is to solicit labels for an image which can later be used to train a learning
machine. The task requests n answers from n workers, and can be considered as a
multi-choice problem. Majority voting is used to estimate the “truth”. An answer
is seen as “correct”, if it equals to the “truth”. The reward amount of a worker
is τ /n if he answers correctly, otherwise, he receives nothing. In our terminology,
the reward Ri := R(Ai ; A1 , . . . , An , τ ) = τ /n, if Ai equals the majority; otherwise,
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Ri = 0. Following [133], we implement and deploy 5 contracts in the test net to
collect 3 answers, 5 answers, 7 answers, 9 answers and 11 answers from anonymousyet-accountable workers, respectively.
The smart contracts are written in Solidity, a high-level scripting language
translatable to smart contracts of Ethereum. We also modify Solidity compiler,
such that a programmer can write a contract involving zk-SNARK verifications at
high-level. We instantiate the encryption to be RSA-OAEP-2048, the DApp-layer
hash function to be SHA-256, and the DApp-layer digital signature to be RSA
signature. Moreover, for zk-SNARK, we choose the construction of libsnark from
[15]. We deploy a test network consisting of four PCs: three PCs are equipped with
Intel Xeon E3-1220V2 CPU (PC-As), and the other one is equipped with Intel i7-4790
CPU (PC-B); all PCs have 16 GB main memory and have Ubuntu 14.04 LTS installed.
In the test net, a PC-A and a PC-B play the role of miners, and the other two PC-As
only validate blocks (i.e., full nodes that do not mine). One full node plays the role
of the requester, and anonymously publishes crowdsourcing tasks to the blockchain;
and the other full node mimics workers, and sends each anonymously authenticated
answer from a different blockchain address. Miners are only responsible to maintain
the test net and do not involve in tasks.
Table 3.2 Execution Time of zk-SNARK Verifications
Operands Length
Proof
Key
Inputs
729B 1.2KB 1.5KB
729B 16.0KB 3.4KB

Time@
PC-A
10.9ms
15.5ms

Time@
PC-B
6.2ms
9.1ms

Majority (5-Worker)

730B

21.6KB

4.7KB

16.3ms

9.8ms

Majority (7-Worker)

731B

27.3KB

6.0KB

17.0ms

10.3ms

Majority (9-Worker)
Majority (11-Worker)

729B
730B

32.9KB
38.6KB

7.3KB
8.6KB

17.5ms
17.9ms

12.1ms
13.1ms

Verification for
Anonymous authentication
Majority (3-Worker)
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Performance evaluation. As the main bottleneck is the on-chain computation of
the smart contract, we first measure the time cost and the spatial cost of miners,
regarding the executions of zk-SNARK verifications used in the above annotation
tasks.

These zk-SNARKs are established for common-prefix-linkable anonymous

authentications and incentive mechanisms, respectively. The results of time cost
are listed in Table 3.2. It is clear that zk-SNARK verifications in our system can be
efficiently executed in respect of verification time. Moreover, our experiment results
also reveal that the spatial cost of zk-SNARK verifications is constant and tiny at
both types of PCs (exactly 17M B main memory). Also, the required on-chain storage
for the task contracts is at the acceptable magnitude of kilobyte11 . Therefore, the

for Anonymous Authentications (second)

Execution Time of Generating Attestations

on-chain performance of the system can be clearly practical, regarding time and space.
79

78

62

61
@PC-A

@PC-B

(3.1GHz E3-1220V2)

(3.6GHz i7-4790)

Figure 3.5 The time of generating common-prefix-linkable anonymous authentications in two PCs. The box plot is derived from 12 different experiments.

We also consider the cost of anonymity, if one uses the common-prefix-linkable
anonymous authentication.

We measure the running time of generating the

11

Remark that the actual price of exchanging ETH fluctuates and is determined by the market.
For instance, the average cost of each kilobyte storage could be as low as 0.05 UDS in Jan 2016,
or could be as much as 15 USD in Jan 2018. Thus, to estimate the cost from an economic view
is out of scope of the dissertation. It is worthwhile to further note that there are many economic
alternatives to minimize the on-chain storage in the later implementations, e.g., to use off-chain
storages [137, 16]. These optimizations are beyond the scope of this dissertation, in which we only
focus on the technical feasibility instead.
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authenticating attestations at PCs. As shown in Figure 3.5, our experiment results
clarify that about 78 seconds are spent on generating an anonymous attestation
with using PC-A (3.1 GHz CPU). In PC-B (3.6GHz CPU), the running time can
be shortened to about 62 seconds.

Those are not ideal, but acceptable by the

anonymity-sensitive workers. We remark that our protocol can be trivially extended
to support non-anonymous mode, in case that one gives up the anonymity privilege:
s/he can generate a public-private key pair (for digital signatures), and then registers
the public key at RA to receive a certificate bound to the public key; to authenticate,
s/he can simply show the certified public key, the certificate, along with a message
properly signed under the corresponding secret key, which essentially costs nearly
nothing regarding the computational efficiency.

3.6

Summary

In this chapter, a generic blockchain-based framework is constructed, analyzed
and implemented to enable the first private and anonymous decentralized data
crowdsourcing system12 . Without relying on any third-party information arbiter, the
protocol can still guarantee the faithful execution for a class of incentive mechanisms,
once they are announced as pre-specified policies in the blockchain. More importantly,
confidential data and identities are also protected from the blockchain network, while
the underlying blockchain is auditing the correct execution of crowdsourcing tasks.
Specifically, this chapter can be summarized as follows.
First, a blockchain based protocol is proposed to realize decentralized crowdsourcing that satisfies: (i) fair exchange between data and rewards, i.e., a worker
will be paid the correct amount according to the pre-defined policy of evaluating
data, if he submits to the blockchain; (ii) data confidentiality, i.e., the submitted
12

A couple of recent attempts on decentralized crowdsourcing [21, 139, 92] have been made,
however, none of them address the fundamental privacy and anonymity issues. See section for
details about their insufficiencies.
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data is confidential to anyone other than the requester; and (iii) anonymity and
accountability. Intuition behind the fairness and confidentiality is an outsourcethen-prove methodology that: (i) the requester is enforced to deposit the budget
of her incentive policy to a smart contract; (ii) submissions are encrypted under the
requester’s public key and will be collected by the blockchain; (iii) the evaluation of
rewards is outsourced to the requester who then needs to send an instruction about
how to reward workers. The instruction is ensured to follow the promised incentive
policy, because the requester is also required to attach a valid succinct zero-knowledge
proof. The worker anonymity of our protocol can ensure: (i) the public, including the
requester and the implicit registration authority, is not able to tell whether a data
comes from a given worker or not; (ii) if a worker joins multiple tasks announced via
the blockchain, no one can link these tasks. More importantly, we also address the
threat of multiple-submission exacerbated by anonymity misuse. In particular, if a
worker anonymously submits more than the number allowed in one task, the scheme
allows the blockchain to tell and drop these invalid submissions. Similarly, we achieve
the requesters’ accountable anonymity.
Second, to achieve the above goal of anonymity while preserving accountability,
we propose, define and construct a new cryptographic primitive, called commonprefix -linkable anonymous authentication. In most of the time, a user can authenticate
messages and attest the validity of identity without being linked. The only exception
that anyone can link two authenticated messages is that they share the same prefix
and are authenticated by one user. To utilize the new primitive in our protocol, a
worker has to submit to a task via an anonymous authentication. The reference of the
task will be unique, and should be the common-prefix, such that the special linkability
will prevent multi-submission to a task. A requester can also use it to authenticate
in each task she publishes, and convince workers that she cannot maliciously submit
to intentionally downgrade their rewards. We remark that such a scheme can be
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used to anonymously authenticate in a constant time independent to tasks. Such a
primitive may be of independent interests for the special flavor of its accountabilityyet-anonymity.
Finally, to showcase the feasibility of applying our protocol, we implement
the system that we call ZebraLancer for a common image annotation task on top
of Ethereum, a real-world blockchain infrastructure.

Intensive experiments and

performance evaluations are conducted in a Ethereum test net. Since current smart
contracts support only primitive operations, tailoring such protocols compatible with
existing blockchain platforms is non-trivial.
Since this work is the first attempt of decentralizing crowdsourcing system
atop the real-world blockchain in a privacy-preserving way, the area remains largely
unexplored. Here we name a few open questions, and we defer solutions to them
in our future work. First, there are many incentive mechanisms using reputation
systems, can we further extend our implementations to support those incentives?
Second, as the current smart contract technology is at an infant stage and can only
allow very tiny on-chain storage, can we further optimize our implementations with
using off-chain storage [137, 16] or information oracle [158] to assist more large-scale
tasks, e.g., to collect annotations for millions of images (i.e., the scale of ImageNet
dataset)? Third, our anonymous protocol currently either relies on the underlying
blockchain to support anonymous transaction, or requires workers/requesters use
one-time blockchain account to submit data and receive reward. Can we design
a (DApp-layer) protocol to solve the drawbacks? Last, our protocol relies on a
trusted registration authority (RA) to establish identities. Although such a trusted
RA could be a reasonable assumption (in view of real-world experiences), it is
more tempting to develop an alternative methodology to remove the third-party RA
without sacrificing securities. For example, can we adapt the successful invention
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of proof-of-work to build up a crowdsourcing framework from literally “zero” trust
without any established identity?
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CHAPTER 4
ON PRACTICAL PRIVATE KNOWLEDGE SOLICITATION

4.1
4.1.1

Background

Motivation

To overcome blockchain’s inherent limits, prior Chapter [98] proposes the general
outsource-then-prove framework for private decentralized HITs.

It enables the

requester to prove the quality of answers that are encrypted to her, without
revealing the actual answers. Such a proof becomes the crux to ensure privacy
and simultaneously deters false-reporting and free-riding. In addition, the feasibility
challenge sprouts up as the blockchain needs to verify the proof, which means the proof
size and verification cost must be small enough to meet the limited on-chain resources.
For above reasons, prior work relies on some generic zero-knowledge proof (zk-proof)
framework that is succinct in proof size and efficient for verifying, in particular
SNARK1 [60, 15, 119] to reduce the on-chain verification cost. Nonetheless, generic
zk-proofs such as SNARK inevitably inherit low performance for the convenience
of achieving generality, causing that prior private decentralized HITs suffer from an
unbearable off-chain proving cost and a still significant on-chain verifying expense.
Infeasible proving (off-chain). The proving of generic zk-proofs (e.g., SNARK)
seems inherently complex, due to the burdensome NP-reduction for generality. In
particular, prior study [99] reported 56 GB memory and 2 hours are needed to prove
whether an encrypted answer coincides with the majority of all encrypted submissions
at a very small scale, e.g., at most eleven answers. Such a performance prevents the
previous protocol from being usable by any normal requesters using regular PCs.
1

Remark that though the rise of Intel SGX becomes a seemingly enticing alternative of SNARK
to go beyond many limits of blockchain by remote attestations [34], unfortunately, recent Foreshadow
attacks [146] allow the adversary to forge “attestations” by stealing the attestation key hardcoded in
any SGX Enclave, which seriously challenges the already heavy assumption of “trusted” hardware,
and makes it even more illusive to trust SGX in practice.
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Costly verification (on-chain). Existing blockchains (e.g., Ethereum) are feasible
to verify only few types of generic zk-proofs such as SNARK, whose verification need
to compute a dozen of expensive pairings over elliptic curve [60, 15, 119]. Even worse,
the on-chain verification cost increases with the complexity of the proving statement.
As a result, the on-chain verification becomes not only computationally costly, but
also financially expensive. Currently in Ethereum, 12 pairings already spend ∼500k
gas [53], and verifying a SNARK proof costs even more (about half US dollar).
Given the insufficiencies of the prior art, the next critical problem remains open:
How to design a practical private decentralized HITs protocol
for crowdsourcing human knowledge?

4.1.2

Challenges

The major challenge of making private decentralized HITs practical is that the
blockchain must learn the quality of some encrypted answers, namely, to obtain some
properties of what a few ciphertext are encrypting. The state-of-the-art [98] proposed
to reduce the problem to generic zk-proofs, by observing the requester can decrypt
the answers, and then prove the quality of answers to the blockchain. But this
generic approach incurs impractical expenses inherently, because of the underlying
heavyweight NP-reduction for generality.
To conquer the above challenge, we follow a different path that deviates from
generic zk-proofs to explore a concretely efficient solution. At the core of our private
decentralized HITs protocol, we design a special-purpose non-interactive proof scheme
to efficiently attest the quality of encrypted answers, which removes heavyweight
general-purpose zk-proofs and then avoids the inefficiency of generality.
The ideas behind our efficient proving scheme are a variety of special-purpose
optimizations to squeeze performance by removing needless generality, such that we
reduce the problem of proving encrypted answers’ quality from generic-purpose zk-
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Abstract real-world HITs

Statement Reformation

Concrete Proving

The only quality-based incentive
incorporated by Amazon's MTurk

1. Prove upper-bound
2. Particular zero-knowledge

Efﬁcient construction of
veriﬁable decryption

Generic
zk-proofs

A concrete crypto
problem between
two parties

Reduced to veriﬁable
decryption by removing
all arithmetic relations

Concretely
efﬁcient proof
of quality

Figure 4.1 The path to realizing efficient proofs for encrypted answers’ quality.

proof to particular verifiable decryption. As shown in Figure 4.1, our core ideas are
highlighted as following.
Abstracting real-world HITs. The first step is to well formulate an incentive
mechanism widely adopted by real-world HITs, namely, the only one incorporated by
Amazon’s MTurk [7]. Some golden standard challenges (i.e., questions with known
answers) [61] are mixed with other questions, and the quality of a worker can be
determined by her performance on the golden standards.2

We rigorously define

the problem of proving the quality of encrypted answers for the above incentive
mechanism. Then, proving the quality of a worker is reducible to a well-defined
two-party problem: where the verifier needs to output the performance of the worker
on a set of golden standard questions, given only a set of ciphertext answering
these golden standards challenges. Nevertheless, solving this two-party problem is
still challenging, as it needs to compute the property of what a set of ciphertext
are encrypting. The generic version of the issue falls into multi-input functional
encryption [66, 19], which is well known for its hardness and has no (nearly) practical
solution so far. We thus conduct the following optimizations to further reduce the
problem.
2

This concrete incentive turns to be powerful, say it can capture most HITs in Amazon’s MTurk
(c.f., the official tutorial [7]) and also adopted by the impactful ImageNet [136] to create large-scale
deep learning benchmark.
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Statement reformation. The main obstacle of removing the generic-purpose
zk-proof framework is the arithmetic relations (i.e., some relationship unrepresentable
in the algebraic domain). Observing that, we dedicatedly reform the statement of
proving the quality of encrypted answers mainly in two ways to remove all arithmetic
relations. First, we let the requester to prove the upper bound of each worker’s
quality instead of proving the exact number, which is a relaxation to the general
cases, but does not abandon any utility, since this property is enough to prevent
any corrupted requester from paying less than what a worker deserves in our context
where the reward is an increasing function of quality. Second, we realize that given
the system’s public knowledge, a tiny and constant portion of each worker’s answer
(i.e., the part answering gold standards) is already leaked, since this little portion is
simulatable by the public knowledge; thus we can explicitly reveal these “alreadyleaked” information. The above reformations allow us to reduce the problem of
proving the quality of encrypted answers to standard verifiable encryption without
sacrificing securities/utilities.
Concretely efficient proving scheme. Following the above optimizations, the
problem eventually is reduced to verifiable encryption, which becomes representable
in concrete algebraic relations. Along the way, we present a certain variant of verifiable
decryption that is concretely tailored for the scenario of HITs where the plaintexts are
short, and thus squeeze most performance out of it and boost private decentralized
HITs practically.

4.2

Prior Art

Besides the existing private decentralized HITs [99, 98] discussed earlier, here we
briefly review some pertinent generic cryptographic frameworks and discuss their
insufficiencies in the concrete context of private decentralized crowdsourcing.
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Privacy-preserving blockchain.

A variety of studies [85, 161, 31] consider

the general framework for privacy-preserving blockchain and smart contract. The
approaches are powerful in the sense of their generality, yet are expensive for concrete
use-cases in practice. For example, Hawk [85] leverages generic zk-proofs to keep
blockchain private, but incurs expensive proving expenses. As such, it is unclear how
to leverage these generic frameworks to design concretely efficient protocol for the
special-purpose of crowdsourcing [98].
Fair MPC using blockchain. Decentralized crowdsourcing is a special-purpose fair
MPC using blockchain. Kiayias, Zhou and Zikas [82] consider the generic version of
fair MPC in the presence of blockchain, but it is unclear how to adopt their generic
protocol in practice without expensively computational costs. Recently, increasing
interests focus on special-purpose variants of fair MPC in aid of blockchain. For
example, [17, 86, 40] consider poker games. But these special-purpose solutions
are over-tuned for distinct scenarios and are unclear how to be used for private
decentralized crowdsourcing.
Multi-input functional encryption. The core problem of private decentralized
crowdsourcing is to let the blockchain learn the quality of encrypted answers, which
is straightforwardly reducible to multi-input functional encryption (MIFE) [66]. But
this generic problem is known for its hardness, and all existing solutions for it are
far from being practical. Even worse, MIFE relies on indistinguishability obfuscation
[66] or multi-linear maps [19] that are even unclear how to be instantiated from the
standard cryptographic assumptions.

4.3

Problem Formalization

This section rigorously defines our security model, by giving the ideal functionality
of Human Intelligent Tasks (HITs) that captures the security/utility requirements of
the state-of-the-art HITs in reality [42, 135, 147, 126, 4, 61, 47, 120, 7, 133, 136, 144,
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74, 103]. Our security modeling sets forth a clear security goal, that is: the HITs in
the real world shall be as “secure” as the HITs in an admissible ideal world.

4.3.1

Reviewing Knowledge Crowdsourcing via HITs in Reality

Let us briefly review the HITs adopted in reality by Amazon’s MTurk [42, 135, 147,
126, 4, 61, 47, 120, 7, 133, 136, 144, 74, 103], before presenting the abstraction of
their ideal functionality.
There are two explicit roles in a HIT, i.e., the requester and some workers.3 The
requester, uniquely identified by R, can post a task T to collect a certain amount of
answers. In the task, R also promises a concrete reward policy. The worker with a
unique identifier Wj , submits his answer aj to expect receive the reward.
A HIT consists of a sequence of questions denoted by T = (q1 , · · · , qN ), where
each qi is a multiple choice question and N is the number of questions in the task.
The answer of each question must lay in a particular range ⊂ N ∪ 0 pre-specified when
T is published. W.o.l.g., we can let all questions are binary (i.e., let Range = {0, 1}).
The above HIT design is based on batched choice questions, which follows real-world
practices [42, 135, 147, 126, 4, 61, 47, 120, 7, 133, 136, 144, 74, 103] to remove
ambiguity, thus letting workers precisely understand the task. For example, Fei-fei
Li et al. [42, 127, 136] used the technique to create the deep learning benchmark
ImageNet, and Andrew Ng et al. [135] suggested it for language annotations.
The quality of an answer is induced by a function Quality(aj ; sp), where
aj = (a(1,j) , · · · , a(N,j) ) is the answer submitted by worker Wj , and sp is some secret
3

There is an implicit registration authority (RA), who is required by real-world crowdsourcing
platforms e.g., MTurk to prevent adversary forging a large number of identities (a.k.a. Sybil
attackers). In practice, RAs can be instantiated by (i) the platform itself (e.g., MTurk), and (ii) the
certificate authority who provides authentication service. Our solution can inherit these established
RAs, and we therefore omits such the implicit RAs, with assuming all identities are granted. If the
participants are interested in anonymity, anonymous-yet-accountable authentication scheme [98, 89]
can be used; however, those are orthogonal techniques out scope of this paper.
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parameters of requester. The output of Quality(·) is denoted by χj , which is said to
be the quality of worker Wj .
The abstraction captures the quality-based incentive mechanism adopted by
real-world HITs in Amazon’s MTurk [133, 136, 7, 144]. For example, a task T consists
of N questions, out of which M questions are golden-standard questions that are
“secretly” mixed. The quality of a worker can be computed, due to her accuracy in
the M golden-standard questions. Formally, in the qualify function Quality(aj ; sp),
the parameter sp = (G, GS ), where G ( [1, N ] represents the randomly chosen indexes
of the golden-standard questions, and GS = {si |si ∈ range}i∈G represents the known
answers of the golden-standard questions.
Following the real-world practices [133, 136, 7, 144], the quality of an answer
P
aj = (a(1,j) , · · · , a(N,j) ) is: Quality(aj , (G, GS )) = i∈G [a(i,j) ≡si ], where [·] is Iverson
bracket to convert any logic proposition to 1 if the proposition is true and 0 otherwise.
In short, we focus on the particularly useful and interesting mechanisms representable
in this form.

4.3.2

Defining Security Goals: Decentralized HITs’ Functionality

Now it is ready to present the security notion of HITs in the presence of cryptocurrency.
We formalize the ideal functionality of HITs (denoted by Fhit ) in the L-hybrid model
L
as shown in Figure 4.2, where the blue text shows Fhit
is proceeding synchronously

as the adversary can delay message deliveries up to next clock period [85, 82]; the
L
brown text means that Fhit
has to proceed asynchronously as if the adversary can
L
arbitrarily delay messages.. Intuitively, Fhit
abstracts a special-purpose multi-party

secure computation, in which: (i) a requester recruits K workers to crowdsource
some knowledge, and (ii) each worker gets a payment of B/K from the requester, if
submitting an answer meeting the minimal quality standard Θ.
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In greater detail, the ideal functionality Fhit of HITs immediately implies the
following security properties:
• Fairness. Our ideal functionality captures a strong notion of fairness, that
means: the worker get paid, if and only if s/he puts forth a qualified answer
(instead of copying and pasting somewhere else). In greater detail, the
requester specifies a sequence of N multi-choice questions, which are multichoice questions having some options in range and contain |G| gold-standard
challenges.4 For each worker, s/he has to (i) meet a pre-specified quality
standard Θ and (ii) submit answers in the range of options, in order to receive
the pre-defined payment B/K.
• Audibility of gold-standards. The choice of golden standards is up to the
requester, thus making a realistic worry that a malicious requester uses some
bogus as the golden standard solutions. The ideal functionality aims to abstract
the best prior art [103, 74] regarding this issue so far, that means the golden
standards become public auditable once the HIT is done. This abstraction
“simulates” the ad-hoc reputation systems maintained by the MTurk workers
to grade the reputations of the MTurk requesters in reality [103, 74].
• Confidentiality. It means any worker cannot learn the advantage information
during the course of protocol execution. Without the property, workers can copy
and paste to free ride, indicating that privacy would be a minimal requirement
to ensure the basic usefulness of decentralized HITs. Our ideal functionality
naturally captures the property.
Adversary Model. We consider probabilistic polynomial-time adversary in the
real world. It can corrupt the requester and/or some workers statically, before the
real-world protocol begins. The uncorrupted parties are said to be honest. Following
the standard blockchain model [85, 82], we also abstract the ability of the real-world
adversary to control the communication (between the blockchain and honest parties)
as: (i) it follows the synchrony assumption [57, 85], namely, we let there is a global
clock [57, 85], and the adversary can delay any messages sent to the blockchain up to
a-priori known time (w.l.o.g., up to the next clock); (ii) the adversary can manipulate
4

We explicitly consider that |G| and range are small constant in the HITs ideal functionality. Such
modeling follows real-world practices [42, 135, 147, 126, 4, 61, 47, 120, 7, 133, 136, 144, 74, 103].
In particular, |range| is a small constant in practice, because it represents few options of each
multi-choice question in HIT; and |G| is also a small constant, as it represents few gold-standard
challenges in a HIT task.
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L
The ideal functionality of HIT Fhit
L interacts with a requester R, a set of
Given accesses to oracle L, the functionality Fhit
workers {Wj } and adversary S.
Phase 1: Publish Task

• Upon
receiving
(publish, N, B, K, range, Θ, G, GS )
from
R,
leak
(publishing, R, N, B, K, range, Θ, |G|, |GS |) to S, until the beginning of next clock
period, proceed with the following delayed executions:
L , P , B):
– send (freeze, Pi , B) to L, if return (frozen, Fhit
i

* store N , B, K, Range, χ̄ and sp as internal states;
* initialize answers ← ∅, and goto next phase;
Phase 2: Collect Answers
• Upon receiving (answer, aj ) from Wj , leak the message (answering, Wj , |aj |) to S, till
receiving (approved) from S, continue with the delayed executions as follows:
– if (Wj , ·) ∈ answers, do nothing;
– else, answers ← answers ∪ (Wj , aj ), send answers to R, leak (Wj , |aj |) to S, go to
phase 3 if |answers| = K.
Phase 3: Evaluate Answers
• Upon entering this phase, leak all received messages to S, until the beginning of next
clock period, proceed to run the following delayed executions for each Wj ∈ {Wj |
(Wj , ·) ∈ answers}:
– if receiving (evaluate, Wj ) from R, proceed as:
* check whether Quality(aj , (G, GS )) ≥ Θ, if that is the case, send
(pay, Wj , B/K) to L, and leak (evaluated, Wj , G, GS ) to all entities including
S;
– if receiving (outrange, Wj , i) from R, proceed as:
* if a(i,j) ∈
/ range, leak (outranged, Wj , a(i,j) ) to all entities, otherwise send
(pay, Wj , B/K) to L.
– else, no message from R was received, proceed as:
* if aj 6= ⊥, send (pay, Wj , B/K) to L.

L
Figure 4.2 The (stateful) ideal functionality of coin-aided HIT Fhit
.
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the order of so-far-undelivered messages sent to the blockchain, which is known as
the “rushing” adversary.
Expressivity of HITs’ ideal functionality. The ideal functionality Fhit not only
captures the elegant state-of-the-art of collecting image/language/video annotations
[42, 127, 136, 135, 144, 147, 133] but also reflects the common scenario of crowdsourcing human knowledge. Consider the next example: Alice is running a small
startup, and aims to provide a service to visualize the availabilities of street parkings.
Unfortunately, at each moment, Alice only knows the availabilities of street parkings
at quite few spots, since she cannot afford the cost of monitoring every corner around
the city. The little a-priori knowledge of Alice is her “golden standards”, and such
information is too little to boost a useful service. She can crowdsource more street
parking information from a few workers, with using her few golden standards to
control the quality of solicited data.

4.4

Dragoon: Highly Efficient Private Decentralized Crowdsourcing

This section elaborates our practical protocol for decentralized HITs. We begin with
an important building block for proving the quality of encrypted answers. Then we
showcase the smart contract functionality Chit that interacts with the workers and
the requester. Later, the detailed protocol is given in the presence of Chit . We finally
prove that our protocol securely realizes the ideal functionality Fhit of HITs.

4.4.1

Proof of Quality of Encrypted Answer

The core building block of our novel decentralized protocol is to allow the requester
efficiently prove the quality of encrypted answers. We formally define this concrete
purpose to set forth the notion called proof of quality of encrypted answers (PoQoEA),
and then present an efficient reduction from it to verifiable decryption (VPKE).
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Defining PoQoEA.

The problem we are addressing here is to prove that: an

encrypted answer cj can be decrypted to obtain some aj s.t. the quality of aj is
χ, without leaking anything other than cj , χ and the parameters of quality function.
To capture the problem, the state-of-the-art [98, 85] adopts the standard notion
of zk-proof in order to support generic quality measurements. Different from existing
solutions, we particularly tailor the notion of zk-proof to obtain a fine-tuned notion of
PoQoEA for the widely adopted quality function defined in §4.3. Namely, we consider
Quality(· ; G, Gs ) where G is the index of gold-standards and Gs = {si }i∈G is the
ground truth of golden standards, and aim to remove the unnecessary generality in
the concrete setting. Precisely, given the quality function Quality(· ; G, Gs ) and any
established public key encryption scheme (Ench , Deck ) ← KeyGen(1λ ), we can define
PoQoEA as a tuple of hereunder algorithms (Proverk , Verifierh ):
1. Proverk (cj , χ, G, Gs ) → π. Given the encrypted answer cj = (c1,j , . . . , cN,j ), the
quality χ, and the golden standards (G, Gs ), it outputs a proof π attesting χ
is the quality of cj ; it also explicitly takes the secret decryption key k as input;
2. Verifierh (cj , χ, π, G, Gs ) → 0/1. It outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept), according to
whether π is a valid proof attesting χ is the actual quality of cj ; the algorithm
explicitly takes the public encryption key h as input;
Moreover, PoQoEA shall satisfy the following properties:
• Completeness. PoQoEA is complete, if for any G, Gs , cj , χ and (Ench , Deck )
s.t. χ = Quality(Deck (cj ); G, Gs ), there is Pr[Verifierh (cj , χ, π, G, Gs ) = 1 | π ←
Proverk (cj , χ, G, Gs )] = 1;
• “Upper-bound” soundness. PoQoEA is upper-bound sound, if for any G, Gs , cj ,
χ and (Ench , Deck ), for ∀ P.P.T. A, there is Pr[Verifierh (cj , χ, π 0 , G, Gs ) = 1∧χ <
Quality(aj ; G, Gs ) ∧ aj = Deck (cj ) | π 0 ← A(G, Gs , χ, cj , λ, Ench , Deck )] ≤
negl(λ), where negl(λ) is a negligible function in λ, which means it is
computationally infeasible to produce a valid proof, if χ is not the upper bound
of the quality of what cj is encrypting;
• “Special” zero-knowledge. Conditioned on |G| and the range of elements in Gs
are small constants, for any G, Gs , cj , χ and (Deck , Ench ), ∃ a P.P.T. simulator
S that can simulate the communication scripts of PoQoEA protocol on input
only h, G, Gs , cj , and χ.
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Rationale behind the finely-tuned abstraction.

The notion of PoQoEA is

defined to remove needless generality in the special case of HITs. Compared to the
state-of-the-art notion [98], PoQoEA is more promising to be efficiently constructed,
as it brings the following definitional advantages as follows.
First, we adopt “upper-bound” soundness to ensure that any probably corrupted
requester cannot forge the upper bound of quality of each worker. Such the tuning
stems from a basic fact that: the reward of a worker is an increasing function in
quality, so the upper bound of the worker’s quality at least reflects the well-deserved
reward of the worker. As a result, any cheating requester has to pay at least as much
as the honest requester.
Second, another major difference is the relaxed special zero-knowledge: PoQoEA
is zero-knowledge, only if |G| and range are small constants, so anything simulatable
by the gold standards can be leaked. Nevertheless, the conditions are prevalent in the
special context of HITs [42, 135, 147, 126, 4, 61, 47, 120, 7, 133, 136, 144, 74, 103].
Recall that G represents the few golden standard questions, and range means the few
options of each question in HITs, indicating that both are small constants in reality.
In sum, even though PoQoEA is seemingly over-tuned, it essentially coincides
with the generic zk-proof of the quality of encrypted answers in the context of HITs.
Construction and security analysis.

Here is an efficiency-driven way to

constructing PoQoEA for the quality function Quality(aj ; G, Gs ) that was defined in
§4.3. We can reduce the problem to the standard notion of verifiable decryption. More
precisely, given the established VPKE scheme (Ench , Deck , Provek , Verifyh ), PoQoEA
can be constructed as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Lemma 1. Given any verifiable public key encryption VPKE, the algorithm in Figure
4.3 satisfies the definition of PoQoEA regarding the quality function defined in §4.3.
Proof. (sketch) The completeness is immediate from the definition of quality function,
the correctness of encryption, and the completeness of VPKE. To prove the upper65

Public knowledge ~x: G, Gs = {si }i∈G , χ, c = hc1 . . . cN i, h

Prover(~x, k)
π←∅
for each i in G:
(ai , πi ) ← Provek (c)
if ai 6= si :
π ← π ∪ (i, ai , πi )
output π

Verifier(~x)

π

for each (i, ai , πi ) in π:
if ai ≡ si :
output 0
if ¬Verifyh (ai , ci , π):
output 0
χ←χ+1
output 1 : 0? χ ≥ |G|

Figure 4.3 The construction of PoQoEA for the quality defined in §4.3.
bound soundness, we assume by contradiction to let an adversary break it, then the
adversary can immediately break the soundness of VPKE. The special zero-knowledge
is also clear: considering |G| and the range of each ai are constants, the permutation

|G|
would be constant, indicating that there exists a P.P.T. simulator S invoking at
χ
most polynomial number of SVPKE (on input ci , h, and guessed ai ∈ range \ {si }) to
simulate all VPKE proofs [94], thus simulating the PoQoEA proof.

4.4.2

HIT Contract and HIT Protocol

Now we are ready to present our concretely efficient decentralized protocol Πhit for
L
HIT. Our design centers around a smart contract Chit
, which is formally described in
L
Figure 4.4. The contract Chit
is the crux to take best advantage of the rather limited
L
abilities of blockchain to make our protocol securely realize the ideal functionality Fhit
.
L
Thus given contract Chit
, our HITs protocol Πhit can be defined among the requester,

the worker and the contract, as formally illustrated in Figure 4.5. Informally, our
HIT protocol Πhit proceeds as follows.
Publishtask. The requester R announces her public key h, and publishes a task
T of N multi-choice questions to crowdsource K answers for the task. Each question
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L
HITs contract functionality Chit

Given accesses to L, Chit interacts with R, {Wj }, and A.
Phase 1: Publish Task
• Upon receiving (publish, N, B, K, range, Θ, h, commgs ) from R, leak the message and R to A,
until the beginning of next clock, proceed with the delayed executions as follows:
L
– send (freeze, Pi , B) to L, if returns (frozen, Fhit
, Pi , B):

* store N , B, K, range, Θ, h and commgs
* initialize answers ← ∅, comms ← ∅
* send (published, R, N, B, K, range, Θ, h, commgs ) to all entities, and goto phase 2-a
Phase 2-a: Collect Answers (Commit phase)
• Upon receiving (commit, commcj ) from Wj , leak the message and Wj to A, then proceed with
the following delayed executions until the beginning of next clock, with consulting A to re-order
all received commit messages:
– for each received commit message (sent from Wj ):
* if (Wj , ·) ∈
/ comms and (·, commcj ) ∈
/ comms:
· let comms ← comms ∪ (Wj , commcj )
· if |comms| = K, send (committed, comms) to all entities, and goto the reveal phase
Phase 2-b: Collect Answers (Reveal phase)
• Upon entering this phase, leak all received messages and their senders to A, till the next clock
period, proceed as:
– for each Wj ∈ {Wj | (Wj , ·) ∈ comms}:
* if receiving the message (reveal, cj , keyj ) from Wj s.t. Open(commcj , cj , keyj ) = 1:
· answers ← answers ∪ (Wj , cj )
* else answers ← answers ∪ (Wj , ⊥)
– send (revealed, answers) to all, and goto the next phase
Phase 3: Evaluate Answers
• Upon entering this phase, leak all received messages and their senders to A, till the next clock
period, proceed as:
– if receiving (golden, G, Gs , keygs ) from R s.t. Open(commsgs , G||Gs , keygs ) = 1:
* for each Wj ∈ {Wj | (Wj , ·) ∈ answers}:
· if receiving (outrange, Wj , i, a(i,j) , πi ) from R:
send (pay, Wj , B/K) to L, if a(i,j) ∈ range or Verifyh (a(i,j) , c(i,j) , πi ) = 0
· else if receiving (evaluate, Wj , χj , π) from R:
send (pay, Wj , B/K) to L, if χj ≥ Θ or Verifierh (cj , χj , π, G, Gs ) = 0
· else if cj 6= ⊥, send (pay, Wj , B/K) to L
– otherwise, for each Wj ∈ {Wj | (Wj , ·) ∈ answers}, send (pay, Wj , B/K) to L

Figure 4.4 The ideal functionality of the (stateful) HITs contract.
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Protocol description of the HITs Πhit
Πhit is among the requester R, the workers {Wj } and Chit
Phase 1: Publish Task
• Requester R:
– (Ench , Deck ) ← KeyGen(1λ )
– Upon receiving the parameters G, Gs , Θ, N , range, B, K of a HIT to publish:
$

* keysg ← {0, 1}λ
* commgs ← Commit(G||Gs , keysg )
* send (publish, N, B, K, range, Θ, h, commgs ) to Chit
Phase 2: Collect Answers
• Worker Wj :
– Upon receiving (published, R, N, B, K, range, Θ, h, commgs ) from Chit :
* get the answer aj = (a(1,j) , · · · , a(N,j) )
* cj ← (Ench (a(1,j) ), · · · , Ench (a(1,N ) ))
$

* commcj ← Commit(cj , keyj ), where keyj ← {0, 1}λ
* send (commit, commcj ) to Chit
– Upon receiving (committed, comms) from Chit :
* if (Wj , ·) ∈ comms, send (reveal, cj , keyj ) to Chit
Phase 3: Evaluate Answers
• Requester R:
– Upon receiving (revealed, answers) from Chit :
* send (golden, G, Gs , keygs ) to R
* for each (Wj , cj ) ∈ answers:
· decrypt each item in cj to get aj = (a(1,j) , · · · , a(N,j) )
· if ∃a(i,j) ∈ aj s.t. a(i,j) ∈
/ range:
· (a(i,j) , πi ) ← Provek (c(i,j) )
· send (outrange, Wj , i, a(i,j) , πi ) to Chit
· else if χj = Quality(Dec(cj , skR ); G, Gs ) < Θ:
· π ← Proverk (cj , χj , G, Gs )
· send (evaluate, Wj , χj , π) to Chit

Figure 4.5 The formal description of the decentralized HITs protocol Πhit .
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in T is specified to have some options in range. The task mixes some golden standard
questions, whose indexes G and ground truth Gs are committed to commgs . Also, R
places B as deposit to cover her budget, which promises that a worker would get a
reward of B/K, if submitting an answer beyond a specified quality standard Θ.
Commitanswer.

Once the task is published, the workers can commit their

answers (encrypted to the requester) in the task. To prevent against copy-and-paste
attacks, duplicated commitments are rejected. The contract moves to the next phase,
once K distinct workers commit.
Revealanswers. After K workers commit their answers, these workers can start
to reveal their answers in form of ciphertexts encrypted to the requester. Note that
the submissions of answers explicitly contain two subphases, namely, committing and
revealing, which is the crux to prevent the network adversary from taking advantages
by adversarially scheduling the order of submissions.
Evaluateanswers. Eventually, the requester is supposed to instruct the blockchain
to correctly pay the encrypted answers for the critical fairness. To this end, the
protocol leverages our novel notion of PoQoEA. The requester can efficiently prove to
the contract to reject a certain answer, if the worker does not meet the pre-specified
quality standard Θ. If an answer is out of the specified range, the requester is allowed
to use verifiable encryption VPKE to reveal that to reject payment.

4.4.3

Instantiating Cryptographic Building Blocks

For sake of completeness, here give the constructions of cryptographic building blocks
that are called by Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Let G = hgi be a cyclic group of prime order
p, where g is a random generator of G.
Short range verifiable decryption is based on exponential ElGamal. The private
$

key k ← Zp , the public key h = g k , the encryption Ench (m) = (c1 , c2 ) = (g r , g m hr ),
and the decryption Deck ((c1 , c2 )) = log(c2 /ck1 ) where log is to brute-force the short
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plaintext range to obtain m; if decryption fails to output m ∈ range, then c2 /ck1 is
returned. In addition, to efficiently augment the above (Ench , Deck ) to be verifiable,
we adopt a variant of Schnorr protocol [130] (for Diffie-Hellman tuples) with FiatShamir transform in the random oracle model.
In detail, the Provek algorithm and the Verifyh algorithm can be described as
follows:
• Provek ((c1 , c2 )). Run Deck ((c1 , c2 )) to obtain m ∈ range (or g m if m ∈
/ range).
$

Let x ← {0, 1}λ . Compute A = cx1 , B = g x , C = H(A||B||g||h||c1 ||c2 ||g m ),
Z = x + kC, and π = (A, B, Z). If m ∈ range, output (m, π); else, output
(g m , π).
• Verifyh (M, (c1 , c2 ), π). Parse π = (A, B, Z). If M ∈ range, compute C 0 =
0
0
Z
C0
H(A||B||g||h||c1 ||c2 ||g M ), and then verify g M ·C · cZ1 ≡A · cC
2 and g ≡ B · h ,
output 1 if the verification passes and 0 otherwise; else if M ∈ G, compute
0
0
Z
C0
C 0 = H(A||B||g||h||c1 ||c2 ||M ) and verify M C · cZ1 ≡A · cC
2 ∧ g ≡ B · h , output
1 iff the verification passes and 0 otherwise.
Proof of quality of encrypted answer is built by invoking the above VPKE in a
black-box manner, due to the reduction from PoQoEA to VPKE in subsection 4.4.1.
Commitment scheme is instantiated according to the well-known efficient
folklore construction in the random oracle model [25, 48]: (i) Commit(msg, key) =
H(msg||key); (ii) Open(comm, msg0 , key0 ) = [H(msg0 ||key0 ) ≡ comm], where [·] is
Iverson bracket from a proposition to 1 (true) or 0 (false).

4.4.4

Security Analysis

Theorem 3. Conditioned on hardness of DDH problem and static corruptions, the
L
stand-alone instance of Πhit securely realizes Fhit in Chit
-hybrid, random oracle model.

Proof. (sketch) Let C denote the set of corrupted parties controlled by the adversary
A, and let H denote the set of rest honest parties. For any P.P.T. adversary A in the
real world, we can sketch a P.P.T. simulator S in the ideal world to interact with the
ideal functionality Fhit and corrupted parties, such that S can emulate the actions of
honest parties and the contract Chit . Detailedly, S proceeds as follows.
70

PublishTask (Phase 1). If R ∈ C, considering that the corrupted R sends the
publish message to Chit in the real world, S can trivially simulate that with interacting
with Fhit . If R ∈ H, when the honest R sends the publish message to Fhit , S is
informed and thus allows S to simulate the real-world scripts of publish task.
CollectAnswers (Phase 2). In the real world, the P.P.T. adversary A has the
following abilities: (i) she can corrupt a set of parties C up to including the requester
and a set of the workers, and (ii) she has to be consulted to reorder the so-farundelivered messages sent to Chit (till the next clock). The basic strategy to emulate
A is that: S invokes the adversary A to obtain how A is re-ordering the commit
messages (sent from workers), let W to represent the set of workers whose commit
messages are scheduled as the first K to deliver; then S delays all answer messages that
are not sent from the workers in W. Then, S internally simulates the ciphertexts sent
via reveal messages to open commitments. If R ∈ H, the ciphertexts can be simulated
as they are indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over the ciphertext space;
if R ∈ C, S is informed about all answer submissions sent from the workers, thus
can internally simulate the submissions of the workers in the real world. Moreover,
if A corrupts a worker whose commit message is scheduled in the first K to deliver
but does not send any the reveal message to open the commitment, the simulator S
can simulate that since it can let the corrupted worker to send an answer message
containing ⊥ with Fhit . In addition, it is trivial to see S can internally simulate the
parties as well as Chit , when the adversary A corrupts a worker to submit duplicated
commitment.
EvaluateAnswers (Phase 3). The simulation becomes clear, if considering the
security requirements of commitment scheme, VPKE, and PoQoEA. If the requester
R ∈ C, the simulator S invokes A to obtain all outrange and/or evaluate messages
sent to Chit , and then simulates the interactions. If the requester R ∈ H, whenever R
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sends outrange and/or evaluate messages to Fhit , S is informed and hence is allowed
to simulate the interactions between Chit and R in the real world.

4.4.5

Implementation and Evaluation

To demonstrate the feasibility of our protocol, we implement it to build Dragoon,
and then use the system to launch a typical image annotation task for ImangeNet
[136, 127] atop Ethereum.
System overview. Dragoon consists of an on-chain part and an off-chain part:
the on-chain smart contract is deployed in Ethereum ropsten network; the requester
client and worker clients are implemented in Python 3.6. The off-chain clients are
installed in a PC that uses Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and equips Intel Xeon E3-1220V2
CPU and 16 GB main memory. We demonstrate our system through an ImageNet
task [136, 127], which is specified as: each task is made of 106 binary questions, 100
out of which are non-gold-standard questions, while the remaining 6 questions are
requester’s gold-standard challenges; 4 workers are allowed to participate; if a worker
cannot correctly answer at least four golden standard questions, his submission will
be rejected without being paid, otherwise he deserves to get the payment. The hash
function is instantiated by keccak256. We choose the cyclic group G by using the G1
subgroup of BN-128 elliptic curve, over which all concrete public key primitives are
instantiated. The code of our prototype is available at https://github.com/njitbc/dragoon. An experiment instance is atop Ethereum ropsten network.
Implementation details. Many non-trivial on- and off-chain optimizations are
particularly made for practicability.
The requester end warps: (i) an Ethereum node to interact with the blockchain,
e.g., publish task, download workers’ submissions, etc; (ii) the prover of verifiable
encryption to generate necessary proofs to instruct the contract to reward workers;
(iii) a Swarm API to publish the detailed questions of each crowdsourcing task. Swarm
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Figure 4.6 The schematic diagram of Dragoon at a high-level.
[137] is an off-chain storage network, where the questions of HIT is stored; in addition,
to ensure integrity of HIT questions, the digest of the questions is committed in the
contract, which significantly reduces on-chain cost, without violating securities. The
worker client wraps Ethereum to interact with the blockchain to read task and submit
answers, and also incorporates Swarm client to allow download task questions.
We cautiously perform a few non-trivial system-level optimizations to lighten
the task contract: (i) we implement all public key schemes over G1 subgroup of
BN-128 [12], since we can use some precompiled contracts in Ethereum to do algebraic
operations there cheaply [53]; (ii) it is expensive to store ciphertexts in the contract
as internal variables, while we make the contract store their 256-bit hashes instead
and let the actual ciphertexts included in the chain as emitted event logs [152].
Evaluations. We conduct intensive experiments to measure the concrete performance,
and discuss the system feasibilities from the on-chain side and the off-chain side.
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Off-chain costs.

First, Dragoon enables the requester to manage only one

private-public key pair throughout all her tasks, because all protocol scripts are
simulatable without secret key and therefore leak nothing relevant. More importantly,
the off-chain cost of proving relevant cryptographic proofs is significantly reduced by
removing unnecessary generality.
Table 4.1 Off-Chain Proving Cost of VPKE and PoQoEA

Ours
Generic ZKP

∗

Statement to Prove Time
VPKE
3 ms
PoQoEA
10 ms
VPKE
37 s
PoQoEA
112 s

Peak Memory
53 MB
53 MB
3.9 GB
10.3 GB

* Through our evaluations, generic zk-proofs are instantiated by zk-SNARK, which is the only
generic zk-proof feasibly supported by existing blockchains to our knowledge.

Table 4.1 clarifies the requester suffers from hindersome off-chain burden of
generating generic zk-proofs. The concrete construction removes the bottleneck of
proving in generic zk-proof. First, the requester can generate a proof to reject a
worker’s submission within only a few milliseconds, which costs nearly 2 minutes if
using generic zk-proof. Second, the concretely efficient constructions also save in
memory usage. For example, by generic zk-proof, rejecting a submission requires
a peak memory usage of 10 GB, which is reduced to only 53 MB by concrete
constructions.
Table 4.2 On-chain Verification Cost of VPKE and PoQoEA

†
Ours
Generic ZKP

‡

Statement to Verify
VPKE
PoQoEA
VPKE
PoQoEA

Verifying Time
1 ms
2 ms
11 ms
17 ms

† The implementation of BN-128 curve is from https://github.com/scipr-lab/libff.
‡ The evaluations for generic ZKP (SNARK) are performed due to constructions from 2048-bit
RSA-OAEP over Zpq instead of ElGamal over the G1 subgroup of BN-128.
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On-chain costs. We measure the critical on-chain performance from many angles
including the cost of verifying zk-proofs and the on-chain gas usage of the whole
protocol. First, we compare the verifying cost of concrete and generic constructions
for VPKE and PoQoEA (six golden standards) in Table 4.2. The concrete proofs
are faster, even compared to the generic zk-proof (SNARK) known for efficient
verification. Moreover, the overall handling fee of running a concrete ImageNet
instance is summarized in Table 4.3. To estimate the cost of on-chain usages, we apply
a gas price at 1.5×10−9 Ether per gas, and an Ether price at 115 USD per Ether, which
are the safe-low price of gas [51] and the market price of Ether on March/17th/2020,
respectively. Under the above exchange rate, the on-chain handling fee paid by each
worker is about $0.48, which is used to submit an answer. In addition, thanks to
the efficient verification of PoQoEA, the requester can spend few cents to reject each
low-quality answer. The overall on-chain handling cost of the entire HIT is about two
US dollars. In contrast, when MTurk facilitates the same ImageNet task, it charges
a handling fee at least $4 currently [131, 6].
Table 4.3 On-Chain Overall Handling Fees of the Concrete ImageNet Task
Handling fee of
Publish task (by requester)
Submit answers (by worker)
Verify PoQoEA to reject an answer
Overall (best-case: reject no submission)
Overall (worst-case: reject all submissions)

Gas Usage
∼1293 k
∼2830 k
∼180 k
∼12164 k
∼12877 k

In USD
$0.22
$0.48
$0.03
$2.09
$2.22

To summarize, Dragoon is practical. Our experiment even reveals that Dragoon’s
on-chain handling cost can be economically cheaper than the the handling fee charged
by third-party platforms such as MTurk. In addition, Dragoon is compatible with
many alternative chains (e.g., Cardano [30]) other than Ethereum, as long as the
blockchains are using Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) as the running environment
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of smart contracts. As a consequence, our system can be deployed in these alternative
chains to further reduce the handling cost.

4.5

Summary

This Chapter answers the unresolved problem of the earlier Chapter, and presents
a practical private decentralized HITs protocol for the major tasks of crowdsourcing
human knowledge. In sum, its core technical contributions are three-fold.
First, to achieve practical private decentralized HITs, we explore various nontrivial optimizations to avoid the cumbersome generic-purpose zk-proof framework,
and reduce the protocol to the specific verifiable decryption. As such, we attain
concrete improvements by orders of magnitude, regarding both the proving and
verification. (i) For proving, our approach is two orders of magnitude better than
generic zk-proof 5 ; For the same HIT, the proving in our protocol costs 50 MB memory
and 10 msec, while the generic proof costs 10 GB and 2 min. (ii) For verifying, our
result improves upon the generic solution by nearly an order of magnitude. The
on-chain cost of verifying a proof for the quality of an answer to 106 batched binary
questions is reduced to ∼180k gas in Ethereum (much smaller than verifying SNARK
proofs) and typically few US cents.
Second, we further implement our protocol to instantiate a practical private
decentralized crowdsourcing system Dragoon, the handling cost of which could be
even less than the existing centralized platforms such as MTurk. Dragoon is launched
atop Ethereum to conduct a typical HIT adopted by ImageNet [136] to solicit largescale image annotations. To handle the task, Dragoon attains an on-chain (handling)
cost ∼$2 US dollars at the time of writing. In comparison, for the same task, the
handling fee of MTurk is at least $4 currently [6, 131]. Our result provides an insight
that the on-chain handling fee (characterizing the users’ financial expense) in the
5

Generic zk-proof refers zk-SNARK in our context, since the only generic zk-proof that can be
feasibly supported by existing blockchains is zk-SNARK.
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decentralized setting can approximate or even less than the handling fee charged
by centralized platforms. This indicates the de facto users can financially benefit
from decentralization, though it is not contradictory to the common belief [132] that
decentralization is more expensive w.r.t. the overall computational cost of the system.
Along the way, we firstly formulate the ideal functionality of decentralized HITs.
The rigorous security model clearly defines what a HIT shall be and allows us to use
the simulation-based paradigm to prove security against subtle adversaries in the
blockchain. In contrast, existing decentralized HITs [98, 99] have quite different
property-based definitions on “securities”, which at least makes the lack of welldefined benchmark to compare them. Even worse, many of them are “flawed”, as
failing to capture all respects of the subtle adversary in the blockchain; for example,
they allow the corrupted requester to reap data without paying, if being given the
standard ability of adversarially re-ordering message deliveries, while our approach
precisely defines the security requirement against this subtle attack.
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CHAPTER 5
ON CROWDSOURCING FOR MACHINE LEARNING TASKS

5.1

Background

It has been a common practice for small companies and individual citizens to
crowdsource their machine learning (ML) tasks to experts [122], as these small parities
want to understand their own data but no clue on how to do that. Such an increasing
demand makes it enticing to establish a marketplace of crowdsourcing ML tasks. In
such a marketplace, the requesters can be small startups or even individuals, and
they will publish their ML tasks with promising some payments; the workers can be
resourceful experts, and can resolve the published ML tasks to earn the well-deserved
rewards. But there lacks such a trusted marketplace currently, and the crowdsourcing
of ML tasks is usually instantiated in the form of an open challenge launched by the
requester herself. Usually, the requesters have to be trusted to 1) maintain their own
challenges at web servers, and 2) pay promised rewards to the experts whoever solve
the challenges.

5.1.1

Motivation

But this challenge-based framework suffers from a couple of major issues [50]: first,
the ML challenges could be too expensive to instantiate and maintain by individual
citizens, as they have to design their own ML challenges and run their own web servers
to maintain them; second, the expert workers have to rely on that the requesters are
fully trusted, as the dishonest requesters can always lie and reject to pay workers,
which could be a rather serious concern, if the requesters are small business owners
or even individuals. The above problems are consequences of the lack of trusted
third-party in the particular use-case of crowdsourced ML, and it become natural to
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consider the global computer , i.e., the blockchain, as the existing infrastructure to
empower the crowdsourcing of ML tasks.
This research therefore will focus on a broad variety of machine learning tasks
such as the training/validation of ML models, and proposes a simple and novel
incentive based approach to realize the crowdsourcing of such ML tasks.

5.1.2

Challenges

The smart contract in (permissionless) blockchain is still at its infant stage, and suffers
from several inherent limitations that hinder its wider adoption in crowdsourcing
of ML tasks. Among several fundamental challenges, one that we are particularly
interested in is that currently smart contract can only support very light computation:
the complexity of computation tasks of each smart contract is usually strictly
bounded. The reason lies in the fact that: during the blockchain mining procedure
(the new block generation), when some output of a smart contract is expected to
be recorded (that might also affect the validity of future blocks), honest miners are
required to execute the program in order to validate the correctness of the outcome. If
such a program is computationally intensive, crafty adversarial nodes may simply skip
such verification step (or ignore putting the output at all), and go ahead to propose
new blocks. Doing this gives the adversarial nodes substantial advantage of winning
the chance for proposing new blocks, as honest nodes would not be able to propose
any block until the execution of the smart contract finishes. Such an undesirable
feature was known as verifier’s dilemma [102].
There is another fundamental challenge for smart contracts that they cannot
support randomized computations: since randomization lets even honest nodes have
inconsistent outputs for the same program with the same input, it obviously prevents
the central goal of the blockchain to ensure the consensus among all honest nodes.
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Those limitations of smart contracts seriously hinder the applicability to broader
interesting scenarios, especially in the settings that involve the execution of machine
learning programs. Since those machine learning tasks are often computational costly
and randomized (e.g., deep learning using stochastic gradient descent algorithm [88]),
it becomes elusive how we can enable the machine learning tasks codified to be autoexecuted in decentralized applications. The severe tension between the demands of
applications and the restrictions of smart contract is widely acknowledged.
Observing that the security of the consensus protocol restricts only the on-chain
computations, thus naturally we could turn to the area of verifiable computation
for mitigation. In particularly, one may employ advanced cryptographic tools for
verifiable computation such as SNARK [85, 98].

The full nodes could simply

“outsource” the execution of the smart contracts to some service providers, and
ask them further attach a succinct proof to the output. The full nodes now only
verify the correctness of the proof during consensus. Unfortunately, although the nice
feature of SNARK enables a cheap verification which reduces the on-chain cost (few
elliptic curve pairings essentially), the computation and memory cost of generating
the SNARK proofs in general for complex programs are still astronomically large,
which makes it in fact infeasible in the scenarios of our interests as the machine
programs are complex. Another line of researches explored the attestation capability
of recently emerged trusted hardwares such as Intel’s SGX to carry such outsourcing
[158]. The basic idea is to load the program into the protected memory (called trusted
enclave), execute the program and sign the output using the secret key hardcoded in
the chip. However, the size of the enclave is pretty small, and therefore considerable
performance penalties can be brought during attesting memory intensive tasks such
as large-scale deep learning and random forest etc. More seriously, a recent attack on
SGX could actually extract the attestation key completely [146], making the status
of secure hardware is currently unclear.
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5.1.3

Problem Formulation

In this subsection, the problem will be presented more precisely along with the security
requirement, in the game-theory model.
The overview of system. As briefly illustrated in Figure 3.1, there are three
roles in the system. The blockchain network mimics a trusted third-party that is
also computationally-restricted. A blockchain user, called requester, can request the
blockchain to execute some small programs called smart contracts. The chain will
internally execute the programs, and “deliver” the computing results to all blockchain
users, which is fully trustful. But, the requester cannot expect the blockchain run
a computationally-intensive smart contract, as heavy smart contracts are hindered
by the intrinsic limit of the blockchain [102]. Alternatively, the blockchain/requester
would like to outsource the computations to some external off-chain service providers,
called workers.
Remark that we will consider the outsourced program has a large output space,
and the correct output is unpredictable, namely, for each given input, one cannot
guess the output without computing the program with that input. Note that for most
machine learning tasks (e.g., the training of DNN classifier for large-scale dataset),
such properties can be observed. Also note that there could be some trivial outputs
such as all zeros, all ones, the input or a part of the input etc., we remark that such
a set of common knowledge denoted by Eck (also a subset of the output space) is
considered in the dissertation to capture these publicly known false outputs.1
The blockchain is always “good” for availability and correctness [57, 85]. The
blockchain can faithfully execute some pre-specified programs called smart contracts
to compute, transfer money, and/or broadcast execution result. But, smart contracts
have to be light and deterministic, due to the intrinsic limitations of the underlying
1
Remark that the correct output will not fall into the common-knowledge set Eck , as we consider
a program whose output is unpredictably placed into a large output space that is much more
considerable than |Eck |.
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blockchain [102]. Worse still, the blockchain is transparent and promise no privacy
guarantee, as all its internal states are public to everyone. It is worth to noticing
that we consider the smart contract can detect any particular false output belonging
to Eck , as Eck is actually common knowledge. This is still a scenario much more
stringent than the presence of a TTP who has to actively show up to resolve any
dispute.
The requester requests the blockchain to execute a smart contract, which
in practice is done through sending the blockchain a transaction pointing to the
contract’s program code2 . Also, the requester promises some pre-specified monetary
rewards to incentivize the blockchain to enforce the smart contract3 .

But the

requester cannot request the blockchain to run heavy and randomized computations
to facilitate his/her business. In such case, s/he will seek to outsource the task to
off-chain service providers. Let the outsourced program be randomized, and represent
it as ~y = P (~x; ~r), where ~x is the inputs, ~y is the outputs, and ~r is the random coin. We
remark our assumption that the outputs ~y will not be predictable as P can extract
considerable entropy from the random coin ~r (or from the input ~x as in some cases
~r can be empty), which actually captures many machine learning algorithms. Also,
the requester promises an incentive mechanism pre-specified via the blockchain to
incentivize the external computation services to compute his/her task, and we can
view the requester as “good”, since all his/her behaviors are codified into self-enforced
contract.
As the blockchain cannot enforce the execution of complex and randomized
computations for the requester, the requester/blockchain will further outsource
these computation tasks to some external computing services, called workers, with
announcing a pre-specified incentive mechanism via the blockchain. When workers
2

After a smart contract is deployed in the blockchain, it will have a unique blockchain address,
such that one can point it out through that address.
3
In practice, the incentive mechanism of smart contract is much more detailed, c.f. the gas
mechanism of Ethereum for details.
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claim to compute a outsourced task, they have to transfer enough deposits to
the blockchain, such that “penalties” can be applied, when the blockchain realizes
undesirable behaviors of the workers. More importantly, any worker is rational, that
means a work only prefers to maximize its utility. If some workers form a coalition,
these workers will prefers to maximize the coalition’s utility as well.
Monetary parameters. As we consider the problem in the game-theoretic setting,
the monetary parameters should be clearly defined. In the following, we will explain
the related parameters, and clarify the rationale behind:
• r represents the reward for a task, which is promised by the requester and
facilitated by the blockchain;
• d corresponds the deposit should be funded by a worker, if the worker claims
to do the outsourced task;
• c means the cost of a worker to do the task, which corresponds to the cost of
running a program in a computer.
Let us consider a situation that r  c, i.e., the payment of the requester should
be significantly larger than the cost of computing. That can be observed from the
real-world blockchain such as Ethereum, where users have to pay pretty considerable
premiums for on-chain computation resources. The requester in our case should
be fine with such a surcharge as well, because his/her purpose is to let the correct
computing result shown in the blockchain to further facilitate his/her business, which
is much more valuable than the tiny cost of computing. Therefore, we will ignore c
in the remaining of this dissertation.
Security goal. Next is to specify the security requirements for outsourcing the
expensive and randomized computation to off-chain services in the rational setting.
Detailedly, we consider that a requester outsources the execution of a computation task to n workers denoted by W1 , . . . , Wn . Our protocol and incentive design
essentially instantiate a game Γ joined by these workers, as the workers have different
utilities under different joint strategies. For a work Wk , we let its strategy set denoted
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by Sk . Also, there is always a strategy of “always sending the true result”, denoted
by σt , in per each worker’s strategy set.
Our security requires that the joint strategy ~σ = {σt , . . . , σt } is the only one that
survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS). The intuition
of such an IEWDS refining equilibrium is quite clear: although sending the correct
result might not always bring better utilities, when other workers do not send the
correct result, but there is always no harm for a worker to send the correct one,
and there even is a situation where sending the correct result brings the dominating
utility. At such a refined equilibrium, everyone worker will apply the strategy of
“always sending the true result”. When this security requirement is satisfied, we can
say our protocol realizes a practical mechanism (Γ, ~σ = {σt , . . . , σt }), as it can realize
the desired Nash equilibrium ~σ surviving IEWDS in the game Γ.

5.2

Prior Art

The insufficiencies of related work, such as verifiable computation, trusted hardware,
and existing game-theoretic approaches, are briefly summarized as follows.
A verifiable computation [59] allows a prover to produce an output along with
a cryptographic proof to convince a verifier that the output is obtained through
correctly executing a pre-defined computation. Recent constructive developments of
zk-SNARKs [15] enables very efficient verification with the price that proving takes
tremendous time and memory. For many heavy tasks, it is infeasible to generate the
proof in practice. For example, in [98], we use more than 250 GB memory+swap and
15 hours to prove the majority of 11 RSA-OAEP encrypted answers.
The recent rise of trusted computation hardware such as Intel SGX [36] brings
new techniques to allow people outsource their particular computation tasks [158]
to untrusted third-party. However, to “enjoy” such new developments, one has to
first trust the manufacturer. Worse still, the design rationale of SGX is a minimalist
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trusted machine that has a restricted amount of enclave, so it becomes unclear how
to avoid the huge performance penalty during attesting memory intensive programs.
Outsourced computation have been intensively discussed in game theoretic
settings before [45, 121, 116, 14, 87]. Most of them rely on a TTP (or an implicit one
launched by the requester) to resolve disputes and de-collude coalitions [45, 14, 87].
Some of them consider the absence of TTP under more optimistic scenario where all
computing services are non-colluding [121, 116]. We will consider a more stringent
setting: n computing services can form any coalition size up to n − 1, and also there
is no TTP to resolve mismatched computing results.

5.3
5.3.1

Protocol for Crowdsourcing ML Tasks

Protocol and Analysis: Two Non-Colluding Workers

In this section, we consider a fundamental scenario where the complex and randomized
computation task is outsourced to two independent workers. Also, the absence of a
trusted third-party (TTP) arbiter is taken into consideration. We observe that the
state-of-the-art incentive mechanism will suffer from deviation by free-riding due to
the absence of TTP arbiter, which can be intuitively understood as that a worker
always prefers to copy and paste the result reported by the other worker. We present
our protocol to address this critical issue, and analyze the security in game-theoretic
setting.
Intuitions. Our basic idea is to outsource the computations of a smart contract to
two independent rational workers, such that the workers can perform the computation
off-chain and the blockchain nodes therefore get rid of doing the heavy work. At the
same time, a simple incentive mechanism should be hosted by the blockchain to
incentivize the workers submit the correct output (and prevent false output as well).
A naive solution may allow the two workers submit their computing results to
the blockchain anytime, which implies someone can submit earlier, and the other one
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can report the computing result later. Unfortunately, the blockchain is transparent,
so the latter worker can free-ride by copying the first submission without doing any
computation; worse still, the second worker will submit the same, even if knowing the
earlier submission is wrong.
Intuitively, the major challenge is that the free-riding problem discourages the
two workers to compute the result independently. To solve this critical issue, our idea
is to ensure that the two workers reveal their computing results to the blockchain
simultaneously.

For the purpose, our protocol involves a commit phase, and a

reveal phase to let the results “simultaneously” posted on the blockchain (or once
committing a result, one cannot change the value even if revealed later). Such that,
the incentive mechanism can ensure: (i) rational workers always submit their results
“simultaneously”, otherwise there will be significant penalty; (ii) rational workers
have no interest to deviate by committing a false result.
Protocol details. Our protocol can be described as follows.
TaskPublish. The requester announces the computing task via the blockchain.
When the requester R would like to run intensive computations atop the blockchain,
she sends a smart contract that clearly specifies the task and the incentive mechanism.
The computing task can be viewed as a randomized program denoted by P (~x; ~r),
where ~x is the inputs and also stored on the chain, and ~r is the random coin which
will be announced by the requester in the next phase.
TaskPrepare. All participants fund enough deposits, and the random coin is
released if necessary. The budget (i.e., the promised rewards, denoted by r) of the
requester will be deposited to the same contract. Then, a worker4 that is interested
in the task should send its deposit, denoted by d. Once both two workers, denoted by
Wi , Wj , send their deposits. Random coin can be released, denoted by ~r, if necessary.
4

We remark that we ignore how to select two workers out of all qualified services. Any proper
worker selection method should be compatible here, for example, we can either let the requester
randomly choose, or let the workers bid, or based on the reputation score (if there is).
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In practice, this coin can be randomly picked by the requester, or be derived by a
future block [20]. After all these are completed, the protocol can move on. Remark
that the blockchain addresses of Wi , Wj are recorded by the contract, such that the
contract can require the workers to authenticate their transactions by signing under
the corresponding secret keys later.
Commit. The workers send the commitments encapsulating their computing
results, respectively. A worker, for example Wi , figures out a result, denoted by
~yi for the task.

If the result is correctly compute, we can expect ~yi same to

~y = P (~x; ~r). Then, Wi will send the commitment of ~yi , denoted by ci , to the
smart contract. The commitment ci is gotten via a standard commitment scheme5 ,
namely, ci = Commit(~yi , , Ki ), where Ki is a randomly chosen secret of Wi until to
open the commitment. For the other worker Wj , it also commits its result to the
blockchain, which can be done through the same commitment scheme. Assuming
that all computations and commitments can be done within a-priori delay ∆c (in
unit of block number), ∆c can be pre-specified by the contract. If any worker misses
the time to commit, its deposit is taken away. We also remark that the execution of
the outsourced computation is done off-chain, which will hurt the consensus of the
underlying blockchain.
Reveal. The workers open the commitment to reveal their computing results,
respectively. When both workers commit results, a worker, e.g., Wi can reveal the
result ~yi to the blockchain. If the blockchain receives Ki , it computes Open(ci , Ki ) to
get ~yi . If the Open algorithm outputs f ail, Wi will lose all its deposit. Also, supposing
that reveal should be done within a-priori countdown timer ∆o , a countdown timer
can be instantiated by the contract, if any worker fails to reveal in time, its deposit
will not be returned.
5

Remark that the commitment scheme itself is not necessarily non-malleable, as the transactions
encapsulating commitments are accepted by the contract only if they are validly signed by workers.
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Reward. The blockchain rewards/punishes the workers according to the results
they revealed. Once both the commitments are open or the countdown timer for
revealing stage expires, the smart contract will check the equality of result(s), and
make rewards or penalties, according to the pre-defined incentive clauses. More
detailedly, the clauses can be abstracted as:
• If any worker fails to commit or de-commit or submit a result in the commonknowledge set Eck , it loses all deposits, and the other party gets only half of its
deposit refunded (if it submits a result); 6
• If ~ri = ~rj , the two workers will split the reward, i.e., Wi gets r/2, and Wj gets
r/2; 7
• If ~ri 6= ~rj , both the two workers will lose half of their deposits, i.e., Wi gets
−d/2, and Wj gets −d/2.
Intuitively, the blockchain can only know the following information: (i) the equality
of two results (if there are two); (ii) anyone who fails to submit a result. And our
incentive mechanism are trying to make best usage of these information to deter the
submission of incorrect results.
Security analysis (sketch). Here we briefly discuss the security of the above
protocol in game-theoretic setting. Let us firstly check all possible pure strategies
of each worker. Considering that the workers are non-colluding, there are three pure
strategies for each worker in general:
• “Do not commit a result in the Commit phase, or do not open the commitment
in the Decommit phase, or submit a result in Eck ”, denoted by σe ;
• “Reveal the correct result to the blockchain”, denoted by σt ;
• “Reveal some false output chosen out of Eck ”, denoted by σf .
6

In practice, we may have valid heuristics to efficiently check weather an output is in Eck . For
example, the false ones in Eck usually have small entropy (except some cases like outputting inputs),
while the output of programs is unpredictable in our setting, which infers much more entropy. Such
that the requester can provide a list of random coins and then let the workers to compute the program
for several times under different random coins, which will allow the smart contract to easily filter
out low-entropy results as they are suspiciously chosen from the set of Eck .
7
One may wonder a trivial strategy that both of workers output some junks in the set of Eck .
But these have been captured by the contract, and are seen as failures of submitting.
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Table 5.1 The Game of Two Workers in Normal Form
Utility of Wi ,Wj
Wi
σe

Wj

σe
−d, −d

σt

σf

−d, −d/2 −d, −d/2

σt

−d/2, −d

r/2, r/2 −d/2, −d/2

σf

−d/2, −d −d/2, −d/2−d/2, −d/2

Since we consider a program having large output space, where the possible correct
results are placed in an unpredictable way. When two non-colluding workers are
submitting two junks out of Eck without coordination, their best way is to sampling
random junks, as the unpredictable output makes them have no advantage other than
guessing. Also, for large output space, there is no chance for such two junks to be
the same, i.e., the contract can always find two different submissions, if both workers
makes junks out of Eck .
Now we are ready to show the security of our protocol. In Table.5.1, the utilities
of two workers are shown for different joint strategies, as the incentive clauses are
clearly defined. We can leverage IEWDS method to check our game:
• For any worker, the pure strategy of playing σe is strictly dominated (i.e., worse
utility for sure), so σe is “deleted” for both workers, i.e., both workers will at
least submit;
• For any worker, the pure strategy of playing σf is weakly dominated (i.e., not
better utility for sure), so σf is “deleted” for both workers, i.e., sending the true
result is at least not worse than sending random junk.
The only left IEWDS refining Nash equilibrium is the joint strategy {σt , σt }, i.e.,
“both workers send the correct result”, and we can claim our protocol realizes a
practical mechanism (Γ, {σt , σt }), which clearly realizes our security goal.
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5.3.2

Protocol & Analysis: n Workers (|Coalition| ≤ n − 1)

The protocol for two workers rely on a key assumption that they are independent,
i.e., non-colluding. Now we are ready to present our protocol in a more general
scenario where n workers instead of two workers can hired to compute the outsourced
computations. More generally, we will allow the n workers to collude, as long as the
size of their coalitions is up to n − 1 (inclusively). Detailedly, in such a coalition, the
colluding workers there can make a strategy pre-agreed by all of coalition members to
deviate the game. If the coalition strategy is not weakly dominated by “always sending
the correct”, the mechanism fails. Otherwise, the mechanism is still a (n − 1)-resilient
practical mechanism (Γ, ~σ = {t, . . . , t}) that can tolerate these coalitions. In this
section, we will show the existence of such a (n − 1)-resilient practical mechanism.
Remark that this more general conclusion essentially captures the situation of two
independent workers (i.e., 1-resilient practical mechanism).
Protocol brief. The protocol for n workers also has TaskPublish, TaskPrepare,
Commit, Reveal and Reward phases, which are similar to the protocol for two workers.
Therefore we only focus on the incentive mechanism for n workers, and present the
clauses only:
• If any worker fails to commit or de-commit or submit a result in the commonknowledge set Eck , it loses all deposits, and all the other workers who submit
will only get a refund of half deposit;
• If n workers successfully report the same computing result, the n workers will
share the reward equally, i.e., each worker gets r/n;
• If n workers submit different results, i.e., there is as least one submission differs
from others, all workers will lose half of their deposits;
The above incentive mechanism for n workers is a straightforward extension of the
one for two workers. Again, the blockchain can only know the equality of reported
results, along with who fails to submit. Our incentive mechanism is designed to use
these little information to deter false results.
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Table 5.2 Utility of an Arbitrary Coalition C (|C| ≤ n−1) in the Game of n Workers
C’s utility

Else’s strategy
Situation I

Situation II

Situation III

σ1

−kd

−kd

−kd

σ2

−kd/2

kr/n

−kd/2

σ3

−kd/2

−kd/2

−kd/2

σ4

−pd/2 − ld

−pd/2 − ld

−pd/2 − ld

σ5

−qd/2 − ld

−qd/2 − ld

−qd/2 − ld

σ6

−(p + q)d/2

−(p + q)d/2

−(p + q)d/2

σ7

−(p + q)d/2 − ld

−(p + q)d/2 − ld

−(p + q)d/2 − ld

C’s strategy

Security analysis (sketch). Here we briefly discuss the security of the protocol for
n workers. For a coalition C of size up to k (1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1), it roughly has the
following strategies:
• Let all player in it play e, i.e., the coalition will submit nothing, denoted by σ1 ;
• Let all members play t, i.e., the coalition will submit all correct results, denoted
by σ2 ;
• Let all members “submit the same pre-agreed randomly chosen junk”, denoted
by σ3 ;
• Let p members send the correct results, and the other l = k − p members send
nothing, and the family of strategies can be denoted by σ4 ;
• Let q members send the random junks, and the other l = k − q members send
nothing, and we denote the family of strategies by σ5 ;
• Let p members send correct results, and the other q = k − p members send
junks, denoted by σ6 ;
• Let q members to send junks, some p members send correct results, and the
remaining l = k − p − q members send nothing, and this strategy family denoted
by σ7 .
Notice that a coalition’s strategy can be enforced for all its member workers. For
example, the same randomly chosen junk can be agreed by all its members. But for
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another worker who is out of the coalition C, it cannot know what the random junk
agreed within C. When C is making a decision on what a strategy to play, its utility
can be discussed by three situations. In each of the situation, the out-of-coalition
worker(s) might play different strategies:
• Situation I: there is at least one out-of-coalition worker submits nothing
(including to submit a result in Eck );
• Situation II: there is at least one out-of-coalition worker submits a randomly
chosen junk (out of Eck );
• Situation III: all out-of-coalition worker(s) submit the correct result.
When the coalition C applies different strategy in different situations, the utility
of this coalition can be derived and shown in Table 5.2. Essentially, for any coalition
formed by up to n − 1 workers, its utility can be represented in a similar table. After
performing IEWDS, the only survived joint strategy of all coalitions is “to send the
correct results”. In details, the iterative deletion of the weakly dominated strategies
can be discussed as follows:
• For any coalition, the pure strategy σ1 is strictly dominated, so σ1 is deleted,
also, situation I can be removed, as a consequence of the previous deletion;
• For any coalition, the pure strategies in σ4 , σ5 and σ7 are strictly dominated,
and therefore these strategies can be removed one by one;
• For any coalition, the pure strategies in σ6 are weakly dominated, and therefore
can be removed, also after this deletion, the situation II disappears.
For any coalition C (1 ≤ |C| ≤ n − 1), the only left pure strategy is to “send all
correct result(s)” after applying IEWDS. Actually, the game even can guarantee that
no matter how a coalition plays, no single worker in that coalition can get better
utility than “sending the true result”. Here we omit the trivial steps of proving this
conclusion. As such, all n workers will submit the correct results, even if we admit
that these workers can collude to make up any coalitions size up to n − 1. In sum,
we can realize a practical mechanism (Γ, {σt , . . . , σt }) which is (n − 1) resilient.
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5.4

Summary

To enable the feasibility of using smart contracts to crowdsource computation
intensive and sometimes randomized programs such as machine learning tasks, with
the given limitations on all existing verifiable computation, we take a game theoretic
approach. Instead of providing absolute confidence of verifying the correct execution
of outsourced “smart contract”, we design a simple incentive mechanism (that is
enforced by smart contract itself) so that dishonest execution could be deterred. We
present a general protocol to allow the chain to outsource heavy and randomized
computations to some external computing service providers (called workers). More
specifically, our contributions are threefold.
First, to enable the execution of heavy computations off-chain, we first consider
a classical (non-cooperative) game-theoretic setting with two workers that can audit
each other.

The chain would take results that both workers agree on.

Most

state-of-the-art solutions along this line assume an opportunistic approach that a
trusted party (TTP) comes online to arbitrate, in case an agreement on the result
cannot be reached. As opposed, we would get rid of this assumption. Besides properly
setting the incentives/payoffs, another subtle point remains due to the transparency
of the open blockchain: if one worker submits his answer, the other worker can simply
send the element without doing any work. This is known as the free-riding problem
in crowdsourcing which was also noted in previous works such as [98]. We leverage
a cryptographic tool of commitment scheme to tackle this problem. Taking all the
issues into account, we design a simple incentive mechanism and prove there is a
desirable refinement of Nash Equilibria that both workers do the correct computation
and return the right answer (c.f.

Sec.

2.4 for the Equilibria refinement).

We

also consider a class of randomized algorithms that can be considered as programs
taking inputs and an extra random coin (which can be supplied by the chain to
ensure the consistency for different workers). We remark that in our protocol, the

93

expensive and randomized computation is crowdsourced via the application layer
to be “asynchronously” executed and separated from the consensus layer. The full
nodes/miners can simply put the output into the coming block as the result is
submitted, they do not need to wait the execution to finish during mining, and thus
the consensus security will not be influenced.
Second, we then give two concrete instantiations regarding different type of
machine learning tasks, and apply our protocol to enable the “execution” of them over
the blockchain. The first example is about checking the quality of a crowdsourced
machine learning model, i.e., conditional payment based on the performance on
the testing data. The second example is directly for outsourcing machine learning
training via the smart contract, which can be an important piece of the social
computing puzzle.

These two interesting instances capture the essence of most

potential decentralized crowdsourcing for machine learning tasks. We also note that
our solution is actually general to carry a wide range of complex (or randomized)
programs as well. Finally, we set force to consider potential coalition(s) in the general
setting of more (≥ 3) workers. In particular, we design a protocol that can tolerate
any coalition(s), as long as there is no coalition consisting of all workers.
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CHAPTER 6
ON RECRUITING RELAYS FOR BLOCKCHAINS’ LIGHT CLIENTS

6.1
6.1.1

Background

Motivation

The emerging blockchain technology, in particular a permissionless blockchain, as nice
resultants of cryptography, distributed consensus and economic incentive, enables an
append only digital ledger to be jointly maintained and replicated consistently across
Internet peers. It enables many fantastic paradigms such as cryptocurrency and smart
contracts. As such, attractive decentralized ecosystems can be envisioned to reduce
the reliance on undesired third-parties, and therefore various promising decentralized
applications (DApps), such as novel financial instruments [114], peer-to-peer storage
outsourcing [108, 124], and data crowdsourcing [98] etc., can be implemented atop
blockchains.
Normally, a blockchain is considered as an abstracted layer so that higher layer
applications can simply interact with the ledger to read data from or write data into
the ledger [57, 85]. This basic abstraction (of reading data)1 implicitly assumes the
higher layer application is within a full node of the blockchain who has a complete
copy of the ledger thus can read data locally. A blockchain full node need always try
to download, verify, and store a replica of the ledger, so that he can catch up with
the consensus reached within the blockchain network.
On the other hand, there is a huge demand [37, 142, 98, 11] of blockchain’s
lightweight nodes (sometimes we also call them lightweight clients or light clients)
that may not have the capability to maintain the whole copy of the ledger. In the
setting of DApps, they could be hosted in smartphones, browser extensions, IoT nodes
1

We remark that to write valid messages into the blockchain could be trivial, as one can always
gossip with some blockchain nodes to diffuse its messages to the whole blockchain network, and then
the liveness of the blockchain will ensure the appearance of these messages in the ledger [57].
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or even an external blockchain’s smart contract. For example, it is highly desirable
that a user can use his mobile cryptocurrency wallet to do online sale and verify the
settlement of transactions sent to her in the blockchain. This demand calls for a
protocol specifically designed for lightweight nodes, such that they can be exempt
from running the consensus protocol to keep up with the whole ledger. What’s more,
such a desirable protocol is also promising to resolve the critical problem of efficient
“cross-chain” communication [80, 11] between two different chains (or among multiple
chains), in which a peer may not be interested to keep the complete ledger of both of
the ledgers; instead, he could be a full node of one blockchain, while plays the role as
a lightweight node of another external blockchain. Let alone for resourceful DApps
users, they have few motivations to setup full nodes to maintain a ledger, and might
also look for lightweight node protocol, as their main purpose is just to use DApps.

6.1.2

Challenges

The difficulty of designing a lightweight friendly protocol comes from the fact that
without a replica of the complete chain, a lightweight node essentially has to rely on
some full nodes to relay the blockchain’s states. Many of the existing systems simply
rely on some trusted relay nodes [104]. Two threats emerge: (i) a dishonest relay
node (especially the one has financial transactions with the lightweight client) may
simply return false information about the ledger to the lightweight client; (ii) not
like miners maintaining the ledger to obtain rewards, full nodes have little incentive
to participate in the relay service [39]. Current efforts on lightweight node protocols
[96, 80, 114, 91] have been focusing on providing succinct cryptographic proofs to
convince the lightweight nodes. The general idea is to allow the lightweight nodes to
keep with some small amount of metadata (which usually are consensus-dependent
such as the proof-of-work in Nakamoto’s blockchains [114, 80, 96]) to pick up the
correct blockchain branch.
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These methods have several drawbacks:

first, most of them require the

lightweight nodes to store and keep updating some metadata to verify the relayed
blockchain readings, which can be unfavorable in resource-starved environments such
as IoT sensors and/or the multi-chain scenarios [96]. Worse still, as these methods
usually require lightweight nodes to validate some consensus-dependent metadata, and
therefore are always specifically designed with considering the underlying consensus
protocols. For example, for proof-of-stake type of consensus, currently one of few
candidates [91] is specifically designed for Algorand [63], which is not suitable for
blockchains that utilize other proof-of-stake protocols. This also creates prohibitive
obstacles to interesting use-cases such as multi-chain clients. See Related Work below
for more detailed discussions about the insufficiencies of the current solutions.
“How to realize a lightweight protocol that is generic as well as friendly to
extremely resource-starved environments” is still a valuable open problem.

6.2

Prior Art

The SPV client is the first lightweight protocol for PoW blockchains, proposed as
early as Bitcoin [114]. Following the protocol, resource-constrained devices need to
download, verify and store a chain of block headers, and then can verify the existence
of any transaction, with the help of other full nodes. The main weaknesses of SPV
client is that the block headers to download, verify and store will grow linearly with the
number of the blocks of the chain, which nowadays corresponds 40 MB in Bitcoin and
more than 2 GB in Ethereum. For this reason, the concept of Proofs of Proof-of-Work
(PoPoW) was formulated in [80, 79], through which one can store only the genesis
block header, and then verify the existence of any transaction at a communication cost
sub-linear to the length of PoW chain. All above schemes cannot be applied to a proofof-stake (PoS) blockchain, because in a PoS blockchain, the validity of a block relies on
the signature(s) of stakeholder(s), whose validities further depend on the distribution
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of all “stakes” recorded in the blockchain ledger. Some fast bootstrap methods such
as [91] was proposed for lightweight nodes, but only works for a particular PoS chain;
moreover the bootstrapping is still at a substantial cost which is still unaffortable to
most resource-constrained nodes.
Vitalik Buterin [22] proposed to avoid forks in PoS blockchain using incentives:
a selected committee will be punished if he proposed two different blocks in one
epoch. In this way, the lightweight node was claimed to be supported as receiving a
block (and then send back to the blockchain network) different with the one on chain
could be viewed as a malicious behavior of the relay node. However, as committees
rotate periodically, it is unclear whether the protocol still works if the relay node
is a committee for a recent period, while the lightweight client query is about some
“ancient” block which was generated before the relay node becomes a committee.
Another recent attempt in [39] focused on implementing a prototype protocol to
support lightweight nodes by using economic incentives way, while our work provides
a formally game-theoretic study in the more general setting.
Verifiable computation allows a prover to produce a cryptographic proof to
convince a verifier that the output is obtained through correctly executing a
pre-defined computation [59]. Recent constructive developments of zk-SNARKs [15]
enables very efficient verification with the price that proving takes tremendous time
and memory. For heavy tasks such as to prove the length (and even more complex
properties) of a blockchain, it is usually infeasible in practice [96].
Attestation via trusted hardwares has attracted many attentions recently [36,
158]. But recent Foreshadow attacks [146, 150] put SGX’s attestation keys in danger
of leakage, and thus allow the adversary to forge attestations, which hints us again
that the whole assumption of trusted hardwares could be arguable.
Outsourced computation via incentive games have been discussed earlier [121,
87].

Some recent studies even consider using the blockchain to facilitate such
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outsourcing games [45, 141]. All these studies assume an implicit game mediator
(e.g., the blockchain) who can speak to and listen to all involving parties, including
the requester, the workers and the arbiter. However, in our setting, we have to
resolve a special issue that there is no such a game mediator, since the blockchain, as a
potential candidate, can not speak to the light node (i.e., the requester of computing).

6.3

Warmup: Security in Extensive-Form Game

Here gives a simple interactive “protocol” to exemplify the game-theoretic setting
(see Chapter 2 for more rigor definitions of the relevant game-theory preliminaries).

6.3.1

Interactive Protocol as Extensive-Form Game

Consider an oversimplified “light-client protocol”: Alice is a cashier of a pizza store;
her client asks a full node (i.e., relay) to check a transaction’s (non)existence, and
simply terminates to output what is forwarded by the relay.
Strategy, action, history, and information set. Let the oversimplified “protocol”
proceed in synchronous round. In each round, the parties will execute its strategy,
i.e., a probabilistic polynomial-time ITM in our context, to produce and feed a string
to the protocol, a.k.a., take an action. During the course of the protocol, a sequence
of actions would be made, and we say it is a history by convention of the game theory
literature; moreover, when a party acts, it might have learned some (incomplete)
information from earlier actions taken by other parties, so the notion of information
sets can be used to characterize what has and has not been learned by each party.
Concretely speaking, the oversimplified “light-client protocol” can be described by
the extensive-form game as shown in Figure 6.1, and it proceeds in the next three
rounds.
Round 1 (chance acts). A definitional virtual party called chance sets the
ground truth, namely, it determines T rue or F alse to represent whether the
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Figure 6.1 The extensive game of an oversimplified light-client “protocol”. The
utility function is an example to clarify insecurity of the trivial idea.
transaction exists (denoted by a or a0 , respectively). To capture the uncertainty
of the ground truth, the chance acts arbitrarily.
Round 2 (relay acts). Then, the relay is activated to forward T rue or F alse
to the light client, which states whether the transaction exists or not. Note the
strategy chosen by the relay is an ITM that can produce arbitrary strings in this
round, we need to map the strings into the admissible actions, namely, t, f and x.
For definiteness, we let the string of ground truth be interpreted as the action t, the
string of the opposite of ground truth be interpreted as the action f , and all other
strings (including abort) be interpreted as x.
Round 3 (client acts). Finally, the client outputs T rue (denoted by A) or F alse
(denoted by A0 ) to represent whether the transaction exists or not, according to the
(incomplete) information acquired from the protocol. Note the client knows how
the relay acts, but cannot directly infer the action of chance. It faces three distinct
information sets I1 , I2 and I3 , which respectively represent the client receives T rue,
F alse and others in Round 2. Note that the client cannot distinguish which history
it reaches within each of its information sets.
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Utility function.

After the protocol terminates, its game reaches a so-called

terminal history. A well-defined utility function specifies the economic outcome of
each party, for each terminal history induced by the extensive game.
In practice, the utility function is determined by some economic factors of the
parties and the protocol itself [69, 45]. For example, the rationale behind the utility
function in Figure 6.1 can be understood as: (i) the relay is motivated to fool the client
to believe the nonexistence of an existing transaction, because this literally “censors”
Alice to harm her business by a loss of $v, which also brings a malicious benefit $α · v
to the relay; (ii) the relay also prefers to fool the client to believe the existence of a
non-existing transaction, so the relay gets free pizzas valued by $β · v, which causes
Alice lose $v (i.e., the amount supposed to be transacted to purchase pizzas), (iii)
after all, the oversimplified protocol itself does not facilitate any punishment/reward,
so will not affect the utility function.

6.3.2

Security via Sequential Equilibrium

Putting the game structure and the utility function together, we can argue the
(in)security due to the equilibria in the game. In particular, we can adopt the strong
notion of sequential equilibrium for extensive games [70, 71, 45, 118] to demonstrate
that the rational parties would not deviate, at each stage during the execution of the
protocol. As a negative lesson, the oversimplified “light-client game” in Figure 6.1
is insecure in the game-theoretic setting, as the relay can unilaterally deviate to fool
the client for higher utility. In contrast, if the protocol is secure in game-theoretic
settings, its game shall realize desired equilibrium, such that rational parties would
not diverge from the protocol for highest utilities.
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6.4

Problem Formulation

The light-client protocol involves a light client, some relay full nodes (e.g., one or
two), and an ideal functionality (i.e., “arbiter” contract). The light client relies on
the relays to “read” the chain, and the relays expect to receive correct payments.
The basic functionality of our light-client protocol is to allow the resourcestarved clients to evaluate the falseness or trueness about some statements over the
blockchain [80]. This aim is subtly broader than [83], whose goal is restricted to
prevent the client from deciding trueness when the statement is actually false.
Chain predicate. The dissertation focuses on a general class of chain predicates
whose trueness (or falseness) can be induced by up to l transactions’ inclusions in
the chain, such as “whether the transaction with identifier txid is in the blockchain
C[0 : N ] or not”. Formally, we focus on the chain predicate in the form of:



F alse, otherwise
`
P (C[0 : N ]) =


T rue, ∃C0 ⊂ C[0 : N ] s.t. D` (C0 ) = T rue
or equivalently, there is Q(·) = ¬P(·):



F alse, ∃C0 ⊂ C[0 : N ] s.t. D` (C0 ) = T rue
`
Q (C[0 : N ]) =


T rue, otherwise
where C0 is a subset of the blockchain C[0 : N ], and D` (·) is a computable predicate
taking C0 as input and is writable as:




T rue, ∃ {txi } that |{txi }| ≤ `:








f ({txi }) = 1 ∧ ∀ txi ∈ {txi },




D` (C0 ) =
∃ C[t] ∈ C0 and P.P.T. computable πi s.t.







VrfyMTP(C[t].root, H(txi ), πi ) = 1







F alse, otherwise
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where f ({txi }) = 1 captures that {txi } satisfies a certain relationship, e.g., “the hash
of each txi equals a specified identifier txidi ”, or “each txi can pass the membership
test of a given bloom filter”, or “the overall inflow of {txi } is greater than a given
value”. We let P`N and Q`N be short for P` (C[0 : N ]) and Q` (C[0 : N ]), respectively.
Examples of chain predicate. The seemingly complicated definition of chain
predicate actually has rather straightforward intuition to capture a wide range of
blockchain “readings”, as for any predicate under this category, either its trueness or
its falseness can be succinctly attested by up to ` transactions’ inclusion in the chain.
For ` = 1, some concrete examples are:
• “A certain transaction tx is included in C[0 : N ]”, the trueness which can be
attested by tx’s inclusion in the chain.
• “A set of transactions {txj } are all incoming transactions sent to a particular
address in C[0 : N ]”, the falseness of which can be proven, if ∃ a transaction tx
s.t.: (i) tx ∈
/ {txj }, (ii) tx is sent to the certain address, and (iii) tx is included
in the chain C[0 : N ].
Limits. A chain predicate is a binary question, whose trueness (or falseness) is
reducible to the inclusion of some transactions. Nevertheless, its actual meaning
depends on how to concretely specify it. Intuitively, a “meaningful” chain predicate
might need certain specifications from an external party outside the system. For
example, the cashier of a pizza store can specify a transaction to evaluate its
(non)existence, only if the customer tells the txid.
“Handicapped” verifiability of chain predicate. W.lo.g., we will focus on the
chain predicate in form of P`N , namely, whose trueness is provable instead of the
falseness for presentation simplicity. Such the “handicapped” verifiability can be well
abstracted through a tuple of two algorithms (evaluate, validateTrue):
• evaluate(P`N ) → σ or ⊥: The algorithm takes the replica of the blockchain as
auxiliary input and outputs σ or ⊥, where σ is a proof for P`N = T rue, and
⊥ represents its falseness; note the proof σ here includes: a set of transactions
{txi }, a set of Merkle proofs {πi }, and a set of blocks C0 ;
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• validateTrue(σ, P`N ) → 0 or 1: This algorithm takes blockhashes as auxiliary
input and outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject) depending on whether σ is deemed to
be a valid proof for P`N = T rue.
The above algorithms satisfy: (i) Correctness, that means for any chain predicate P`N ,
the probability Pr[validateTrue(evaluate(P`N ), P`N ) = 1 | P`N = true] is equal to 1, and
(ii) Verifiability, which means for any P.P.T. A and P`N , there is Pr[validateTrue(σ ←
A(P` ), P`N ) = 1 | P`N = f alse] ≤ negl(λ), where evaluate implicitly takes the
blockchain replica as input, and validateTrue implicitly inputs blockhashes.

The

abstraction can also be slightly adapted for Q`N whose falseness is the provable
side, though we omit that for presentation simplicity. Through the remaining of
the dissertation, evaluate can be seen as a black-box callable by any full nodes that
have the complete replica of the blockchain, and validateTrue is a subroutine that can
be invoked by the smart contracts that can access the dictionary blockhashes.

6.4.1

System and Adversary Model

The system explicitly consists of a light client, some relay(s) and an arbiter
contract. All of them are computationally bounded to perform only polynomial-time
computations. The messages between them can deliver synchronously within a-priori
known delay ∆T , via point-to-point channels. In details, each system participant can
be abstracted in the following way.
The rational lightweight client LW is abstracted as follows: (i) It is rational and
selfish; (ii) It is computationally bounded, i.e., it can only take an action computable
in probabilistic polynomial-time; (iii) It opts out of consensus; to capture this, we
assume: The client can send messages to the contract due to the network diffusion
functionality [57, 85]; and the client cannot receive messages from the contract except
a short setup phase, which can be done in practice because the client user can
temporarily boost a personal full node by fast-bootstrapping protocols.
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The rational full node Ri is modeled as: (i) It is rational, and the full node
Ri might (or might not) cooperate with another full node Rj ; The cooperative
full nodes form a coalition to maximize the total utility, as they can share all
information, coordinate all actions and transfer payoffs, etc. [117]; essentially, we
follow the conventional notion to view the cooperative relays as a single party [13];
Non-cooperative full nodes maximize their own utilities independently in a selfish
manner due to the standard non-cooperative game theory, which can be understood
as that they are not allowed to choose some ITMs to communicate with each other
[90]; (ii) It can only take P.P.T. computable actions at any stage of the protocol; (iii)
It runs the consensus, such that it stores the complete replica of the latest blockchain
and can send/receive messages to/from the smart contract; (iv) It can send messages
to the light client via an off-chain private channel.2
The arbiter contract Gac follows the standard abstraction of smart contracts
[85, 82], with a few slight extensions. First, it would not send any messages to the
light client except during a short setup phase. Second, it can access a dictionary
blockhashes [106, 54], which contains the hashes of all blocks. The latter abstraction
allows the contract to invoke validateTrue to verify the proof attesting the trueness of
any predicate P`N , in case the predicate is actually true.

6.4.2

Economic Factors

It is necessary to clarify the economic parameters of the rational parties to complete
our game-theoretic model. We present those economic factors and argue the rationale
behind them as follows.
Parameter c: It represents how much the client spends to maintain its (personal)
trusted full node during the repeatable query phase. Note c does not mean the
2

Such the assumption can be granted if considering the client and the relays can set up private
communication channels on demand. In practice, this can be done because (i) the client can
“broadcast” its network address via the blockchain [101], or (ii) there is a trusted name service
that tracks the network addresses of the relays.

105

security relies on a trusted full node and only characterizes the cost of maintaining
the trusted full node. For example, c → ∞ would represent that the client cannot
connect any available trusted full node, once the protocol has been set up and the
client disconnects any personal full node. Note c does not characterize the cost of the
relay full node to run the consensus, and is considered to argue that rational users are
willing to employ our protocol instead of maintaining their own personal full nodes
(or subscribing some other relaying services).
Parameter v: The factor means the “value” attached to the chain predicate
under query. If the client incorrectly evaluates the predicate, it loses v. For example,
the cashier Alice is evaluating the (non)existence of a certain transaction; if Alice
believes the existence of a non-existing transaction, she loses the amount to be
transacted; if Alice believes the nonexistence of an existing transaction, her business
is harmed by such the censorship.
Parameter vi (P`N , C) → [0, vi ]: This function characterizes the motivation of the
relay Ri to cheat the light client. Namely, it represents the extra (malicious) utility
that the relay Ri earns, if fooling the client to incorrectly evaluate the chain predicate.
P
We explicitly let vi (P`N , C) to have an upper-bound vi s.t.
Ri vi ≤ v, which means
the malicious utilities acquired by all relay nodes when the light client is fooled shall
not be greater than the “value” attached to the chain predicate to query.
Parameter : When a party chooses a strategy (i.e., a P.P.T. ITM) to break
underlying cryptosystems, we let  represent the expected utility of such a strategy,
where  is a negligible function in cryptographic security parameter [44].
In addition, all communications and P.P.T. computations can be done costlessly
w.r.t. the economic aspect (unless otherwise specified).
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6.4.3

Security Goals

The aim of the light-client protocol in the game-theoretic model is to allow a rational
light client employ some rational relaying full nodes (e.g., two) to correctly evaluate a
few chain predicates, and these recruited full nodes are correctly paid as pre-specified.
In details, we require such the light-client protocol ΠLW to satisfy the following
correctness and security properties.
Correctness. If all parties are honest, we require: (i) the relay nodes are correctly
paid; (ii) the light client correctly evaluates some chain predicates under the category
of P` (·), regarding the chain C[0 : T ] (i.e., the chain at the time of evaluating). Both
requirements shall hold with probability 1.
Security.

We adopt a strong game-theoretic security notion of sequential

equilibrium [71, 45, 70] for incomplete-information extensive games.

Consider

an extensive-form game Γ that models the light-client protocol ΠLW , and let
(Zbad , Zgood ) as a partition of the terminal histories Z of the game Γ. Given a
-sequential equilibrium of Γ denoted by σ, the probability of reaching each terminal
history z ∈ Z can be induced, which can be denoted by ρ(σ, z). Our security goal
would require: there is a -sequential equilibrium σ of Γ where  is at most a negligible
function in cryptographic security parameter λ, such that under the -equilibrium σ,
the game Γ always terminates in Zgood .
Remark. The traditional game-theory analysis captures only computationally
unbounded players. But it becomes natural to consider computationally-bounded
players in an interactive protocol using cryptography, so will we do through the
dissertation. In such the setting, a strategy of a party can be a P.P.T. ITM to break
the underlying cryptosystems. However, this strategy succeeds with only negligible
probability. Consequently, our security goal (i.e., -sequential equilibrium) can be
refined into a computational variant to state the rational players switch strategies,
only if the gain of deviation is non-negligible.
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6.5

A Simple Light-Client Protocol

We dedicatedly design a simple light-client protocol, in which a light client (LW) can
leverage it to employ two (or one) relays to evaluate the chain predicates P`N .

6.5.1

Arbiter Contract and High-Level of the Protocol

The simple light-client protocol is centering around an arbiter smart contract Gac as
shown in Figure 6.2. It begins with letting all parties place their initial deposits in
the arbiter contract Gac . Later, the client can ask the relays to forward some readings
about the blockchain, and then feeds what it receives back to the contract. As such,
once the contract hears the feedback from the client, it can leverage the initial deposits
to facilitate some proper incentive mechanism, in order to prevent the parties from
deviating by rewards and/or punishments, which becomes the crux of our protocol.
For security in the rational setting, the incentive mechanism must be powerful
enough to precisely punish misbehaviors (and reward honesty). Our main principle to
realize such the powerful incentive is letting the arbiter contract to learn as much as
possible regarding how the protocol is actually executed off-chain, so it can precisely
punish and then deter any deviations.
Nevertheless, the contract has “handicapped” abilities. We have to carefully
design the protocol to circumvent its limits, for the convenience of designing the
powerful enough incentive mechanism later.
First, the contract Gac does not know what the relay nodes forward to the
light client off-chain. The contract Gac has to rely on the client to know what the
relays did. At the first glance, the client might cheat the contract, by claiming that it
receives nothing from the relays or even forging the relays’ messages, in order to avoid
paying. To deal with the issue, we require that: (i) the relays authenticate what they
forward to the client by digital signatures, so the contract later can verify whether
a message was originally sent from the relays, by checking the attached signatures;
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The arbiter contract Gac for m relays (m = 1 or 2)
Init. Let state := INIT, deposits := {}, relays := {}, pubKeys := {},
ctr := 0, predicate := ∅, predicate.N := 0, Tend := 0
Setup phase
Create. On receiving the message (create, k, p, e, dL , dF , ∆T ) from LW:
-

assert state = INIT and ledger[LW] ≥ $k · dL
store k, p, e, r, dL , dF , and ∆T as internal states
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] − $k · dL
ctr := k and state := CREATED
send (deployed, k, p, e, dL , dF , ∆T ) to all

Join. On receiving (join, pki ) from Ri for first time:
assert state = CREATED and ledger[Ri ] ≥ $k · dF
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] − $k · dF
pubKeys := pubKeys ∪ (Ri , pki )
state := READY, if |pubKeys| = m
Queries phase
Request. On receiving (request, P` ) from LW:
-

- assert state = READY and ledger[LW] ≥ $(p + e)
- ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] − $(p + e)
- predicate := P`T //Note T is the current chain height
- Tend := T + ∆T
- send (quering, ctr, predicate) to each full node registered in
pubKeys
- state := QUERYING
Feedback. On receiving (feedback, responses) from LW for first time:
- assert state = QUERYING
- store responses for the current ctr
Timer. Upon T ≥ Tend and state := QUERYING:
-

call Incentive(responses, predicate) subroutine
let ctr := ctr − 1
if ctr > 0 then state := READY
else state := EXPIRED

Figure 6.2 The contract Gac written in the conventional pseudocode notations.
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(ii) the contract requires the light client to deposit an amount of $e for each query,
which is returned to the client, only if the client reports some forwarded blockchain
readings signed by the relays.
Second, the contract has a “handicapped” verifiability, which allows it to
efficiently verify a claim of P`N = T rue, if being give a succinct proof σ. To leverage
the property, the protocol is designed to let the relays attach the corresponding proof
σ whenever claiming the provable trueness. Again, such the design is a simple yet still
useful way to allow the contract “learn” more about the protocol execution, which
later allows us to design powerful incentive mechanisms to precisely punish deviations.

6.5.2

The Light-Client Protocol

In the presence of the contract Gac , our light-client protocol can be formally described
as Figure 6.3. To make an oversimplified summary, it first comes with a one-time setup
phase, during which the relay(s) and client make initial deposits, which later can be
leveraged by the incentive mechanism to fine tune the payoffs. Then, the client can
work independently and request the relays to evaluate a few chain predicates up to
k times, repeatedly. Since the payoffs are well adjusted, “following the protocol”
becomes the rational choice of everyone in each query.
Setup phase. As shown in Figure 6.3, the user of a lightweight client LW connects
to a trusted full node in the setup phase, and announces an “arbiter” smart contract
Gac . After the contract Gac is deployed, some relay full nodes (e.g., one or two) are
recruited to join the protocol by depositing an amount of $k · dF in the contract. The
public keys of the relay(s) are also recorded by contract Gac .
Once the setup phase is done, each relay full node places the initial deposits
$k · dF and the light client deposit $k · dL , which will be used to deter their deviations
from the protocol. At the same time, LW records the public keys of the relay(s), and
then disconnects the trusted full node to work independently.
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The light-client protocol ΠLW (where are m relays)
Setup phase
• Protocol for the light client LW:
Create. On instantiating a protocol instance:
- decide k, p, e, dL , dF , ∆T and let ctrlw := k
- send (create, k, p, e, dL , dF , ∆T ) to Gac
Off-line. On receiving (initialized, pubKeys) from Gac :
- record pubKeys and disconnect the trusted full node
.................................................................................
• Protocol for the relay Ri :
Join. On receiving (deployed, k, p, e, dL , dF , ∆T ) from Gac :
- generate a key pair (ski , pki ) for signature scheme
- send (join, pki ) to Gac
Queries phase
• Protocol for the light client LW:
Request. On receiving a message (from the higher level app) to evaluate the
predicate P` :
- Tf eed := T + 2∆T , and send (request, P` ) to Gac
Evaluate. On receiving (response, ctri , resulti , sigi ) from the relay Ri :
- assert T ≤ Tf eed and ctri = ctrlw
- assert vrfySig(hresulti , ctri, sigi , pki ) = 1
- responses := responses ∪ (resulti , sigi )
- if |responses| = m then
output b ∈ {T rue, F alse}, if responses claim b
Feedback. Upon the global clock T = Tf eed :
- ctrlw := ctrlw − 1
- send (feedback, responses) to Gac
.................................................................................
• Protocol for the relay Ri :
Respond. On receiving (quering, ctr, P`N ) from Gac :
- resulti := evaluate(P`N )
- sigi := sign(hresulti , ctri, ski )
- send (response, ctr, resulti , sigi ) to LW
Figure 6.3 The light-client protocol ΠLW among the relay(s) and client.
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In practice, the setup can be done by using many fast bootstrap methods [123,
91, 80], which allows the user to efficiently launch a personal trusted full node in the
PC. The light client (e.g., a smart phone) can connect to the PC to sync. Remark
that, besides the cryptographic security parameter λ, the protocol is specified with
some other parameters:
• k: The protocol is expired, after the client requests the relay(s) to evaluate some
chain predicates for k times.
• k · dL : This is the deposit placed by the client to initialize the protocol.
• k · dF : The initial deposit of a full node to join the protocol as a relay node.
• p: Later in each query, the client shall place this amount to cover the welldeserved payment of the relay(s).
• e: Later in each query, the client shall place this deposit e in addition to p.
Repeatable query phase. Once the setup is done, LW disconnects the trusted full
node, and can ask the relay(s) to query some chain predicates repeatedly. During the
queries, LW can message the arbiter contract, but cannot read the internal states of
Gac . Informally, each query proceeds as “request-response-evaluate-payout”.
Request. In each query, LW firstly sends a request message to the contract Gac ,
which encapsulates detailed specifications of a chain predicate P` (·), along with a
deposit denoted by $(p + e), where $p is the promised payment and $e is a deposit
refundable only when LW reports what it receives from the relays. Once Gac receives
the request message from LW, Gac further parameterizes the chain predicate P` as P`N ,
where N ← T represents the current global time (i.e., the latest blockchain height).
Response. The the relay full node(s) can learn the predicate P`N under query
(whose ground truth is fixed since N is fixed and would not be flipped with the
growth of the global timer T ), and the settlement of the deposit $(p + e) by reading
the arbiter contract. Then, the relay node can evaluate the predicate P`N with using
its local blockchain replica as auxiliary input. When P`N = T rue, the relay node
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shall send the client a response message including a proof σ for trueness, which can
be verified by the arbiter contract but not the light client; in case P`N = F alse, the
“honest” full node shall reply to the light client with a response message including
⊥. In addition, when the relay sends a response message to LW off-chain,3 it also
authenticates the message by attaching its signature (which is also bounded to an
increasing only counter to prevent replaying).
Evaluate & Feedback. Upon receiving a response message from the relay Ri ,
LW firstly verifies that it is authenticated by a valid signature sigi . If sigi is valid,
LW parses the response message to check whether Ri claims P`N = T rue or P`N =
F alse. If receiving consistent response message(s) from all recruited relay(s), the light
client decides this consistently claimed T rue/F alse. Then the client sends a feedback
message to the contract Gac with containing these signed response message(s). Remark
we do not assume the client follows the protocol to output and feeds back to the
contract. Instead, we focus on proving “following the protocol to decide an output”
is the sequential rational strategy of the client.
Payout.

Upon receiving the feedback message sent from the light client,

the contract Gac shall invoke the Incentive subroutine to facilitate some payoffs.
Functionality-wise, the payoff rules of the incentive subroutine would punish and/or
reward the relay node(s) and the light client, such that none of them would deviate
from the protocol.
Remark on correctness. It is immediate to see the correctness: when all parties
are honest, the relay(s) receive the payment pre-specified due to incentive mechanism
in the contract, and the client always outputs the ground truth of chain predicate.
Remark on security. The security would depend on the payoffs clauses facilitated
by the incentive subroutine, which will be elaborated in later subsections as we
3
Note that we assume the off-chain communication can be established on demand in the
dissertation, which in practice can be done through a name service or “broadcasting” encrypted
network addresses through the blockchain [101].
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intentionally decouple the protocol and the incentive design.

Intuitively, if the

incentive subroutines does nothing, there is no security to any extent; since following
the protocol is not any variant of equilibrium. Thus, the incentive mechanism must
be carefully designed to finely tune the payoffs, in order to make the sequential
equilibrium to be following the protocol.

6.6

Adding Incentives for Security

Without a proper incentive subroutine, our simple light-client protocol is seemingly
insecure to any extent, considering at least the relay nodes are well motivated to
cheat the client. To mitigate the issue, this section formally treats the light-client
protocol as an extensive game, and then studies on how to squeeze most out of the
“handicapped” abilities of the arbiter contract to design proper incentives, such that
the utility function of the game can be well adjusted to deter any party from deviating
at any stage of the protocol’s extensive game.

6.6.1

Challenges of Designing Incentives

The main challenge of designing proper incentives to prevent the parties from
deviating is the “handicapped” abilities of the arbiter contract Gac : there is no proof
for a claim of P`N = F alse, so Gac cannot directly catch a liar who claims bogus
P`N = F alse. We conquer the above issue in the rational setting, by allowing the
contract Gac to believe unverifiable claims are correctly forwarded by rational relay(s),
even if no cryptographic proofs for them. Our solution centers around the fact: if
a claim of P`N = F alse is actually fake, there shall exist a succinct cryptographic
proof for P`N = T rue, which can falsify the bogus claim of P`N = F alse. As such,
we derive the basic principles of designing proper incentives in different scenarios:
(i) When there are two non-cooperative relays, we create an incentive to leverage
non-cooperative parties to audit each other, so sending fake P`N = F alse become
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Note: the client's last actions (i.e. feedback & output) are omitted here in the figures

Figure 6.4 The repetition structure of the light-client game in one query: (a) two
non-cooperative relays (i.e., Γ2 ); (b) one single relay (i.e., Γ1 ). The last actions of the
client are not shown for presentation simplicity.

irrational and would not happen; (ii) When there is only one relay node (which
models that there are no non-cooperative relays at all), we somehow try an incentive
design to let the full node “audit” itself, which means: the relay would get a higher
payment, as long as it presents a verifaible claim instead of an unverifiable claim. So
the relay is somehow motivated to “audit” itself.

6.6.2

“Light-Client Game” of the Protocol

Here we present the structure of “light-client game” for the simple light-client
protocol presented in the earlier section. We would showcase how the extensive game
does capture (i) all polynomial-time computable strategies and (ii) the incomplete
information received during the course of the protocol.
Game structure for two relays. For the case of recruiting two (non-cooperative)
relays, we denote the “light-client” game as Γk2 . It has a repetition structure (i.e., a
stage game Γ2 ) that can be repeated up to k times as shown in Figure 6.4 (a), since
the client can raise queries for up to k times in the protocol. More precisely, for each
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query, the protocol proceeds as the incomplete-information extensive stage game Γ2
that can be described as follows.
Client acts by making a query or not. The client moves, with two optional
actions Q and B. Q denotes “sending a request message to query”, and B denotes
“others” (including abort). The game only proceeds when the light client acts Q.
Chance acts by choosing the truth. At the history Q, the special player “chance”
moves, with two possible actions a and a0 . Let a represent P`N = T rue, and a0 for
P`N = F alse. The occurrence of a and a0 follows an arbitrary distribution [ρ, 1 − ρ].
Note the action of chance can be observed by the relay full nodes but not the client.
Relay acts by responding the client. At histories Q(a|a0 ),

4

the relay node R1

acts, with three available actions {t, f, x}:
• The action t means R1 forwards the ground truth of P`N to LW (with attaching
correct “proofs” if there are any).5
• The action f represents that R1 forwards the opposite of the ground truth of
chain predicate to LW.
• The action x means as others, including abort and some attempts to break the
cryptographic primitives.
The other relay acts by responding the relay. At histories Q(a|a0 )(t|f |x), it is
the turn of R2 to move. Since R1 and R2 are non-cooperative, histories Qa(t|f |x)
make of an information set of R2 denoted by I1 , and similarly, Qa0 (t|f |x) is another
information set I2 . At either I1 or I2 , R2 has three actions {t, f, x}, which can be
understood as same as the actions of R1 at Q(a|a0 ), since R1 and R2 are exchangeable
notations.
Client acts by feeding back and evaluating. Then the game Γ2 reaches one of
the histories Q(a|a0 )(t|f |x)(t|f |x). As shown in Figure 6.4, the client LW is facing
4

Remark that we are using standard regular expressions to denote the histories and information
set. For example, Q(a|a0 ) represents {Qa, Qa0 }
5
There exists another strategy to claim the truth of the predicate when the predicate is indeed
true, but with invalid proof. This strategy is strictly dominated and would not be adopted at all,
since it neither fools the client, nor get through the verification of contract to get any reward. We
therefore omit it.
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nine information sets6 : I1LW = Q(att|a0 f f ), I2LW = Q(atf |a0 f t), I3LW = Q(at|a0 f )x,
I4LW = Q(af t|a0 tf ), I5LW = Q(af f |a0 tt), I6LW = Q(af |a0 t)x, I7LW = Q(axt|a0 xf ),
I8LW = Q(axf |a0 xt), I9LW = Q(a|a0 )xx. At these information sets, the light client
shall choose a probabilistic polynomial-time ITM to: (i) send a feedback message
back to the contract, and (ii) decide an output. As such, the available actions of the
client at each information set can be interpreted as:
• From I1LW to I5LW , the client receives two response messages from both relays
in time, and it can take an action out of {T, L, R, X} × {A, A0 , O}: T means to
report the arbiter contract Gac both of the response; L (or R) represents that
LW reports to the contract Gac only one response message sent from R1 (or
R2 ); X represents others, including abort; A means to output T rue; A0 is to
output F alse; O denotes to output nothing.
• Through I3LW to I8LW , the client LW receives only one response message from
R1 (or R2 ), and can take an action out of {T, X} × {A, A0 , O}: T means to
report the contract Gac the only response message that it receives; X means to
do others, including abort; A, A0 and O have the same concrete meaning as
before.
• At I9LW , LW receives nothing from the relays in time, it can take an action out
of {T, X} × {A, A0 , O}: T can be translated as to send the contract nothing
until the contract times out, X represents others (for example, trying to crack
digital signature scheme); A, A0 and O still have the same meaning as before.
After all above actions are made, the protocol completes one query, and can go to the
next query, as long as it is not expired or the client does not abort. The protocol’s
game Γk2 (capturing all k queries) can be inductively defined by repeating the above
structure up to k times.
Game structure for one relay. For the case of recruiting only one relay to request
up to k queries, we denote the protocol’s “light-client” game as Γk1 . As shown in
Figure 6.4 (b), it has a repetition structure (i.e., the stage game Γ1 ) similar to the
game Γ2 , except few differences related to the information sets and available actions of
the light client. In particular, when the client receives response from the only relay,
Remark that the histories Qatt and Qa0 f f cannot be distinguished by the light client, because
for the light client, both of them correspond that two claims of T rue. All the nine information sets
of the light client can be translated similarly.
6
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it would face three information sets, namely, Q(at|a0 f ), Q(af |a0 t) and Q(ax|a0 x),
instead of nine in Γ2 . At each information set, the client always can take an action
out of {T, X} × {A, A0 , O}, which has the same interpretation in the game Γ2 . Since
Γ1 is extremely similar to Γ2 , we omit such details here.
What if no incentive? If the arbiter contract facilitates no incentive, the possible
execution result of the protocol can be concretely interpreted due to the economic
aspects of our model, which are:
• When the client is fooled. The client loses $v, and the relay Ri earns $vi . Note
$v is related to the value attached to the chain predicate under query, say the
transacted amount, due to our economic model; and $vi is the malicious benefit
earned by Ri if the client if fooled.
• When the client outputs the ground truth. The relay would not earn any
malicious benefit, and the client would not lose any value attached to the chain
predicate either.
• When the client outputs nothing. The relay would lose $c, which means it will
launch its own (personal) full node to query the chain predicate. In such case,
the relay would not learn any malicious benefit.
It is clear to see that without proper incentives to tune the above outcomes, the game
cannot reach a desired equilibrium to let all parties follow the protocol, because at
least the relays are well motivated to cheat the client. Thus we leverage the deposits
placed by the client and relay(s) to design simple yet still useful incentives in next
subsections, such that we can fine tune the above outcome to realize a utility function
obtaining desired equilibrium, thus achieving security.

6.6.3

Basic Incentive Mechanism

The incentive subroutine takes the feedback message sent from the client as input, and
then facilitates rewards/punishments accordingly. After that, the utility function of
the “light-client game” is supposed to be well tuned to ensure security. Here we will
present such the carefully designed incentive subroutine, and analyze the incentive
makes the “light-client game” secure to what extent.
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Basic incentive for two relays. If two non-cooperative relays can be recruited, the
incentive subroutine takes the feedback message from the client as input, and then
facilitates the incentives following hereunder general principles:
• It firstly verifies whether the feedback from the light client indeed encapsulates
some responses that were originally sent from R1 and/or R2 (w.r.t. the current
chain predicate under query). If feedback contains two validly signed responses,
return $e to the client; If feedback contain one validly signed response, return
$e/2 to the client.
• If a relay claims P`N = T rue with attaching an invalid proof σ, its deposit for
this query (i.e., $dF ) is confiscated and would not receive any payment.
• When a relay sends a response message containing ⊥ to claim P`N = F alse,
there is no succinct proof attesting the claim. The incentive subroutine checks
whether the other relay full node provides a proof attesting P`N = T rue. If the
other relay proves P`N = T rue, the cheating relay loses its deposit this query
(i.e., $dF ) and would not receive any payment. For the other relay that falsifies
the cheating claim of P`N = F alse, the incentive subroutine assigns it some
extra bonuses (e.g., doubled payment).
• After each query, if the contract does not notice a full node is misbehaving (i.e.,
no fake proof for truthness or fake claim of falseness), it would pay the node $p/2
as the basic reward (for the honest full node). In addition, the contract returns
a portion of the client’s initial deposit (i.e., $dL ). Moreover, the contract returns
a portion of each relay’s initial deposit (i.e., $dF ), if the incentive subroutine
does not observe the relay cheats during this query.
The rationale behind the incentive design is straightforward. First, during any query,
the rational light client will always report to the contract whatever the relays actually
forward, since the failure of doing so always causes strictly less utility, no matter
the strategy of the relay full nodes; Second, since the two relay full nodes are noncooperative, they would be incentivized to audit each other, such that the attempt
of cheating the client is deterred. To demonstrate above general reward/punishment
principles of the incentive mechanism are implementable, we concretely instantiate
its pseudocode that are deferred to subsection A.2.1.
Basic incentive for one relay. When any two recruited relays might collude, the
situation turns to be pessimistic, as the light client is now requesting an unknown
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information from only a single distrustful coalition. To argue security in such the
pessimistic case, we consider only one relay in the protocol.

To deal with the

pessimistic case, we tune the incentive subroutine by incorporating the next major
tuning (different from the the incentive for two relays):
• If the relay claims P`N = F alse, its deposit is returned, but it receives a payment
less than $p, namely, $(p − r) where $r ∈ [0, p] is a parameter of the incentive.
• Other payoff rules are same to the basic incentive mechanism for two noncooperative relays.
To demonstrate the above delicately tuned incentive is implementable, we showcase
its pseudocode that is deferred to subsection A.2.2.

6.6.4

Security Analysis for Basic Incentive

Utility function. Putting the financial outcome of protocol executions together with
the incentive mechanism, we can eventually derive the utility functions of game Γk2
and game Γk1 , inductively. The formal definitions of utilities are deferred to Appendix
A.3. Given such utility functions, we can precisely analyze the light-client game Γk2
(and the game Γk1 ) to precisely understand our light-client protocol is secure to what
extent.
Security theorems of basic incentive. For the case of two non-cooperative relays,
the security can be abstracted as Theorem 4:
Theorem 4. If the relays that join the protocol are non-cooperative, there exists a
negl(λ)-sequential equilibrium of Γk2 that can ensure the game Γk2 terminates in a
terminal history belonging Zgood := (QattT A|Qa0 ttT A0 ){k} (i.e., no deviation from
the protocol), conditioned on dF + p/2 > vi , dL > (p + e), and c > p. In addition, the
rational client and the rational relays would collectively set up the protocol, if p > 0.
For the case of one single relay (which models cooperative relays), the security
of the basic incentive mechanism can be abstracted as:
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Theorem 5. In the pessimistic case where is only one single relay (which models a
coalition of relays), there exists a negl(λ)-sequential equilibrium that can ensure the
game Γk1 terminates in Zgood := (QatT A|Qa0 tT A0 ){k} (i.e., no deviation from the
protocol), conditioned on dF +p−r > vi , r > vi , dL > (p+e), and c > p. Moreover, the
rational client and the rational relay would collectively set up the protocol, if p − r > 0
and p > 0.
Interpretations of Theorem 4. The theorem reveals that: conditioned on there
are two non-cooperative relays, the sufficient conditions of security are: (i) the initial
deposit dF of relay node is greater than its malicious benefit vi that can be obtained
by fooling the client; (ii) the initial deposit dL of the client is greater than the payment
p plus another small parameter e; (iii) for the light client, it. The above conclusion
essentially hints us how to safely set up the light-client protocol to instantiate a
cryptocurrency wallet in practice, that is: let the light client and the relays finely tune
and specify their initial deposits, such that the client can query the (non)existence of
any transaction, as long as the transacted amount of the transaction is not greater
than the initial deposit placed by the relay nodes.
Interpretations of Theorem 5. The theorem states that: even in an extremely
hostile scenario where only one single relay exists, deviations are still prevented when
fooling the light client to believe the non-existence of an existing transaction does
not yield better payoff than honestly proving the existence. The statement presents
a feasibility region of our protocol that at least captures many important DApps
(e.g., decentralized messaging apps) in practice, namely: fooling the client is not very
financially beneficial for the relay, and only brings a payoff vi to the relay; so as long
the client prefers to pay a little bit more than vi to read a record in the blockchain,
no one would deviate from the protocol.
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6.6.5

Augmented Incentive

This subsection further discusses the pessimistic scenario that no non-cooperative
relays can be identified, by introducing an extra assumption that: at least one public
full node (denoted by PFN ) can monitor the internal states of the arbiter contract
at a tiny cost ε w.r.t. economic factor (say zero through the dissertation for the
convenience of analysis), and does not cooperate with the only recruited relay. This
extra rationality assumption can boost an incentive mechanism to deter the relay and
client from deviating from the light-client protocol. Here we present this augmented
incentive design, and analyze its security guarantees.
Augmented incentive for one relay. The tuning of the incentive mechanism stems
from the observation that: if there is any public full node that does not cooperate
with the recruited relay (and monitor the internal states of the arbiter contract), it
can stand out to audit a fake claim about P`N = F alse by producing a proof attesting
P`N = T rue. Thus, we slightly tune the incentive subroutine (by adding few lines of
pseudocode), which can be summarized as:
• When a relay forwards a response message containing ⊥ to claim P`N = F alse,
the incentive subroutine shall wait few clock periods (e.g., one). During the
waiting time, the public full node is allowed to send a proof attesting P`N = T rue
in order to falsify a fake claim of P`N = F alse; in this case, the initial deposit dF
of the cheating relay is confiscated and sent to the public full node who stands
out to prove the cheating behavior.
• Other payoff rules are same to the basic incentive mechanism, so do not involve
the public full node.
We defer the formal instantiation of the above augmented incentive mechanism in the
standard pseudocode format to subsection A.2.3.
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Figure 6.5 The induced game G1 , if having a non-cooperative public full node.

6.6.6

Security Analysis for Augmented Incentive

Augmented “light-client game”. By the introduction of the extra incentive
clause, the “light-client game” Γ1 is extended to the augmented light-client game
G1 . As shown in Figure 6.5, the major differences from the original light-client game
Γ1 are two aspects: (i) the public full node (PFN ) can choose to monitor the arbiter
contract (denoted by m) or otherwise (x) in each query, which cannot be told by the
relay node due to the non-cooperation, and (ii) when the ground truth of predicate
is true, if the relay cheats, PFN has an action “debate” by showing the incentive
mechanism a proof attesting the predicate is true, conditioned on having taken action
m.
The security intuition thus becomes clear: if the recruited relay chooses a
strategy to cheat with non-negligible probability, the best strategy of the public full
node is to act m, which on the contrary deters the relay from cheating. In the other
word, the relay at most deviate with negligible probability.
Security theorem of augmented incentive. Now, in the augmented game G1 , if the
recruited relay deviates when the predicate is true with non-negligible probability, the
rational PFN would act m and then d, which will confiscate the initial deposit of the
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relay and deters it from cheating. More precisely, the security due to the augmented
incentive mechanism can be summarized as:
Theorem 6. Given the augmented incentive mechanism, there exists a negl(λ)sequential equilibrium of the augmented light-client game G1 such that it can ensure
the client and the relay would not deviate from the protocol except with negligible
probability, conditioned on dF > vi , dL > (p + e), c > p and a non-cooperative public
full node that can “monitor” the arbiter contract costlessly. Also, the client and the
relay would set up the protocol, if p > 0.
Interpretations of Theorem 6.

The economics behind the theorem can be

translated similarly to Theorem 4.

6.7

Instantiation of the Light-Client Protocol

Here we shed light on the concrete instantiation of the protocol in practice
and emphasize some tips towards feasibility. Though the current permissionless
blockchains (e.g., Ethereum) are suffering from many baby-age limitations (e.g., high
cost of on-chain resources, low throughput, and large latency), a straight instantiation
of our light-client protocol has been arguably practical.
On- and off-chain feasibility. As shown in Table 6.1, we instantiate the protocol
atop Ethereum (with recruiting one relay and using the basic incentive mechanism,
c.f., Section 6.6.4), and measure the costs of repeatedly evaluating five chain predicates
about the (non)existence of different Ethereum transactions.
Due to the simple nature of our protocol, the off-chain cost of the light client
is constant and essentially tiny, as it only needs: (i) to store two public keys, (ii) to
instantiate two secure channels to connect the relay nodes (e.g., the off-chain response
message is < 1KB), (iii) to verify two signatures and to compute a few hashes to few
verify Merkle tree proof(s) in the worst case.
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Table 6.1 An Instantiation (Basic Incentive of One Relay for 5 Ether Transactions)
txid queried for
evaluating (non)existence
0x141989127035...
0x0661d6e95ab1...
0x949ae094deb0...
0x1e39d5b4b46d...
0xfe28a4dffb8e...

Gas of request Size of response
(LW → Gac )
(Ri → LW)
71,120 gas
947 Byte
41,120 gas
951 Byte
41,120 gas
949 Byte
41,120 gas
985 Byte
41,120 gas
951 Byte

Gas of feedback
(LW → Gac )
199,691 gas
251,480 gas
257,473 gas
339,237 gas
248,119 gas

Note: The code is available at https://github.com/yylluu/rational-light-client. These five
transactions under query are included by the Ethereum blockchain, and we choose them from the
blocks having various sizes. For example, the transaction 0x1e39... is in a block having 263
transactions, which indicates the evaluation has captured some worst cases of reading from large
blocks. In lieu of EIP-210 [54] which currently is not available in EVM, we hardcore the needed
blockhashes (in the contract) to measure the actual on-chain overhead (as if EIP-210 is available).

Besides the straightforward off-chain efficiency, the on-chain cost is also low.
Particularly, the client only sends two messages (i.e., request and feedback) to the
contract, which typically costs mere 300k gases in the worst case as shown in Table
6.1. At the time of writing (Jan/13/2020), ether is $143 each [35], and the average
gas price is 10 Gwei [51], which corresponds to a cost of only $0.43.
Latency. If the network diffuse functionality [57] can approximate the latency of
global Internet [10, 58], the delay of our light-client protocol will be dominated
by the limitations of underlying blockchain. The reasons are: (i) many existing
blockchains have limited on-chain resources, and the miners are more willing to pack
the transactions having higher transaction fees [114, 152, 10], and (ii) messaging the
contract suffers from the intrinsic delay caused by underlying consensus. For example,
in Ethereum network at the time of writing, if the light client sets its transactions
at the average gas price (i.e., 9 Gwei), the latency of messaging the contract on
average will include: (i) 10 blocks (about two minutes) [51] for being mined, plus
(ii) a few more blocks for confirmations (another a few minutes) [62]. If the client
expects the protocol to proceed faster, it can set higher gas price (e.g., 22 Gwei per
gas), which causes its messages to be included after 2-3 blocks on average (i.e., about
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30-45 seconds) [51], though the on-chain cost increases by 144%. After all, once the
underlying blockchain goes through the baby-age limitations, the protocol’s latency
can be further reduced to approximate the actual Internet delay.
Who are the relays? The light-client protocol can be deployed in any blockchain
supporting smart contracts. The relays in the protocol can be the full nodes of
the chain (e.g., the full nodes of two competing mining pools) that are seeking
the economic rewards by relaying blockchain readings to the light clients, so it
is reasonable to assume that they can maintain the full nodes to evaluate chain
predicates nearly costlessly. Even in the extremely adversarial environment where
the light client has no confidence in the non-collusion of any two full nodes, the
protocol can still be finely tuned (e.g., increase the rewards) to support at least a
wide range of useful low-value chain predicates.
The initial setup. We explicitly decouple the presentations of “protocol” and
“incentive mechanism” to provide the next insight: the initial deposit is not necessary
to be cryptocurrency as our design, and it can be any form of “collateral”, such as
business reputations and subscriptions; especially, if the “deposit” is publicly known
off the chain, the setup phase also becomes arguably removable, as the light client
has no need to rely on a personal full node to verify the correct on-chain setup of the
initial deposit anymore.
The amount of initial deposits. One might worry that the amount of initial
deposit, especially when considering that the needed initial deposit is linear to the
number of queries to be asked. In practice, a few instantiations can avoid the deposit
from being too large to be feasible. One of those is to let the light client and the relay
node(s) to negotiate before (or during) the setup phase to choose a moderate number
of queries to support, and then they can periodically reset the protocol, which is
feasible as the light client user can afford to periodically reset her personal full node
for a short term to handle the setups. Another possibility, as already mentioned, is
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relying on some external “collateral” (e.g., reputations and subscriptions) to replace
the deposit of cryptocurrency in the protocol.

6.8

Summary

Different from the existing light client protocols in cryptographic settings, this dissertation takes a different path and systematic study the problem in the game-theoretic
setting and solve it via mechanism design. Assuming lightweight nodes and relaying
full nodes are rational, it leverages the smart contract to facilitate a simple incentive
mechanism such that being honest is their best choice, i.e., for their highest utility,
full nodes must faithfully relay blockchain’s states to the light client for being paid.
In a bit more details, after a one time setup with a trusted full node checking the
relay nodes have correctly deposit to the dedicated designed incentive smart contract,
the lightweight client can repeated query. First, it posts detailed specifications about
the query along with a deposit (which is larger than the payment promised for the
query) to the incentive smart contract via a transaction (which can be done because
writing to blockchain is trivial for any Internet nodes including the lightweight ones);
The relay full nodes will see the above transaction in its local ledger replica, and
relay the query results to the lightweight node off-chain for the promised payment;
The lightweight node is incentivized to report to the contract all relayed results that it
receives, otherwise it gets a fine; The contract verifies the correctness of these relayed
results and pay the full nodes accordingly. The amount of the required deposits and
economic punishment if cheating is finely tuned such that the game achieves a desired
refinement of Nash equilibrium. This means, it is guaranteed that (i) the rational full
nodes will relay the blockchain’s states correctly and (ii) a rational lightweight node
would like to pay the full nodes as promised.
These procedures empower a superlight protocol that enables a light client to
recruit several relay full nodes (e.g., one or two) to securely evaluate a general class
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of predicates about the blockchain. To summarize, the core technical contributions
of this Chapter are four-fold.
First, our light-client protocol can be bootstrapped in the rational setting,
efficiently and generically. The protocol is superlight, in the sense that the client
can go off-line and wake up any time to evaluate a general class of chain predicates
at a tiny constant computationally cost; as long as the truthness or falseness of these
chain predicates is reducible to few transactions’ inclusion in the blockchain.
Second, this generic protocol gets rid of the dependency on consensuses and
can be deployed in nearly any permissionless blockchain (e.g., Turing-complete
blockchains [23, 152]) without even velvet forks [157], thus supporting the promising
PoS type of consensuses.
Third, it conducts a systematic study to understand whether, or to what
extent, the light-client protocol is secure in the rational setting (without trusted
third-parties). It makes non-trivial analyses of the incomplete-information extensive
game induced by our light-client protocol and conduct a comprehensive study to
understand how to design the incentives to achieve security in different scenarios,
from the standard setting of non-cooperative full nodes to the pessimistic setting of
colluding full nodes.
Finally, the protocol enables the rational client to evaluate non-existence of a
given transaction besides the existence, i.e., the rational client can be convinced by
the rational full nodes that a given transaction is not in the blockchain. That provides
a simple way to performing non-existence “proof”. In contrast, relevant studies in the
cryptographic setting either give up non-existence proof [114, 83] or have to heavily
modify the blockchain’s data structure [18, 110].
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CHAPTER 7
OTHER PERTINENT RESULTS

Besides focusing on decentralized applications for specific crowdsourcing scenarios, it
also initiates a few other relevant studies, ranging from various high-level decentralized
application to the underlying core blockchain techniques, thus inferring a much larger
scope of the research (c.f., Chapter 8 for more details on the future vision). Here down
below are some brief discussions on these preliminary results.
Decentralized content delivery with strong fairness [72]. P2P content
delivery is thought of a cost-saving alternative to replace existing content delivery
network (CDN), the latter of which suffers from extremely high cost. Nevertheless,
to ensure P2P content delivery to function as expected, it does require to enforce
carefully designed incentive mechanism to ensure fairness among the participants,
that means each participant earns proportional to what it contributes. Most existing
P2P content delivery frameworks either only achieve weaker versions of fairness or rely
on unrealistic assumptions that are elusive in practice. Here it designs a decentralized
content delivery system atop the blockchain. This system satisfies the fairness for the
content owner, the deliverer, and the consumer, each of which can enjoy guaranteed
fairness against the other two (probably colluding) parties. For the first time, it
achieves a stronger and realistically meaningful notion of fairness, such that the
content deliverer would be paid (nearly) proportional to the bandwidth that it uses,
despite the influence of the malicious consumer and the malicious content owner.
This system still remains high efficiency and attains low on-chain computational cost,
which is close to optimal. Especially in the optimistic case that all parties are honest,
the on-chain is as small as a few US cents.
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Privacy-preserving decentralized retailer gift card ledger [100]. Though
the retailer gift card has been an ultra-practical marketing tactic to attract customers
to spend more, it on the contrary also places a great number of customers in
troublesome situations due to its current limitations. First, dealing with unwanted gift
cards is often time-consuming, costly or even risky due to the frequent occurrences
of gift card resale frauds. Worse still, the issuance and redemption of gift cards
happen inside the retailer as in a “black-box”, indicating that a compromised retailer
can cheat customers (or even third-party auditors) to deny the issuances of some
unredeemed gift cards. This paper proposes a practical middle-layer solution based
on blockchain to address the fundamental issues of the existing gift card system, with
incurring minimal changes to the current infrastructure. In addition, it enjoy other
needed security requirements such as (i) keeping the gift card balances confidential
against corrupted blockchain nodes and (ii) maintaining easy giftability such that any
cards can be gifted without knowing the recipient’s public key.
Optimal validated asynchronous Byzantine agreement (VABA) [97].
VABA is fundamental for critical atomic broadcast in the asynchronous network
[24], and turns to be a needed building block for achieving consortium blockchain
in the unstable global Internet environment. It was left as an open problem to
asymptotically reduce the O(`n2 + λn2 + n3 ) communication (where n is the number
of parties, ` is the input length, and λ is the security parameter). Recently, [1]
removed the n3 term to partially answer the question only if the input is small in size.
However, in many other typical use-cases, for example, building atomic broadcast
around VABA, the needed input length (of VABA) ` shall be larger than λn, and
thus the communication is still dominated by the `n2 term so does not fully answer the
open problem raised in [24]. This work fills the gap and answers the remaining part of
the open problem by presenting two VABA protocols with O(`n+λn2 ) communicated
bits without scarifying optimal fault-tolerance and optimal message complexity, which
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immediately corresponds to a better way to realizing robust yet still high-performing
consortium blockchain suitable for the fluctuating real-world Internet.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION

8.1

Conclusion

To reduce over-reliance on third-party platforms in the traditional crowdsourcing
sector, it becomes enticing to use the novel blockchain technologies and seek for the
rising decentralization paradigm. However, if decentralized crowdsourcing is naively
engineered, the inherent restrictions of the blockchain might backfire and greatly harm
the basic utilities of these trivial designs. There still remains a huge gap between the
ideal end-goals of decentralized crowd-sharing economy and the problematic prior art
of blockchain-based crowdsourcing applications.
Noticing that huge gap, this dissertation proposes a package of secure yet
still efficient solutions to go through the intrinsic issues of blockchains, such that
one can achieve truely meaningful decentralized crowdsourcing in practice, which
means: (i) the basic utilities can be guaranteed with high security assurance, despite
of the influence of attacks launched by (probably any) Internet nodes through the
open blockchain network; (ii) the system remains highly feasible, although necessary
security-driven designs have to be added for the provably secure utilities. In short,
the dissertation focuses on the following two main categories of applications.
On the one hand, Chapters 3 and 4 initiate the study of private knowledge
solicitation atop the blockchain.

This line of research identifies privacy as an

indispensable security requirement to make decentralized knowledge solicitation
meaningful; otherwise, the well-known transparency of blockchain would open new
attack surface to allow literally anyone to free-ride (namely, reap credits without
contributing), which further causes that no rational users would contribute highquality data anymore and results in sorta tragedy of the commons to completely fail
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the system. Chapter 3 proposes ZebraLancer to adapt the advanced zero-knowledge
proof framework (zk-SNARK) to let the requester prove the quality of encrypted
answers, which achieves critical on-chain efficiency due to constant proof size and
nearly constant verification time; Chapter 4 proposes Dragoon to further improve
this result by designing a special-purpose proving scheme for the concrete quality
rules widely adopted by Amazon’s MTurk, thus improving the efficiency by a few
orders of magnitude without scarifying privacy. More surprisingly, Dragoon is so
efficient that it is on-chain handling cost can be less than the handling fee charged
by Amazon MTurk for the same ImageNet tasks.
On the other hand, Chapters 5 and 6 initiate systematic studies on decentralized
solicitation of “computing resources”. The challenges of decentralized crowdsourcing
of computing power stem from the fact that the blockchain has to validate the
(dis)honesty of computations off the blockchain, otherwise the recruited workers
can earn rewards without committing any actual efforts. Traditional solutions to
resolve the challenges (in the cryptographic setting) require advanced cryptographic
primitives such as verifiable computation, the state-of-art of which, unfortunately,
is far from being practical for complex computations. For real-world practicality,
this dissertation explicitly deviates from conventional cryptographic approaches, and
seeks for mitigation in the game-theoretic setting. At high-level, the selfishness of
non-cooperative workers is leveraged to audit each other. When some workers is
misbehaving, the other non-colluding workers would report to a dedicatedly designed
smart contract about the misbehavior and instruct the contract to punish. Eventually,
the designs realize some desirable refinements of Nash equilibrium, under which no
rational parties would deviate from being honest and thus ensure the desired outcome
despite of adversarial behaviors.
These results not only bridge the gap towards the end-goal of deploying
meaningful decentralized crowdsourcing in reality, but also turn to be promising to
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bootstrap blockchains themselves to conquer their own issues, for example, to support
complicated smart contracts and to enable superlight clients.

8.2

Reflection

More generally, this dissertation develops and demonstrates two distinct methodologies to simultaneously achieve the critical security and efficiency required by the
decentralized applications atop (permissionless) blockchains.
In the cryptographic model, it showcases that specific-purpose optimizations
for concrete decentralization can be dedicated to significantly reduce the
cryptographic overhead incurred by the indispensable security requirements such as
privacy (see Chapters 3 and 4 for hints). In particular, by considering the specific
demands of real-world use-cases, some concretely efficient solutions can be worked
out for real-world problems. The idea behind the methodology is to remove needless
generality in specific circumstances, thus achieving high efficiency while remaining
any indispensable security guarantees.
In the game-theoretic setting, it demonstrates that secure decentralization
can be efficiently attained via proper incentive mechanisms through using
smart contracts and cryptocurrencies. In contrast to the cryptographic setting where
an implicit adversary can corrupt and fully control some participating parties to
arbitrarily misbehave, the game-theoretic approach considers that each party neither
completely honest nor arbitrarily malicious, but is rational to seek for its own highest
benefits. Embracing this game-theoretic methodology, Chapters 5 and 6 consider
how to design proper incentives atop the blockchain to (i) recruit computing power
for machine learning tasks and (ii) employ blockchain full nodes to relay blockchain
readings, respectively. These game-theoretic solutions are much more efficient than
the best so-far solutions in the conventional cryptographic setting.
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The previous two methodologies essentially correspond to a couple of general
ways that can be applied for a broader array of decentralized applications to achieve
indispensable security as well as real-world practicability.
In greater detail, the research can immediately benefits many categories of
decentralized applications in much larger scope. First, the methodologies in this
research could be leveraged to handle the decentralized crowdsourcing of various
physical resources. One remarkable example is the decentralized crowdsourcing of
Internet bandwidth, which could be further augmented to attain the ideal goal
of decentralized peer-to-peer content delivery network [72] in order to reduce the
high usage cost of existing content delivery networks. Second, the results about
decentralized knowledge crowdsourcing can be directly borrowed to bootstrap the
desired decentralized data marketplace, since the key methodologies would also be
valid solutions to solve the critical privacy and fairness issues in the decentralized
version of data marketplace. As such, individuals can expect a secure and anonymous
way to sell their personal information to certain parties.

Third, this research

(in particular, Zebralancer) provides an insight on how to achieve an anonymous
blockchain-based auction platform in a meaningful way. In an anonymous auction
protocol, the major challenge is that some malicious users might leverage the
anonymity to flood bids to manipulate the auction’ outcome. The common-prefix
linkable anonymous authentication scheme could be the key to prevent those
malicious behaviors. Finally, the methods (e.g., the special-purpose cryptographic
optimizations) also shed light on how to implement a few interesting applications
in the sector of decentralized finance, securely yet still efficiently. One example can
be private blockchain-based gift cards [100]. This dedicatedly optimized system can
enable the retailers to shift their gift card management databases on the blockchain,
without scarifying the indispensable confidentiality or the critical efficiency.
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8.3

Future Vision

Open problems. Though this dissertation presents a few newest results on decentralized crowdsourcing, this novel paradigm (along with the underlying blockchain
technology) is still quickly developing, and the relevant area is also largely unexplored.
In particular, a few immediate follow-up studies can be carried out to extend the
functionalities and securities from various perspectives.
One promising direction is to conduct more specific-purpose designs to efficiently
decentralize distinct flavors of crowdsourcing. For example, can we design a concretely
efficient protocol to decentralize participatory crowd-sensing that is minimally
meaningful with the needed fairness and privacy? Such the problem is challenging,
since there is no explicit requester to “prove” the quality of encrypted data anymore.
Unfortunately, letting the blockchain learn encrypted data’s quality (without a
prover) falls into the category of (multi-input) functional encryption [66, 19], which
is unclear how can be solved practically till today.
In addition, this dissertation considers the security of decentralized knowledge
crowdsourcing due to conventional cryptographic notions, in which the corrupted
parties are fully controlled by an adversary and the honest parties will be honest to
follow the protocol independently. This model has an inherent drawback to explain
why rational workers would not deviate (e.g., by colluding together to free-ride).
To address this realistic concern, an “incentive-compatible” protocol is required, so
“following the protocol” is a Nash equilibrium (or its refinement) that can deter
rational workers from deviating.
Another appealing future work is to explore decentralized crowdsourcing for
more physical resources, for example, the bandwidth. In particular, the decentralized
crowdsourcing of bandwidth resources could be considered as a novel P2P content
delivery paradigm based on blockchain for the needed fairness, namely, an Internet
users can be well paid iff it honestly delivers contents on behalf of the content owners.
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Such a bandwidth crowdsourcing paradigm could be further considered as the final
piece of the puzzle to complete the P2P storage network [124, 108], which only
guarantees the storage of content but not the delivery.
Finally, it becomes an urgent open problem to consider the composability
of collateral in crypto-economic protocols.

Say all protocols in this dissertation

requires participants to place considerable deposits for security. What is more, many
crypto-economic protocols (e.g., PoS blockchains [81, 38, 63] and payment channels
[107, 49] already introduce a few locked deposits, and it becomes enticing to explore
the composability of using the same collateral in many crypto-economic protocols,
without scarifying the securities of all. Collateral composability is critical to bootstrap
the wider adoption of crypto-economic protocols in reality, as it allows the participants
to conveniently enjoy the benefits of all protocols after merely placing a single piece
of deposit.
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Figure 8.1 Trade-off between performance and decentralization.
Permissionless v.s. permissioned? Though the main results of this dissertation
are initiated to adapt the extremely adversarial environment of so-called permis137

sionless blockchains (in which any Internet node can dynamically join and leave), they
can be directly migrated to fit the so-called consortium blockchains (e.g., permissioned
blockchains) where the consensuses are maintained collectively by a set of pre-selected
parties with known identities.
Taking this in mind, it is straightforward to ask: when some practitioners
are implementing the protocols in the dissertation, which underlying infrastructure
shall they choose, the permissionless or the permissioned? Currently, it is actually
a choice between performance (e.g., throughput and latency) and decentralization
(e.g., scalability and robustness), as briefly illustrated in Figure 8.1. In particular,
most existing permissionless blockchains are low-performing while being highly robust
and scalable; in contrast, most existing permissioned blockchains are usually better
performing but is much less robust and small in scale. Thus, in performance-aware
scenarios, the permissioned blockchains could be preferred, while in robustness-critical
cases, the permissionless infrastructure would be more desired.
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the blockchains, no matter the permissioned
or the permissionless, are at their baby age and might be greatly improved through
more groundbreaking efforts. In particular, in light of a few recent breakthroughs of
Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols [68, 97, 156, 109], it is rather promising to improve
the scalability of permissioned blockchains for large-scale. It, therefore, could be
envisioned that the (permissioned) blockchains can soon break the current barrier of
performance-decentralization trade-off, so in the near future, practitioners no longer
have to sacrifice either decentralization or performance as they have to nowadays.
The previous two methodologies essentially correspond to a couple of general
ways that can be applied for a broader array of decentralized applications to achieve
indispensable security as well as real-world practicaliblity, instead of being restricted
to the crowdsourcing use-cases discussed in this dissertation.
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APPENDIX
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 6

A.1

Merkle Tree Algorithms

Figure A.1, A.2 and A.3 are the deferred algorithms related to Merkle tree. A Merkle
tree (denoted by MT) is a binary tree: (i) the i-th leaf node is labeled by H(txi ), where
H is a cryptographic hash function; (ii) any non-leaf node in the Merkle tree is labeled
by the hash of the labels of its siblings. BuildMT(·) takes a sequence of transactions
as input, and outputs a Merkle tree whose root commits these transactions. GenMTP
takes a Merkle tree MT and a transaction tx as input, and can generate a Merkle
tree proof π for the inclusion of tx in the tree. Finally, VrfyMTP takes H(tx), the
tree root, and the Merkle proof π, and can output whether H(tx) labels a leaf of the
Merkle tree MT.

BuildMT algorithm
BuildMT(TX = (tx1 , · · · , txn )):
• if |TX| = 1:
– label(root) = H(tx1 )
• else:
– lchild = BuildMT(tx1 , . . . , txdn/2e )
– rchild = BuildMT(txdn/2e+1 , . . . , txn )
– label(root) = H(label(lchild)||label(rchild))
• return Merkle tree M T with root
Figure A.1 BuildMT that generates a Merkle tree with root for TX = (tx1 , · · · , txn ).
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GenMTP algorithm
GenMTP(MT, tx):
• x ← the leaf node labeled by H(tx)
• while x 6= label(MT.root):
–
–
–
–
–

lchild ← x.parent.lchild
rchild ← x.parent.rchild
if x = lchild, bi ← 0, li = label(rchild)
otherwise, bi ← 1, li = label(lchild)
x ← x.parent

• return π = ((li , bi ))i∈[1,n]
Figure A.2 GenMTP that generates a Merkle tree proof.

VrfyMTP algorithm
VrfyMTP(lable(root), π, H(tx)):
• parse π as a list ((li , bi ))i∈[1,n]
• x = H(tx)
• for i in [1, n]:
– if bi = 0, x ← H(x||li ), else x ← H(li ||x)
• if x 6= lable(root), return F alse, otherwise return
T rue
Figure A.3 VrfyMTP that verifies a Merkle tree proof.

A.2

Deferred Formal Description of Incentive Subroutines

Here are the deferred proofs for the security theorems in Chapter 6. These proofs
complete the analysis for the basic incentive mechanism for two relays, the basic
incentive for single relay, and the augmented incentive for single relay.
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A.2.1

Basic Incentive for the Protocol with Two Relays

Figure A.4, A.5 and A.6 showcase that the basic incentive mechanism for two relays
is implementable, when given the validateTrue algorithm. Figure A.5 presents the
detailed incentive clauses when the client feeds back two validly signed response
messages from both recruited relays (clause 1-6). Figure A.6 presents how to deal
with the scenario where the client only feeds back one validly signed response message
from only relay (clause 7-9). Note that $r is a parameter used to deter the collusion
of two relays, which could be better illustrated later by the incentive for one single
relay (that models colluding relays essentially).
Incentive subroutine for two non-cooperative relays
Incentive(responses, P`N ):
if |responses| = 2 then
parse {(resulti , sigi )}i∈{1,2} := responses
if vrfySig(hresulti , ctri, sigi , pk1 ) = 1 for each i ∈ [1, 2]
call Payout(result1 , result2 , P`N ) subroutine in Figure A.5
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL
return
if |responses| = 1 then
parse {(resulti , sigi )} := responses
if vrfy(resulti ||ctr, sigi ) = 1
call Payout0 (resulti , P`N ) subroutine in Figure A.6
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL
return
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $dF
ledger[R|1−i| ] := ledger[R|1−i| ] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL

Figure A.4 Incentive subroutine (two non-cooperative relays).
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Payout subroutine
Payout(result1 , result2 , P`N ):
if result1 can be parsed as σ1 then
if validateTrue(σ1 , P`N ) = 1 then
if result2 can be parsed as σ2 then
if validateTrue(σ2 , P`N ) = 1 then // Clause 1
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $( p2 + dF ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e)
else // i.e., validateTrue(σ2 , P`N ) = 0 // Clause 2
ledger[R1 ] := ledger[R1 ] + $(p + 23 dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e + d2F )
else // i.e., result2 = ⊥ // Clause 3
ledger[R1 ] := ledger[R1 ] + $(p + 23 dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e +

dF
2

)

else // i.e., validateTrue(σ1 , P`N ) = 0
if result2 can be parsed as σ2 then
if validateTrue(σ2 , P`N ) = 1 then // Clause 2
ledger[R2 ] := ledger[R2 ] + $(p + 23 dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e + d2F )
else // i.e., validateTrue(σ2 , P`N ) = 0 // Clause 4
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p + e + 2dF )
else // i.e., result2 = ⊥ // Clause 5
ledger[R1 ] := ledger[R1 ] + $( p2 − r + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( p2 + e + r + dF )
else // i.e., result1 = ⊥
if result2 can be parsed as σ2 then
if validateTrue(σ2 , P`N ) = 1 then // Clause 3
ledger[R2 ] := ledger[R2 ] + $(p + 3d2F )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e + d2F )
else // i.e., validateTrue(σ2 , P`N ) = 0 // Clause 5
ledger[R2 ] := ledger[R2 ] + $( p2 − r + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( p2 + e + r + dF )
else // i.e., result2 = ⊥ // Clause 6
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $( p2 − r + dF ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e + 2r)

Figure A.5 Payout subroutine called by Figure A.4.
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Payout0 subroutine
Payout0 (resulti , P`N ):
if resulti can be parsed as σi then
if validateTrue(σi , P`N ) = 1 then // Clause 7
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $(p + dF )
ledger[R|1−i| ] := ledger[R|1−i| ] + $(dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( 2e )
else // i.e., validateTrue(σi , P`N ) = 0 // Clause 8
ledger[R|1−i| ] := ledger[R|1−i| ] + $(dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( p+e
2 +

dF
2

)

else // i.e., resulti = ⊥ // Clause 9
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $( p2 − r + dF )
ledger[R|1−i| ] := ledger[R|1−i| ] + $(dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $( 2e + r)

Figure A.6 Payout0 subroutine called by Figure A.4.

A.2.2

Basic Incentive for the Protocol with Single Relay

When the protocol is participated by the light client and one single relay node (which
models that the client does not believe there are non-cooperative relays), we tune
the incentive to let the only relay node to audit itself by “asymmetrically” pay the
proved claim of truthness and the unproved claim of falseness (with an extra protocol
parameter r), and thus forwarding the correct evaluation result of the chain predicate
becomes dominating. In general, the incentive mechanism for one single relay is
similar to the case of two relays. Moreover, as shown earlier, the incentive parameter
r can also be incorporated into the two-relay case to deter the collusion of relays. Here
we describe the case of one single relay as an over-simplified modeling to capture the
effect of two completely cooperative relays (that can act as a single coalition), which
allows us to better illustrate the idea of using r to deter collusion.

143

Incentive subroutine for one single relay
Incentive(responses, P`N ):
if |responses| = 1 then
parse {(resulti , sigi )} := responses
if vrfy(resulti ||ctr, sigi ) = 1
if resulti can be parsed as σi then
if validateTrue(σi , P`N ) = 1 then
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $(p + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $e
else // i.e., validateTrue(σi , P`N ) = 0
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p + e + dF )
else // i.e., resulti = ⊥
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $(p − r + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(e + r)
return
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL

Figure A.7 Incentive subroutine for the protocol with (one single relay).

A.2.3

Augmented Incentive for the Protocol with Single Relay

Here is the augmented incentive mechanism for the protocol with one single relay.
Different from the aforementioned idea of using “asymmetric” incentive to create
“self-audition”, we explicitly allow the additional public full nodes to audit the relay
node in the system. To do so, the incentive subroutine has to wait for some “debating”
message sent from the public full nodes (that are monitoring the internal states of the
contract at a tiny cost), after it receives the feedback from the client about what the
relay node does forward. If the relay node is cheating to claim a fake unprovable side,
the public can generate a proof attesting that the relay was dishonest, thus allowing
the contract to punish the cheating relay and reward the public node and return the
payments to the light client.
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Incentive subroutine for one single relay
Incentive(responses, P`N ):
if |responses| = 1 then
parse {(resulti , sigi )} := responses
if vrfy(resulti ||ctr, sigi ) = 1
if resulti can be parsed as σi then
if validateTrue(σi , P`N ) = 1 then
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $(p + dF )
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $e
else // i.e., validateTrue(σi , P`N ) = 0
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p + e + dF )
else // i.e., resulti = ⊥
Tdebate := T + ∆T
debate := P`N
return
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $dL

Debate. Upon receiving (debating, P`N , σpf n ) from PFN :
assert debate 6= ∅ and debate = P`N
if validateTrue(σpf n , P`N ) = 1 then:
ledger[PF N ] := ledger[PF N ] + $dF
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $(p + e)
debate := ∅
Timer. Upon T ≥ Tdebate and debate 6= ∅:
ledger[Ri ] := ledger[Ri ] + $(dF + p)
ledger[LW] := ledger[LW] + $e
debate := ∅

Figure A.8 Augmented Incentive subroutine (a single relay) with assuming a noncolluding public full node (in the whole blockchain network).

A.3

Inductive Definition of Utility Functions

Let h denote a history in Γk2 the to represent the beginning of a reachable query, at
which the LW moves to determine whether to abort or not, and then chance, R1 ,
R2 and LW sequentially move. Then the utilities of LW, R1 and R2 can be defined
recursively as shown in Table A.1, A.2 and A.3.
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Table A.1 Recursive Definition of Utility of Γk2 (Continued in Table A.2)
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Table A.2 Recursive Definition of Utility of Γk2 (Continued from Table A.1)
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4
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5
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6
ILW
0
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LA0

d

-

-

RA0

e + dF
uLW (h) + dL − p
− 2
2
2

-

-
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uLW (h) + dL − p − e

-

-
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uLW (h) + dL − v − p + 2r

LA0

e +r
uLW (h) + dL − v − p − 2

− r + dF
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2
-
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2
-
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e +r
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-

-
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uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e

-

T A0

uLW (h) + dL − p + 2r

− r + dF
uR1 (h) + p
2

uR2 (h) + p
− r + dF
2

LA0

e +r
uLW (h) + dL − p − 2

-

-
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-

-
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uLW (h) + dL − p − e

-

-
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e +r
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− r + dF
2

uR2 (h) + v2 + dF

XA0

uLW (h) + dL − v − p − e
e +r
uLW (h) + dL − p − 2

uR1 (h) + p
− r + dF
2

uR2 (h) + dF

XA0

uLW (h) + dL − p − e

-

-

T A0

e
uLW (h) + dL − v − p − 2

uR1 (h) + v1 + dF

uR2 (h) + v2 + p + dF

T A0

-

XA0
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-

-

uR1 (h) + dF
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XA0
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-

-
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-
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2
-
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uR2 (h) + p
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2

XA0
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-

-
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uR1 (h) + v1
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d
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7
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9
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d

d

147

Table A.3 Recursive Definition of Utility of Γk2 (Continued from Tables A.1 and A.2)
Info Set

Histories

Actions

of LW

of LW

of LW

Utility of LW

Utility of R1

Utility of R2

uLW (h) − c − p

uR1 (h) + p
+ dF
2

uR2 (h) + p
+ dF
2

LO

uLW (h) − c − p − e

-

-

RO

uLW (h) − c − p − e

-

-

XO

uLW (h) − c − p − e + 

-

-

TO

uLW (h) − c + 2dF

uR1 (h)

uR2 (h)

-

-

-

-

TO
hQatt
1
ILW

hQa0 f f

hQatf
2
ILW

hQa0 f t

hQatx
3
ILW

hQa0 f x

hQaf t
4
ILW
0

hQa tf

RO

e + dF
uLW (h) − c − p
− 2
2
2
p
e + dF
uLW (h) − c − 2 − 2
2

XO

uLW (h) − c − p − e + 

LO

TO

uLW (h) − c − p +

LO

uLW (h) − c − p −

5
ILW

hQa0 tt

hQaf x
6
ILW

hQa0 tx

hQaxt
7
ILW

hQa0 xf

hQaxf

-

uR1 (h) + p +

uR2 (h)

-

-

uLW (h) − c − p −

-

-

XO

uLW (h) − c − p − e

-

-

TO

uLW (h) − c − p
+ r + dF
2

uR1 (h)

uR2 (h) + p
− r + dF
2

-

-

-

-

p
2

r
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− 2
2
e +r
− 2

LO

uLW (h) − c −

RO

uLW (h) − c − p
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uLW (h) − c − p − e

-
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e
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-

-
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− 2
2
2

uR1 (h)

uR2 (h) + dF
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-

-
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uR1 (h)

d
uR2 (h) + p + 3 2F
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-

-
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We make the following remarks about the recursive definition of the utilities: (i)
when h := ∅, set uLW (h) := 0, uR1 (h) := 0, and uR2 (h) := 0; (ii) uLW (h) = uLW (h) +
dL and the utility functions depict the final outcomes of the players, when |h| = 6k
(i.e., the protocol expires); (iii) when the chance choose a and the lightweight client
outputs A0 , or when the chance choose a0 and the lightweight client outputs A, the
light client is fooled, which means its utility increment shall subtract v, and the utility
increments of R1 and R2 shall add v1 := v1 (P1h , C) and v2 := v2 (P1h , C) respectively;
(iv) when the light client outputs O, which means the client decides to setup its own
full node and c is subtracted from its utility increment to reflect the cost. Also note
that if two non-cooperative relays R1 and R2 share no common conflict of cheating
the light client, one more constrain is applied to ensure v1 (P1h , C) · v2 (P1h , C) = 0.
The utility functions of game Γk1 and Gk1 can be inductively defined similarly.

A.4
A.4.1

Deferred Proofs for Security Theorems

Proof for Theorem 4

Lemma 2. If the client raises a query in the game Γk2 , the sequentially rational
strategies of the light client LW (under any belief system) will not include L, R and
X (i.e., the light client will always take T to report the contract the whatever it receives
from the relay nodes) in this query.
Proof. It is clear to see the Lemma from the recursive formulation of the utility
function of LW. Because no matter at any history of any information set, taking an
action including L, R or X is dominated by replacing the character by T .
Lemma 3. At the last query (history h) in the game Γk2 , if the client raises the last
query (i.e., reaching the history hQ), when R1 and R2 are non-cooperative, the game
terminates in hQ(attT A|a0 ttT A0 ), conditioned on dF +

p
2

> vi .

Proof. Let the history h denote any history where is the turn of the light client
to choose from {Q, B}.

If the client raises the query due to Lemma 6, it
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can be seen that the only reachable histories from h must have the prefix of:
hQ(a|a0 )(t|f |x)(t|f |x)T (A|A0 |O).
Say hQ(a|a0 )(t|f |x)(t|f |x)T (A|A0 |O) terminates the game, and w.l.o.g. let Ri
choose to deviate from t. Due to such the strategy of Ri , a belief system of Rj
consistent with that has to assign some non-negligible probability to the history
corresponding that Ri takes an action off t, so the best response of Rj after h is
also to take action t according to the utility definitions. Then we can reason the
sequential rationality backwardly: in any information set of the full nodes, the best
response of the relay full nodes is to take action t. Thus the strategy of Ri consistent
to Rj ’s strategy must act t. Note the joint strategy ~σ that R1 and R2 always choose
the action of t and the LW always chooses the strategy of T . For the light client, its
belief system consistent with the fact must assign the probability of 1 to hQatt out of
the information set of I1LW and the probability of 1 to hQa0 tt out of the information
set of I5LW . Conditioned on such the belief, the light client must choose T A in I1LW
and choose T A0 in I5LW . This completes the proof for the lemma.

Deferred proof for Theorem 4:
Proof. At the last query in the game Γk2 , the client will raise the query (namely act
Q), conditioned on dL > (p + e). Additionally from Lemma 3, it nearly immediately
proves the Theorem 4 due to backward reduction. To prove, there is only one more
step of backward reduction to see that: (i) the rational light client must raise a query
through the protocol when c > p, and (ii) rational parties are incentivized to setup
the protocol (as the light client avoids the cost of maintaining its own personal full
node and the relay full node will get positive payments).

150

A.4.2

Proof for Theorem 5

Lemma 4. If the client raises a query in the game Γk1 , the sequentially rational
strategies of the light client LW (under any belief system) will not include X (i.e.,
the light client will always take T to report the contract the whatever it receives from
the relay nodes) in this query.
Proof. No matter at any history of any information set, taking an action including
X is dominated by replacing the character by T , which is clear from the utility
function.
Lemma 5. At the last query (history h) in the game Γk1 , if the client raises the
last query (i.e., reaching the history hQ), the game terminates in hQ(atT A|a0 tT A0 ),
conditioned on dF + p − r > vi , r > vi .
Proof. Let the history h denote the beginning of the last query. If the client raises
the query, the game reaches hQ. Due to Lemma 6, it can be seen that the only
reachable histories from h must have the prefix of: hQ(a|a0 )(t|f |x)T (A|A0 |O). Then
it is immediate to see t is dominating from the utility function. This completes the
lemma.

Deferred proof for Theorem 5:
Proof. From Lemma 5, acting Q is strictly dominates B due to the utility function,
at least in the last query. The last query would include no deviation at all. It (nearly)
immediately allows us prove the Theorem 5 due to backward reduction from Lemma
5. To prove, there is only one more step of backward reduction to see that, which
can be derived because: (i) the rational light client must raise a query through the
protocol when c > p, and (ii) rational parties are incentivized to setup the protocol
(as the light client avoids the cost of maintaining its own personal full node and the
relay full node will get positive payments).
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A.4.3

Proof for Theorem 6

Lemma 6. If the client raises a query in the augmented game Gk1 , the sequentially
rational strategies of the light client LW (under any belief system) will not include X
(i.e., the light client will always take T to report the contract the whatever it receives
from the relay nodes) in this query.
Proof. No matter how the relay and the public full node act, acting X is dominated
by replacing the character by T in the augmented game Gk1 .
Lemma 7. At the last query (history h) in the game Gk1 , if the client raises the last
query (i.e., reaching the history h(m|x)Q), the relay node would not deviate off t with
non-negligible probability, conditioned on dF > vi .
Proof. Let the history h denote any history where is the turn of the light client
to choose from {Q, B}.

If the client raises the query due to Lemma 6, it

can be seen that the only reachable histories from h must have the prefix of:
h(m|x)Q(a|a0 )(t|f |x)T (A|A0 |O). Given such fact, the relay would not deviate off
t with non-negligible probability: (i) deviating from the protocol to play x is strictly
dominated; (ii) deviating to play f with negligible probability will consistently cause
the public full node acts m. This completes the lemma.

Deferred proof for Theorem 6:
Proof. From Lemma 7, acting Q is strictly dominates B due to the utility function,
at least in the last query. Thus we can argue due to backward reduction from the last
query to the first query. It (nearly) immediately completes the proof for Theorem 6.
To prove, there is only one more step of backward reduction to see rational parties are
incentivized to setup the protocol (as the light client avoids the cost of maintaining
its own personal full node to evaluate chain predicates and the relay full node will
get positive payments).
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